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Essays & Comments:
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

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Things to Come

The Shape of the New World Order

James Kurth

THE LAST two years have seen more history made, and unmade, than the previous two generations. The great events in Eastern Europe in 1989–90 together add up to the greatest transformation in Europe since the end of World War II. Indeed, they repealed many of the results of that war. The great events in the Persian Gulf in 1990–91 together add up to the greatest transformation of America's international reputation since the Vietnam War and the OPEC revolution. Here, too, recent events repealed many of the results of that war and that revolution.

With so much history in so short a time, it is not surprising that there is no agreement on what it will all mean in terms of America's role in the world. In the year between the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the invasion of Kuwait, it seemed that economic power would dominate the future, with leadership falling to Japan and Germany. Then, in the months of the Gulf Crisis and War, it seemed again that military power would dominate the future, with leadership returning to the United States. Now, as both the dust from the fall of the Wall and the sand from Desert Storm settle, there is an opportunity, and a necessity, to try to perceive the shape of things to come.

James Kurth is a professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

We shall soon see a great drama involving two distinct conceptions or paradigms of international order. The first is a global conception, expounded by the United States for much of this century and now advanced once again as the New World Order. The second is a regional conception, or, more exactly, two variations on a regional theme. One of these centers on Germany and Central Europe, the other on Japan and East Asia.

The Second Coming of One World

OF COURSE, many political commentators think that the phrase "New World Order" means nothing at all; it comes, after all, from a president famous for his ridicule of "the vision thing." Yet the phrase is only the latest in a series of expressions of the most solid and established American tradition in world affairs. The phrases used have changed with the circumstances of the time and have included "A World Safe for Democracy," "One World," "Free World," and now, "New World Order." But the content of that tradition has remained largely the same since the second decade of this century—or, as yet another of these phrases would have it, the American Century.

That tradition addresses the organization of both the world economy and international security. In the case of the economy, the tradition has been international liberalism: liberal states, particularly those in North

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America and Western Europe, support market forces within an open international economy. This is the GATT model, after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade established in 1948. In the case of international security, the tradition has been collective security and nuclear deterrence: the United States contains Soviet military aggression, particularly in Western Europe, by the threat of nuclear response. This is the NATO model, after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established in 1949.

In 1945, of course, the United States had hoped that its great victory in World War II would bring about a liberal international order that would be truly global. But the completeness of the American triumph and the liberal order was ruined first by the Soviet Union and then by the communist revolutions in Asia. By 1950, the visions of the United Nations and One World had been reduced to the realities of GATT, NATO, and the Free World. Indeed, by 1960, One World had split into the First, Second, and Third Worlds.

THE EVENTS of the last two years have reversed this melancholy history. The collapse of the Soviet threat has meant the removal of the major obstacle in the Second World to the American conception of One World. Similarly, the defeat of Iraq has meant the removal of a major obstacle in the Third World to that conception. But these events not only removed external obstacles, they also dissolved internal hesitations within America itself. The collapse of the Soviet threat repealed the great disappointment of the Cold War; it removed the historical burden of the 1940s and 1950s. The defeat of Iraq repealed the great debacle of the Vietnam War; it removed the historical burden of the 1960s and 1970s. Together, these two events have rolled history back to that great moment of American triumph in 1945, the beginning of the American half-century, which quickly became only an American half-world. Now appears a fitting time indeed to declare a New World Order, to announce the Second Coming of One World.

The likely military and economic pillars of the New World Order have much in common with those of the world order set up in 1945. After World War II, the American international security order was based on American high-tech weaponry—in that case the atomic bomb—and the strategy of nuclear deterrence. This provided a secure framework for the political reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. Now, after the Gulf War, an American international security order could again be based on American high-tech weaponry—in this case smart bombs, precision missiles, and stealth aircraft—and the strategy of conventional deterrence. And this strategy of conventional deterrence could have a good deal more credibility than did the strategy of nuclear deterrence for much of the American half-century.

Similarly, after 1945, one of the principal pillars of the American international economic order was American control of Middle East oil, which provided a secure fuel supply for the industrial reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. Now, after the Gulf War, an American international economic order could again be based on a heavy American influence over Persian Gulf oil. It has been observed that one of the results of the war has been to make the United States, in effect, a new and important member of OPEC.

Together, the American credibility in military operations and the American influence over Persian Gulf oil should provide the United States with substantial bargaining power in economic negotiations with its principal economic rivals, Germany and Japan—apparently the only candidates, other than the United States itself, for shaping the world order of the future. The hesitant and reluctant behavior of Germany and Japan during the Gulf War caused many to conclude that these countries are incapable of taking initiative and exercising power in international affairs. And in fact the two are presently incapable of employing military power, or exercising any serious political influence on a

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global scale (or even within the Middle East). The only global power for some time to come will be the United States, and the only world order will be an American one.

The German and Japanese roles in the New World Order are to be merely regional powers. But that "merely" is misleading: by being the principal regional powers in their particular parts of the world, Central Europe and East Asia, they will actually transform, and perhaps hollow out, the meaning of the New World Order itself. And so, we must now look at that other great conception or paradigm of international order, the regional one, and at the regions where it can unfold.

The Return of History and Mitteleuropa

THE GREAT events in Eastern Europe in 1989–90 abolished the Soviet Empire in Europe and in doing so abolished Eastern Europe itself, which had existed as a separate, and separated, region only by virtue of its conquest and subsequent communization by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The abolition of Eastern Europe has meant the resurrection and return of *Mitteleuropa*.

The revolution of 1989 was the third East European revolution in this century. Like the earlier two revolutions of 1918 and 1945, 1989's came at the end of a world war, in this case the Cold War. The settlement after each of these brought about great shifts in power—international and internal, strategic and economic. To understand the consequences of the end of the Cold War and the latest revolution in Eastern Europe, it is helpful to place them in the historical perspective of the two earlier postwar and post-revolutionary settlements. In doing so, it is useful to distinguish between the apparent and the real victors of war. For in each of the first two cases, those who appeared to be the victors in the immediate aftermath of the great struggle turned out not to be the real victors. There is reason to believe that this pattern may be repeated in the third case.

The post-World War I settlement: In 1918–19, it appeared that the Western Allies—particularly France, Britain, and the United States—were the victors over Germany. This perception was certified in the Versailles Treaty and in the system it established. But France and Britain had fought the war so long and so hard that they were exhausted even as they triumphed, and it soon became clear that the real inheritor of the fruits of victory was the United States. The United States first composed the League of Nations (which it almost immediately abandoned) and then the Dawes Plan (large-scale bank loans) for reconstructing Central Europe and especially Germany in its own liberal-democratic and liberal-capitalist image. From the perspective of the 1920s, then, the United States was the real victor of World War I.

At the end of the 1920s, however, it turned out that the U.S. victory, too, was only apparent, and with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, the Dawes Plan and the American project for Germany collapsed. Now the real and fundamental strategic legacy of 1918 was revealed. Before 1914, Germany had been haunted by the "nightmare of encirclement," trapped between France and Russia. During World War I, however, Germany had defeated Russia, as demonstrated in the "forgotten peace" of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, and for two decades thereafter Russia remained isolated behind a *cordon sanitaire* of new and weak states and preoccupied with its "socialism in one country." Thus, after 1918, Germany was confronted with only one major continental adversary, France, rather than with two.

The economic legacy of 1918 was much the same. Despite its long succession of economic miseries—defeat, revolution, occupation, inflation, depression—the German economy remained the largest, the most advanced, the most efficient, and the most competitive industrial complex in Europe, just as it had been before 1914.

When the Weimar Republic was displaced by the Nazi regime in 1933, it was not long before these underlying strategic and

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economic strengths were recognized and realized. While Hitler and the Nazi elite were fixated on the strategic strengths, the economic strengths were well understood by the conservative elites of German industry and finance. These elites soon composed the Schacht Plan (based on organized foreign trade and controlled currency exchange) for reconstructing Central Europe or *Mitteleuropa* in their own corporatist-authoritarian and organized-capitalist image. This grand project for German leadership of *Mitteleuropa* through economic power, which very well might have succeeded, was instead overtaken by Hitler's own ambition for German domination of all of Europe through military conquest.

The post-World War II settlement: A similar but simpler pattern occurred after World War II. In 1945, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were the obvious victors over Germany and Japan, as was demonstrated in the Yalta-Potsdam system. But Britain had fought World War II longer and harder than any of the other Western allies, so long and hard, in fact, that it was again and even more deeply exhausted at the moment of triumph. The real inheritor of the fruits of victory in the West was again the United States. The United States then composed the Marshall Plan and the NATO Alliance to reconstruct Western Europe in its own liberal-democratic and liberal-capitalist image, now modified by the New Deal welfare state. In this grand project, Britain had a special relationship but only a secondary role.

The other real victor was the Soviet Union. It proceeded to carry out the East European revolution of 1945, a revolution from above and from outside that reconstructed Eastern Europe in its own Stalinist and state-communist image, and reoriented the East European economies toward the Soviet one. More precisely, it created an Eastern Europe in much of what had previously been known as Central Europe or *Mitteleuropa*. In doing so, the Soviets severed the region from the rest of the Continent, which thereby became Western Europe (even if Stockholm remained east of East Berlin, Vienna east of Prague, and Athens east of Sofia).

The post-Cold War settlement: In the last two years, political commentators have proclaimed that the United States has won the Cold War. But in a pattern similar to that of Britain in both world wars, the United States fought the Cold War longer and harder than any of the other Western allies, so long and hard, in fact, that it was depleted by its military expenditures, and in many ways the real inheritors of the fruits of victory look like Germany and Japan. It is likely that Germany will come to compose a *Mitteleuropa* project, if not quite a Kohl plan, reconstructing Eastern Europe in its own liberal-democratic and social-market image (and thereby completing the reconversion of Eastern Europe back into Central Europe). In this grand project, the United States will have a special relationship but only a secondary role.

This *Mitteleuropa* project could recapitulate the economic goals and methods of the German industrial and financial conservatives of the 1880s-1930s and the political goals and methods of the German Social Democrats of the 1920s and 1940s-1980s. It would also represent the reversal of the military defeats of the 1940s by the economic achievements of the 1990s. De-Stalinization, it might be said, would reach its logical culmination in the symbolic reversal of Stalingrad—not long after 1992, the fiftieth anniversary of that great climactic battle and the "unification year" of the European Community.

The Once and Future Church

THE NOTION of a return of *Mitteleuropa* must certainly give one pause. It has been remarked that Central Europe has to export its history because it produces too much for it all to be consumed locally. Of all the regions that have generated conflict in this century, it has been the most momentous, both the source and the center of two world wars and the Cold War. Out of Central Europe exploded a destructive en-

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ergy that threw much of the rest of the world into conflict and turmoil. Onto Central Europe there was then imposed a deterrence system erected by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Of all the international security systems of the past half-century, easily the most important and the most institutionalized have been NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which by partitioning the Continent into two blocs, appeared to have put an end to Central Europe as an assortment of independent actors and a mass producer of international insecurity. Now with the collapse of half of the old security system—the Soviet bloc and the Warsaw Pact—and the transformation of Eastern Europe back into Central Europe, the ancient problem of the explosive propensity of *Mitteleuropa* confronts us once again.

What will the new *Mitteleuropa*, with the new Germany as its core, look like? Here again it is useful to look at earlier patterns.

For most of the past half-millennium, the history of Central Europe or *Mitteleuropa* was defined by the grand alliance between a multinational religious institution, the Catholic Church, and a multinational empire, the Hapsburg monarchy. This half-millennium, which corresponds to the modern era, is often seen as the story of the rise of secular nation-states; seen from the other side of the coin, however, it is the story of the decline of these two great multinational institutions.

For the Hapsburg monarchy, it was a decline that culminated in its destruction in 1918. That destruction in turn led to revolutions and wars until, at the end of World War II, a new order of sorts was imposed by powers that were neither Central nor even European. Indeed, these two superpowers were not even nation-states in the conventional sense, but were themselves multinational in different ways.

For the Catholic Church, on the other hand, decline has been punctuated by a series of reforms and revivals, of transfigurations and resurrections, so that it remains a vital multinational institution even today. It is in fact now the most significant multinational institution operating in Central Europe.

It is conventional wisdom that the countries of old Eastern Europe or new Central Europe aspire to become like Western Europe or the United States—i.e., not only civil societies but liberal democracies and capitalist economies. This is the "end of history."

THE GREAT transformation from Eastern to Western, authoritarian to liberal, communist to capitalist, however, shows more and more signs of being an unstable equilibrium rather than a permanent settlement. It is probably only a matter of time before the nations of *Mitteleuropa* reject liberal capitalism, which they see as one extreme, as decisively as they have rejected the extreme of state socialism, and proceed to seek a "third way." If so, the new Central Europe will become rather like the old Central Europe. It will be a return, rather than an end, of history.

The civil society, cultural standards, and life styles of much of *Mitteleuropa* were shaped by the Catholic Church (Poland), by the Hapsburg Empire (the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia), or by both acting together (Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia). These countries have long found their social and cultural models in Germany (whose southern region is Catholic) and Austria.

This is now true of their economic and political models as well. Their economic model is not the free market but the social market, as it has existed in West Germany and Austria since the early 1950s. This includes first, a substantial part (40 to 50 percent) of the gross national product passing through the public sector (federal, state, or local governments); second, "societal corporatism," or close and continuous cooperation between state agencies, business corporations, and labor organizations; and third, a universal system of social welfare benefits.

The principal political model is the Christian Democratic Party, as it has existed in most of West Germany (Christian Demo-

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cratic Union), Bavaria (Christian Social Union), and Austria (People's Party) since the late 1940s. Governments led by Christian Democratic Parties have recently been elected in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia, countries which were once both Hapsburg and Catholic. The German Christian Democratic Party, the political leader and the financial power of the Christian Democratic International, has provided substantial guidance and support to these new Christian Democratic Parties to the East.

A political model at another level is that of a federal republic, again as it has existed in West Germany and Austria since the late 1940s. Czechoslovakia has recently reconstituted itself officially as the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The ideas of civil society, social-market economy, Christian democracy, and federal republic are completely in accord with Catholic social teaching as articulated in a century-old tradition of papal encyclicals. The first papal encyclical on social questions, *Rerum Novarum* (*On the Condition of the Working Classes*), was promulgated exactly 100 years ago, in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII. It has been followed since then by a half-dozen comparable encyclicals, each focusing on the social questions of the time. They include *Quadregesimo Anno* (*Social Reconstruction*, 1931) by Pius X, *Mater et Magistra* (*Christianity and Social Progress*, 1961) by John XXIII, and *Laborem Exercens* (*On Human Work*, 1981) by John Paul II. To commemorate this centennial and to direct the application of this Catholic social tradition to the new emerging Europe, Pope John Paul II has designated 1991 as the Year of Catholic Social Teaching, in which he has promulgated a new encyclical on contemporary social questions and convened a synod of bishops that will formulate a social project for the new Europe.

The papal encyclicals and the social teaching of the Catholic Church have consistently criticized both state socialism and liberal capitalism as incomplete and flawed ideologies. In their place, the church advocates such conceptions as the need for both business and labor organizations and "the principle of the priority of labor over capital," the need for meaningful work and a "just-wage" for the full development of the human person, and the need to limit state power to its proper role by the "principle of subsidiarity," which devolves power and responsibilities to intermediate institutions between the state and the individual.

Catholic social teaching is likely to fit the social and economic needs of the new *Mitteleuropa* for many years to come. It could provide an intellectual order, political legitimation, and policy guidance to governments as an alternative to liberal capitalism after the collapse of state socialism.

A Tale of Three Cities

IT IS THE new, united Germany that will most influence the shape of the new *Mitteleuropa*. This will fulfill the vision and the *Westpolitik* of Konrad Adenauer. As chancellor and Christian Democratic leader, in 1950, Adenauer conceived that a West Germany fully integrated into a Catholic Western Europe (France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands) would become a "magnet" that would gradually but steadily draw Eastern Europe to it by its economic, social, and cultural lines of force. It will also be a fulfillment of the vision and the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt. As chancellor and Social Democratic leader, in 1970, Brandt conceived of removing the iron curtain that stood in the way of the iron magnet's lines of force. The unification strategy and *Deutschlandpolitik* of Helmut Kohl, as chancellor and Christian Democratic leader, in 1990 figuratively as well as literally combined East and West.

It could turn out, of course, that the Christian Democrats will be less dominant in the new united Germany than they were in the old West Germany. The arithmetic suggests so: in West Germany, Catholics composed about 50 percent of the population, in East Germany they were about 10 percent, and in united Germany, about 40 percent. In any event, the economic depression in eastern

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Germany since unification has extinguished the earlier enthusiasm of East Germans for Kohl and the Christian Democrats. When and if the Christian Democrats give up power it will probably be to the Social Democrats, as in the past in both West Germany and Austria. And for more than three decades, the Social Democrats also have adhered to the principles of civil society, social-market economy, electoral democracy, and federal republic.

The history of Germany since the end of World War II may be seen as a development of three successive German personas or characters. It is also a journey between three cities and a trajectory over three generations.

The first Germany is the Germany of Bonn and the Federal Republic. As the earliest and weakest Germany, this was also the American Germany. Its historical moment was the 1950s-1960s, though of course this particular German character still survives today in Germany's military dependence, through NATO, on the United States. But it is no longer dominant.

The second Germany is the Germany of Brussels and the European Community. As one of several more or less equal Community states, it is the West European Germany. Its historical moment was the 1970s-1980s. This persona not only came to overshadow the first Germany, but still appears as the most prominent German character today.

The third Germany—not yet fully emerged—is the Germany of Berlin and *Mitteleuropa*, the largest and eastern-most version. This is the Central European Germany; it also entails, to a significant degree, a German Central Europe. Its historical moment will be the 1990s-2000s.

When Germany faces east toward *Mitteleuropa*, its role will be that of the dominant partner in a series of bilateral relationships with the Central European states, as the hub with spokes radiating outward. Conversely, as Germany faces west toward the European Community, its role will continue to be that of the first among several equal West European states, but now more manifestly the first than it was before. Germany will also be the bridge and the broker, indeed in large measure the gatekeeper, between the European Community and *Mitteleuropa*. Direct investment and foreign aid from the Community and from its member states will find their way into *Mitteleuropa*, but they will do so within a framework of German practices, as junior partners to German firms, and perhaps subject to the veto of the German government. Germany will seek to promote a basic standard of political stability and predictability within the Central European states by promoting economic stability and predictability within the region through preferential trade, investment, and aid arrangements. The German conception of the international economy will become primarily a continental, rather than a global, one.

Japan in East Asia

THE POTENTIALITIES for Germany and *Mitteleuropa* in the 1990s have a good deal in common with what already had become the realities of Japan and East Asia in the 1980s.

East Asia, of course, is not a region in quite the same sense as Central Europe. In particular, Japan has provided much less of an historical and cultural model for East Asia than Germany has for *Mitteleuropa* (although Imperial China once provided a model in some ways similar to that which was provided by the Hapsburg Empire). In the past decade, however, Japan's example and investments have helped inspire much of East Asia, especially South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, to emulate Japan's own model of dominant-party politics and organized capitalism.

Japan's current role in East Asia has often been described by critics as a new version of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere established during World War II. By evoking the wartime memories of military conquest, domination, and exploitation, these critics intend to condemn Japan's role in East Asia today. But if the wartime connotations are set aside and the upper-case letters of the phrase

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dispensed with, the term greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere becomes a quite accurate description of the results of Japan's role in the region in the contemporary era. That role conforms to a particular Japanese vision of international order; it includes both a conception of the economy, which can be termed international mercantilism, and a conception of security, which the Japanese have called comprehensive security.

The international mercantilism of Japan and other East Asian states conceives of the state as guiding society toward effective competition in the world market to increase the power and wealth of both state and society. It also conceives of this competition as taking place within a context of dynamic, not static, comparative advantage, with the state helping society to move progressively higher up the ladder of technology, to shift out of low technology and low-wage industries into high-technology and high-wage ones. As one country moves up the technological ladder, others—especially the newly industrializing ones of East Asia—will move onto it. Thus international mercantilism conceives the world economic competition to be not a zero-sum but a positive-sum game; not only one but many countries will benefit, and these benefits will be not only short-term gains but long-term developments. But this mutually beneficial process requires the more advanced countries to be continually developing new technologies and new industries, so that they can devolve their old industries to less developed countries. This in turn, the Japanese believe, requires the guidance of a strong and coherent state.

THIS INTERNATIONAL mercantilism has fulfilled the economic goals and methods of the Japanese industrial and financial conservatives as they existed first in the 1920s and then since the 1950s; it also has fulfilled the political goals and methods of their liberal-democratic partners of the 1920s and since the 1950s. It is a cliché that Japan has already reversed the military defeats of the 1940s with the economic achievements of the 1980s, that U.S. trade and budget deficits have brought about the reversal of Midway, that other great climactic battle of 1942.

Japan has also developed a particular conception of international security. After World War II, Japan was not permitted to provide for its own security, a condition institutionalized in the famous Article 9 of the new constitution that placed severe limits on Japan's military ("self-defense forces"). Accordingly, the Japanese army was replaced in effect by the U.S. Army, which continued to perform some of the same roles the Japanese army had before: that is, it fought and remained in Korea in large measure to ensure the military security of Japan. Similarly, the Japanese navy was replaced by the U.S. Navy, which continued to perform some of the same roles the Japanese navy had before: it secured access to markets for Japanese goods in Southeast Asia and ensured the free flow of oil to Japan from Indonesia and the Persian Gulf. (It had been the oil embargo of the United States, the leading oil exporter in 1941 and the Saudi Arabia of the day, that had actually driven the Japanese government to seize the oil of the Dutch East Indies, the predecessor to Indonesia, and to protect the strategic flank of that oil lifeline with a preventive strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.)

By the 1980s, Japan had arrived at its own distinct conception of international security based on a combination of U.S. military power and Japan's own economic power and low-posture diplomacy. This combination has become known as the concept of comprehensive security. The core of the concept, however, has been economic power.

Comprehensive security is obtained by an implicit grand bargain between political and economic leaders in Japan and their counterparts in America, involving both its economic and its military dimensions. The Japanese continue to provide capital to the United States, most obviously in the purchase of U.S. Treasury notes, while the United States continues to provide military

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protection to Japan and to other East Asian countries which are of vital interest to Japan, especially South Korea.

Mitteleuropa and the New World Order

THE POTENTIALITIES of *Mitteleuropa* and the realities of East Asia mean that two intellectually fashionable ideas of the last few years—Paul Kennedy and great-power decline in 1988, Francis Fukuyama and liberal triumphalism in 1989—will have to be revised. Each, it turns out, was half-right and half-wrong. Kennedy was right about the impact of military spending and "imperial over-stretch" on the economic decline of the Soviet Union: the Soviet Empire did indeed collapse for these very reasons. But this same rapid collapse made less plausible and more debatable the other half of Kennedy's argument, that there was also underway an economic and political decline of the United States, due to military spending and imperial over-stretch.

Conversely, although Fukuyama was perfectly right about communism, he was wrong about liberalism. Fukuyama's history ends with liberalism, but the world's history will not. The next stage of history will not be dominated by state-communism, but it probably won't be dominated by liberal-capitalism either. It is more likely that it will be shaped in major ways by states practicing the social market and organized capitalism. In the terms used by Richard Rosecrance, it will be led not by the "military-political state" but by the "trading state." The next stage of history will invoke a return to an era when Germany and Japan were leading powers—and *Mitteleuropa* and East Asia leading regions—of the world; again, in a real sense the triumph, not the end, of history.

What will be the relationship between the new Germany and the United States? How will the new *Mitteleuropa* fit into the New World Order and particularly into its old institutions of NATO and GATT? The departure of Soviet troops from German territory will probably be followed by the departure of American troops from German territory as well. But, more generally, Germany and *Mitteleuropa* will still want some residual security, some insurance policy, against potential conflicts with a still-unstable and unpredictable Soviet Union.

The most stable equilibrium would be the consequence of a nuclear deterrence provided by U.S. naval forces stationed in the waters around Europe, perhaps supplemented by other U.S. military forces based in Britain. This nuclear protectorate could be organized within a NATO framework, but a framework more like that of the original NATO of 1949–51, centered on U.S. nuclear and naval forces, rather than the later NATO which became an integrated organization centered on national ground forces under American command.

Such a redefinition of the U.S. security role with regard to Germany and Central Europe would have much in common with the role of the United States with respect to Japan and much of East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War. In the East Asia of recent years, there has been little expectation of either an invasion by Soviet ground forces or the use of American ground forces (Korea apart). Rather, U.S. nuclear and naval forces have provided an insurance policy against an event that is about as unlikely, but also as potentially disastrous, as the Tokyo earthquake of 1923. Of course, U.S. military forces have been based in Japan, whereas they may no longer be in Germany; even in Japan, however, they have never been based in that region (Hokkaido) closest to the Soviet Union and thus most subject to Soviet invasion. There have been no "forward strategies," "flexible-response doctrines," and "nuclear trip-wires" in Japan, as there have been in West Germany (and, to a large degree, in South Korea). But it is precisely these features of the U.S security role that are now likely to depart from united Germany.

What could be the incentives for the United States to assume the burden of providing a nuclear deterrent for a Germany at the head of a *Mitteleuropa*? One might simply

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be institutional inertia, which can explain a great deal about international politics.

Beyond that, however, there have emerged the elements of a grand bargain between political and economic leaders in America and their counterparts in Germany, a bargain similar in crucial respects to that already existing between America and Japan in East Asia. It involves the economic dimension as well as the security dimension, the GATT institution as well as the NATO institution, of the liberal international order. At the same time (1989–90) that the United States strongly supported the unification of Germany, it hoped and expected that Germany would strongly support a continued American economic presence in the European Community. In the last few years, the deadline of 1992 and the prospect of a unified Community excluding American corporations, banks, and products have wonderfully concentrated the minds of American economic and political leaders. And in the last two years, the East European revolution and the prospect of new market economies, where American business could easily lose out to German competition, have focused their attention even more. Given German support rather than opposition, however, these prospects would change. The American economic presence in the new Europe would not be nearly as prominent as the German one. But it would be substantial and profitable nonetheless. The obvious bargain to be struck would have American leaders continue to support a U.S. nuclear deterrent for Europe, while their German counterparts support an American economic presence in Europe.

To the Brandenburg Gate

GREAT international orders have their great cities, and great cities have their essential symbols. The city of the liberal international order has been New York, and its symbol is the Statue of Liberty. The city of the communist international order has been Moscow, and its symbol is Lenin's tomb. The city of the international order of *Mitteleuropa* will be Berlin, and its symbol is the Brandenburg Gate.

This year, the Brandenburg Gate is two centuries old. It was one of the first of the great neo-classical monuments that would distinguish the Prussian capital in the first half of the nineteenth century. But it is surrounded on all sides by monuments which express different styles and different parts of the German experience and achievement. Two in particular express the values of the liberal, the western Germany. To the west of the Brandenburg Gate is the *Kurfurstendamm*, the glittering boulevard that is the symbol of capitalist Germany; also to the west is the *Reichstag*, the symbol of democratic Germany. Similarly, there are two monuments in particular that express the values of the traditional, the eastern Germany. To the east of the Brandenburg Gate is the statue of Frederick the Great, the symbol of military Germany; also to the east is the Museum Island, the symbol of cultural Germany.

The Brandenburg Gate, at the center of Berlin and therefore of *Mitteleuropa*, is also at the center of the four great talents of the German past—capitalist, democratic, military, and cultural—and the four great promises of the German future. The tragedies of the German past, and of the old *Mitteleuropa*, occurred when these four powers fell out of balance and ran out of control.

On top of the Brandenburg Gate stands the Quadriga, the chariot drawn by four horses, and at its center stands the charioteer, the symbol of classical order harnessing, balancing, and directing dynamic powers. In our time, it may again be the symbol of order harnessing powers, of organized capitalism, the social market, the civil society. The order of *Mitteleuropa* will depend on the German charioteer's prowess and skill. And so also to a very considerable extent will what we are learning to call the New World Order.□

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The Next South Africa

Francis Fukuyama

ON FEBRUARY 2, 1990, State President F.W. de Klerk announced the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the removal of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), thereby capping off a twelve-month period of political miracles around the world. By the end of the current parliamentary session in July, the principal laws that constitute the legal basis of apartheid—the Population Registration Act, the Land Act, the Group Areas Act—will have been repealed. At the same time, if all goes well, an All-Parties Conference will begin negotiations on a new constitution that will enfranchise blacks and lead, over the next few years, to new elections on the principle of one man, one vote.

When de Klerk made his historic announcement, the Berlin Wall had been down for just three months and the anticommunist revolutions in Czechoslovakia and Romania were but weeks old. A wave of democratic revolution was sweeping the communist world, from Leipzig to Moscow to Beijing, just as a similar wave had swept Latin America earlier in the decade, and Southern Europe in the 1970s. Is there a larger pattern to history at play here that has made democracy necessary in such culturally disparate parts of the world?

De Klerk himself made a connection between the freeing of Mandela and events in Eastern Europe when he explained that "The year 1989 will go down in history as the year in which Stalinist communism expired," which would "weaken the capability of organizations which were previously supported from those quarters."[1] But while events in Eastern Europe did undoubtedly make it easier for de Klerk to do what he did, his remark begs the question of what social forces are pushing either South Africa or the former communist world in the direction of change, and whether those forces are at all comparable. There are, moreover, a host of obvious differences between South Africa's situation and the situation of the former communist world that would suggest that the two have nothing to do with one another. South Africa already possesses three things that the former communist world is now desperately seeking: a functioning market economy, a democratic tradition (albeit limited to whites and much abused by them in the past), and a civil society, highly developed for the whites but still forming among blacks.

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[1]Quoted in John Kane-Berman, *South Africa's Silent Revolution* (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1990), p. 68.

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On the other hand, most of the former communist world has one advantage not enjoyed by South Africa: an almost universal revulsion of elites and popular masses alike to the old socialist system, and a broad consensus on the need to replace it with the democratic free market system of the West. The winds of perestroika, so strong in Eastern Europe, have not reached South Africa's shores: according to Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Soviet Union's problems were due to "pilot error" rather than to the plane's design and direction. Eastern Europe, which has just overcome the socialist stage of history and is now ready to build capitalism, is in different respects both behind and ahead of South Africa.

Two Urbanizations

THE FACT that a majority of South Africa's whites now support the universalization of rights reflects the power of the idea of contemporary liberal democracy. Apartheid was based on a systematic but distinctly non-liberal ideology of racial differentiation whose sources were partly religious and partly pseudo-scientific. South Africans have long been wrestling with the internal contradictions of this doctrine, evidenced in the Dutch Reformed Church's crumbling efforts to reconcile apartheid with the Christian belief in human equality. In this respect, the fact that nobody in the outside world accepted the legitimacy of ideologies based on racial superiority played a critical role in reshaping the political consciousness of the Afrikaner community. So did the collapse of communism, which removed socialism as a legitimate alternative for most of the white community.

Yet these intellectual trends do not in themselves contain the whole reason for apartheid's collapse, any more than they are sufficient in themselves to explain the global crisis into which authoritarian regimes of the Left and Right have fallen over the past generation, from Franco's Spain and Chun's South Korea to Brezhnev's Soviet Union. The ground for these ideological developments was prepared as a result of what we might call the logic of modern economic development.

In a famous 1959 article, Seymour Martin Lipset showed that there was an extremely high correlation between stable democracy and levels of economic development, when measured by such indices as per capita income, urbanization, and education.[2] That correlation is if anything stronger today than when Lipset wrote. The world's wealthiest countries still tend to be the most democratic, and are stable in proportion to their degree of industrialization. Those nondemocracies that experienced the most far-reaching economic transformations in recent decades—Spain, South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and China—have also been the first ones subject to democratic reform movements.[3] In the 1960s, the economies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece grew at rates of 6 to 7 percent, bringing about enormous social changes; while half the populations of those countries were engaged in agriculture in 1950, by the 1970s, the corresponding figure was around 20 percent. This change facilitated their emergence as stable democracies in the mid-1970s. The Francoist commissar for Economic Development, Laureano Lopez Rodo, once said, half facetiously, that Spain would be ready for de-

[2]"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959), pp. 69–105.

[3]The major exception to this rule is a number of states in the Middle East—including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran—that have relatively high levels of per capita income but no democracy. This anomaly is explained by the presence of oil, which has permitted these countries to acquire the trappings of economic modernity without their societies having to go through the social transformations required were that wealth generated by the labor of their own populations.

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mocracy when per capita income reached $2,000, and indeed, Spain reached that crossover point some time in the early 1970s.

Economic development, whether it occurs under capitalism or socialism, is a great homogenizer of human societies, and tends to evolve as a coherent process in all of the countries where it takes place, regardless of cultural starting points. The growth of a technologically advanced economy forces all societies to urbanize, since modern industries require the concentration of skills and infrastructure found in cities. It encourages the breakdown of traditional forms of association, like tribes, clans, extended families, and religious sects, and fosters their replacement with "modern" forms of organization like political parties, labor unions, or bureaucracies, whose organizational principles are functional and geared toward economic efficiency. And finally, technologically based economies require universal education, not just for elites but for the broad mass of workers who must be not only literate but increasingly proficient technically.

The reasons why economic development should lead to democracy are complicated and contingent. Education connects people to the larger world of ideas, including ideologies that provide concepts of political legitimacy. While these ideologies were largely socialist at mid-century, they have been liberal and democratic in the past generation. Education and rising socioeconomic status, moreover, bring in their train a much greater awareness of one's personal status and dignity, and thus makes people unhappy with authoritarian political systems that fail to recognize them as free adults. Hence education indirectly tends to foster belief in the only political system that provides man with rational recognition of his dignity—modern liberal democracy.

Economic development does not bring democracy (or belief in free markets) in an automatic or deterministic way. Politics and ideology must intervene: leaders must lead wisely, publicists must put forward arguments, and populations must become infused with concepts of democratic legitimacy. But there is no question that economic change provides a very helpful environment for liberal democratic ideas to take hold. Middle-class societies with large numbers of college-educated, urban professionals—those we learned to call "yuppies" in the 1980s—simply have a different type of politics than uneducated and illiterate smallholders in predominantly agrarian societies. In the latter, it is possible for authoritarian rulers to mobilize poorly educated followers into armies or death squads—one fad that yuppies have been notably reluctant to take up.

IT IS PRECISELY the transformation from smallholder to yuppie that has occurred within South Africa's Afrikaner community over the past forty years. The unbanning of the ANC did not undermine the political base of the National Party among whites; if anything, de Klerk's support among whites is higher than it was when he first came into office. This indicates that he was not simply leading Afrikaner opinion by his surprising moves, but reflecting it as well.

It is important to understand the extreme social backwardness of the Afrikaner community after the National Party took power in 1948 and began formalizing the apartheid system. The Afrikaners had traditionally been farmers, and over 41 percent still lived in the countryside in 1936. Many of them were driven off the land and into the cities by drought in the 1930s. They were poorly educated and many were not even literate: fully one-fifth of the Afrikaner population in 1948 could be classified as "poor whites," defined as "a person who has become dependent to such an extent, whether from moral, economic or physical causes, that he is unfit, without help from others, to find proper means of livelihood for himself. . . ."[4] Moreover, they labored under a pronounced sense

[4]T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1987), p. 319.

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of social inferiority toward the English speakers in South Africa, who had beaten them in war and totally dominated the country's economic life.

The Afrikaners used their capture of state power in 1948 to advance themselves socially. It is ironic, in view of the way that much of the ANC and the South African Left blames capitalism for the woes of apartheid, that the Afrikaners practiced a form of economic statism that at times verged on socialism. As in many developing countries, the state under the National Party created and controlled a number of major industrial enterprises (known as parastatals), not just in sectors like electrical power, railroads, and communications, but also steel, energy development, arms manufacturing, and the like. The state bureaucracy was greatly expanded over the years, and all these public sector institutions were used to provide jobs for unemployed and poorly educated Afrikaners—to the point where more than one in three Afrikaners is to this day an employee of the state. Like most state-owned companies, the parastatals were not run particularly efficiently, and the employment they provided came at the expense of the black and coloured workers displaced by whites. The South African economy could have been considerably larger than it is today were it not for this kind of economic intervention.

The result for the Afrikaners was, however, highly positive: by the 1980s, they had been transformed into an urbanized, professional population, little different in educational or occupational terms from their counterparts in other Western countries. By 1977, only 8 percent of Afrikaners remained on the land, 27 percent were blue-collar workers, and 65 percent had graduated to the ranks of white collar managers and professionals.[5] As in the case of Soviet elites, the pull of international consumer culture proved irresistible, and with that culture came ideas concerning political legitimacy that were totally incompatible with apartheid. Afrikaners travelled about in the "West" with which they associated themselves but from which they had been cut off for several centuries. As in the case of the Soviets and Chinese, the changing social and occupational status of the Afrikaner led to a break with economic statism as well as apartheid, and free market ideas began to gain currency.

THIS CHANGE in the Afrikaner's socio-economic status might not have been sufficient in itself to bring about the end of apartheid were it not for a second, parallel process of urbanization in the black community. Like the Afrikaners before the war, black South Africans began to migrate to the cities after the war in increasing numbers, searching for employment in the growing industrial sector. In retrospect, the aim of the apartheid system created in the 1950s under H.F. Verwoerd was utterly insane: it sought to permit the creation of a modern industrial economy in South Africa using black labor, while seeking not just to prevent but to actively reverse the urbanization of blacks. No communist apparatchik ever devised a policy so contrary to the fundamental laws of economics. Under apartheid, the state pretended that the blacks who assembled Toyotas or fabricated synthetic fuels in Durban or Johannesburg were really residents of a faraway rural African homeland.

Apartheid, far from being an outgrowth of capitalism, interfered massively in free labor markets and undermined the principle of private property.[6] It reserved skilled occupations for whites and, by denying blacks equal access to education and housing, prevented them from acquiring those skills. It also prevented them from starting private businesses by entangling them in a web of petty regulation. As in other countries with large state sectors and overregulated free markets like the Soviet Union, Brazil, or Peru,

[5]H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-Building* (Johannesburg: Oxford University Press, South Africa, 1990), p. 120.

[6]On this general point, see Walter Williams, *South Africa's War against Capitalism* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 67–91 *inter alia*.

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this effectively stifled entrepreneurship among the poor and drove it into an informal sector. (As in Peru, one of the consequences of this was the spontaneous emergence of an informal public transportation industry; the minibus taxi industry, now legalized, is one of the largest black-owned business sectors in South Africa.) Until the 1980s, blacks were prevented from legally owning their own homes in the townships, eliminating one of the most important psychological props for a stable bourgeois society.

By the 1980s, the absurdity of the attempt to prevent black urbanization was plain for anyone to see in the teeming black townships that encircled every major South African city. Some eighteen million blacks were arrested between 1916 and 1986 under the so-called "pass laws," whose bizarre premise was that a black could only reside in a city temporarily and at the sufferance of a white employer. While only 29 percent of the black population was urbanized as recently as 1970, 55 percent lived in cities by 1990. This reality led F.W. de Klerk to say back in 1987:

> The National Party policy on blacks was originally that the majority should go back to their homelands. However, every effort to turn the tide streaming to urban areas failed. It does not help to bluff ourselves about this. The economy demands the permanent presence of the millions of blacks in urban areas. . . . There are blacks who have lived in South Africa [i.e, outside the homelands] all their lives and they and their children will remain here. . . . They cannot stay in South Africa year after year without political representation.[7]

Despite legal and cultural obstacles, blacks "empowered" themselves economically long before the official end of apartheid. They acquired skills, moved into formerly reserved positions, and, by the late 1970s, were permitted to form their own legally-recognized labor unions. The logic of economic development, then, undermined apartheid through two parallel modernization processes, the creation both of a white professional middle class and a black urban proletariat.[8]

As they stand on the verge of political power, the position of South Africa's almost 30 million blacks is not entirely different from that of the Afrikaners in 1948, being recently urbanized, poorly educated, and resentful of their exclusion from the political life of the country for so long. The question for the future of South African democracy, then, is whether they can undergo a similar type of socio-economic evolution. As it was, the Afrikaners took forty years to make their trek toward democracy, and black South Africans come to this process with certain disadvantages not shared by the white community. These disadvantages are evident in the current township violence.

The Township Violence

THE LEVEL of violence that has occurred since de Klerk's February 2, 1990 announcement is unprecedented in South Africa's history. While 69 people were killed in the notorious Sharpeville massacre in 1960, nearly 1,000 have been killed in political violence during the first five months of 1991 alone. The recent violence has been almost entirely black-on-black, and the level of misery that it has created in the townships is hard to imagine. It victimizes South Africa's poorest people, who are killed over issues like who gets to use a particular settlement's few portable toilets.

South Africa's different political groups have been busy pointing fingers as to who is responsible, with the ANC blaming both the police and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party. Blame, however, would seem to be more evenly divided. Certainly, Buthelezi had reason to resent the fact that the government was acting at times as if the ANC were the only black political organization in town, and Inkatha

[7]Quoted in Kane-Berman, p. 60.

[8]On this general interpretation, see Michael O'Dowd, "Complexities of the South African Situation," *International Journal on World Peace* (June 1990), pp. 25–41.

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has proved that it can be both violent and disruptive when excluded. There is a strong element of ethnic rivalry as well, since much of the leadership of the ANC is Xhosa. In view of their all-too-recent role as the enforcers of the apartheid system, the South African police are widely distrusted and therefore ineffective in dealing with township violence. They have a history of brutality in dealing with blacks and shelter elements seeking to encourage trouble. But the ANC charge that the government is deliberately fomenting the violence in order to scare people about the prospects for black rule does not make sense: that would be the agenda of the white opposition Conservative Party, while the government's interest lies in portraying its chosen negotiating partners as moderates.

Rather, the violence reflects a much larger social problem for which South Africa will have to pay a price many years into the future. There is an entire generation of township youth—mostly boys and young men between the ages of 14 and 25—who dropped out of school, escaped the authority of their parents, are functionally illiterate and unskilled, and have virtually no prospects for employment or advancement. The background condition of this phenomenon is economic, where employment and per capita income for the poorest blacks has been dropping steadily over the past decade. The apartheid regime contributed to the problem by undermining an already troubled African family structure when it required migrant workers to live separately from their families.

But a good deal of the blame must be laid at the door of the ANC, which by promoting "armed struggle" in decades past under slogans like "liberation before education" sought to undermine the authority of local elected officials and to make the townships "ungovernable." By providing ideological sanction to what eventually became simple criminal behavior, the ANC helped create a monster that it is no longer able to control, and with which it will have to deal once it comes to power. The violence cannot be resolved simply by meetings between Mandela and Buthelezi. It is the ostensible reason for the ANC's April ultimatum that the government fire Defense Minister Magnus Malan and Interior Minister Adriaan Vlok as a condition for future negotiations.

Getting to Democracy

IN THE initial sparring with the ANC, the National Party government has largely controlled the agenda. De Klerk's objectives are straightforward: he does not want to build a new society so much as extend the institutions of the existing society, including the present system of constitutional rights and a free market economy, to include people of all races. His government sees this unfolding in three stages, each of which will present formidable obstacles on the road to full democracy. These are getting to the negotiating table (the current stage), negotiating a new constitution, and the enacting of policies by a government elected under that constitution.

Prior to the current crisis over the township violence, de Klerk and Mandela have agreed to the convening of an "All Parties Conference," scheduled to begin sometime over the summer. This conference will either write the terms of reference for a constituent assembly or else evolve into such an assembly itself. So far the National Party, the ANC, the SACP, Inkatha, and various small parties have announced a willingness to attend, while the Conservative Party (CP), representing pro-apartheid whites, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), both of the latter black-consciousness groups, have said they will boycott.

The convening of such a conference is in itself a controversial issue. The ANC and other groups to its left have argued that an interim government should be formed immediately, and that universal suffrage elections for a constituent assembly should be held. This the government resists because while an All-Parties Conference would have to proceed by consensus, a popularly elected constituent assembly could write whatever constitution it wanted based on simple majority

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rule. The government also argues, not unreasonably, that a constituent assembly would immediately take on the attributes of sovereignty and would begin operating like a Jacobin assembly, undermining the authority of the present government during the crucial transition period. In its view, the new constitution written by the All-Parties Conference should be submitted to a popular referendum, and only then should there be one man, one vote elections under the rules established in the new document. It calculates that a real constitutional negotiation will develop irresistible momentum, and that those parties initially opposing the process will have no option but to approve the resulting document.

Simply getting to negotiations on a new constitution has been a slow process. The government, for its part, needs to fulfill its promises to release all political prisoners, permit the return of exiles, and to strike the remaining apartheid legislation from the books, all of which should have substantially occurred by July. What will really determine the pace of negotiations, however, is the ANC's progress in getting itself organized as a broad-based political party. The ANC leadership was as surprised as anyone by de Klerk's February 2 announcement, and has had understandable difficulty in converting itself from a liberation organization whose leaders were either in jail or exile, to a mass political organization capable of governing a country of South Africa's complexity. It has been very slow to establish a grass-roots national organization, and is rent by factionalism. A congress to elect a new leadership scheduled for last December had to be postponed until this summer due to the power struggle going on within the ANC's ranks, and even after the congress it is not clear that the organization will be able to speak with one voice.

The New Constitution

ASSUMING that the All-Parties Conference convenes successfully in the next few months, the next hurdle will be to actually write a new constitution. Constitutional ideas on both the government and ANC sides have been undergoing constant evolution, and based on drafts that have already been tabled, there are likely to be at least two major points of disagreement. The first concerns the nature of rights. The National Party originally supported constitutional language making explicit reference to group rights based on race, as is the case in the current constitution. Under fire for such an approach, the party now indicates that it can achieve the same end through a bill of rights containing a generalized right of association. The ANC and the SACP, on the other hand, favor including second and third generation rights—like housing, employment, health care, etc.—as are found in the constitutions of former Soviet-bloc countries. More troubling is the ANC's attitude to the question of rights per se. Their drafts indicate that they view political rights either as subordinate to higher aims like affirmative action and redistribution, or else as being deserved only by people who have struggled against apartheid. Certain ANC spokesmen have been evasive about whether freedom of the press will be absolute; this may be one of the first rights to fall in the name of "combatting racism."

The second area of constitutional controversy concerns the question of federalism. The National Party, as well as many English-speaking liberals, favors a highly decentralized state modeled on the United States or West Germany, where many powers and responsibilities are devolved to state and local governments. This reflects a political calculation that conservative Afrikaners are likely to support the new constitution if they are guaranteed a certain autonomy in issues that matter a great deal to them, such as the education of their children and the preservation of Afrikaans culture. Others have argued that the black community is itself far from monolithic, and that federalism would be well suited to a country that speaks over ten major languages. The ANC, on the other hand, strongly supports a powerful, unitary state. This proceeds from its socialist inclinations: a strong state will be necessary to

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reconstruct South African society along the lines that it prefers, to actively "combat racism" and to prevent a return to "tribalism." The idea that racism may best be combatted by a weak government and a strong system of individual rights that protects people from discrimination appears to be imperfectly understood.

Grave as these differences appear to be, writing a new constitution may not be the most difficult of the tasks facing South Africa. There is already a considerable area of consensus between the government and ANC positions on constitutional language: the ANC has apparently agreed to a two-chamber parliament and elections on the basis of proportional representation. The real problem, however, is not so much the constitution, as what happens once a new government comes into power under it. As one diplomat who participated in the Lancaster House Agreements on Zimbabwe remarked, Africa is full of beautiful constitutions that aren't worth the paper they are written on.

After the New Constitution

IN COMMENCING negotiations for a new constitution, the National Party does not believe it is committing suicide, but rather that it is preparing a new basis for remaining a potent political force into the next century. It calculates that the ANC will not be able to dominate the country after one man one vote, and that even if it is not forced into a coalition with the NP, the latter will be able to veto policies inimical to the core interests of its constituency. That constituency is rapidly changing, for the National Party recently opened up its membership to people of all races. As noted earlier, de Klerk's reform path has if anything strengthened the National Party's hold on the white electorate, for those opposed to the dismantling of apartheid had left the party well before February 1990.

The Nationalists fully expect most Indians and many coloureds to vote for them, and some believe that in a future free election, a significant number of blacks—particularly those who own property and have graduated into the lower middle classes—may vote for the former party of apartheid. Whether this transformation can really be engineered remains to be seen. In the communist world, the reformist communists who brought about major changes in their societies—the Posgays, Modrows, and Gorbachevs—have not been shown a lot of gratitude for their efforts once democratization began in earnest. On the other hand, the National Party represents a cohesive ethnic group with clearly defined interests, and will in all likelihood remain as a major player in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Of the black political organizations, Inkatha will clearly survive into the post-apartheid world because it too represents the largest, if not necessarily the most cohesive, of South Africa's ethnic communities. The ANC's failure to take Inkatha seriously has cost it dearly. Chief Buthelezi has always been a darling of American conservatives because he has consistently espoused free market economics and political pluralism. Nonetheless, it is unrealistic to hope, as many whites do, that Buthelezi can somehow emerge as *the* spokesman for the black community. For while Inkatha has tried to portray itself as a national organization, and has succeeded in signing up some whites and black non-Zulus, it is still perceived as a predominantly Zulu organization. Buthelezi speaks a modern and moderate line, but the social basis of his power is a very traditional form of rural authority that would not exist in a truly modernized South Africa. The depth of Inkatha's commitment to either free markets or political pluralism remains unclear.

This leaves the ANC and its close ally, the South African Communist Party, as the other major black political organizations. Nelson Mandela has obviously earned enormous moral authority throughout the world for the way in which he emerged from twenty-seven years in prison with such personal dignity. In view of the way that National Party governments have treated him in the past, he is

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remarkably free of bitterness or vindictiveness. His ideological flexibility and willingness to work with de Klerk has given many whites confidence that it will be possible to make a peaceful transition to majority rule.

Mandela does not represent the whole of the ANC, however, and much of the organization advocates policies that, if enacted in their presently articulated form, would be an utter disaster for South Africans, both black and white. While Mandela will undoubtedly be elected ANC president at the congress scheduled for June, there will be a fight over who succeeds him as deputy president between relative moderates like Thabo Mbeke and those on the hard left like Chris Hani, who leads the organization's military wing.

The ANC's left is anchored by its close alliance with the South African Communist Party. It remains the case that the executives of the two organizations are closely intertwined, with officials like Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, and Ronnie Kasrils serving on both. Moreover, the SACP constitutes what one observer called the "competent half" of the ANC, with the organizational ability and manpower to staff and control the ANC's central bureaucracy and executive. To the extent that the ANC is able to institutionalize itself effectively as a political party, it will be due in no small measure to the efforts of the communists within its ranks.

The SACP was called by one liberal editor in Johannesburg the "last communist party on earth," a title it must share with those in Havana and Pyongyang. Perestroika has had little resonance for South Africa's communists, who feel betrayed by their former Soviet and East German friends, and mildly irritated that recent events in Eastern Europe provide grist for "anticommunist propaganda" on the part of liberals and the business community. Slovo claims now to believe in multiparty democracy, but suspicions of continuing Leninism are fed by the fact that his party (like the ANC) has not democratized internally, and continues to veil its activities in secrecy. His objective, moreover, remains constant: socialism, which has failed everywhere else, will finally be built correctly in South Africa. Other communists have suggested that the lesson of recent Soviet experience is that they should look to Trotsky rather than Stalin. Official party doctrine still mandates a certain distance from the ANC and its potentially "petty bourgeois" tendencies. At one extreme it implies that Nelson Mandela, once elected state president, will be treated in the way that Kerensky was treated by the Bolsheviks.

DESPITE the unrepentant nature of the SACP, the main threat that it poses to the future of South Africa is not that of a Bolshevik-style *putsch* imposing a rigid police state on the country. For it is the white communists who are the most committed to this sort of doctrinaire revolution, and it seems highly implausible that a black majority government will eventually come to power only to be unseated by a white minority communist government. The real danger that the South African communists represent lies in the kinds of economic policies that they will advocate as close allies of a governing ANC. They will be a consistent voice in favor of strong state control of economic life and of the most radical forms of wealth redistribution. Moreover, the fact that it is highly implausible that they should ever come to power does not mean that they will never try; the Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974–76 was made incomparably harder than that of neighboring Spain by the efforts of Alvaro Cunhal's hardline Communist Party to seize power.

The main problem with the ANC as a governing party, however, is its own strong continuing attachment to socialism. As with the communists, much of the ANC's economic thinking appears to have been placed in a deep freeze for several decades. What is now thawing is not necessarily doctrinaire Marxism, but the Fabianism of postwar Britain, or even a kind of 1950s Keynesianism, as reflected in the slogan "growth through redistribution." Much of this thinking does not reflect knowledge of economics so much as

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the moral conviction, quite understandable in South Africa's case, that property is unjustly distributed. The liberal economic revolution now sweeping Eastern Europe and Latin America, which maintains that wealth must be created before it is redistributed and favors privatization and liberalization of trade policy, has passed the ANC by. While Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are busily selling off state companies and negotiating free trade pacts, the ANC is steadfastly opposed to the further privatization of South African parastatals, which are regarded as family heirlooms or, less gracefully, milk cows for future public-sector employment once a black government is in power.

THE OTHER troubling aspect of ANC policy is in the political realm. Though the ANC vows that it is committed to pluralism, it also clearly expects to be the sole political force in post-apartheid South Africa, and its pluralism seems to amount to no more than the tolerance of a few small parties operating in its shadow. There is a strong current of Leninist thinking within the ANC, manifest in the desire to subordinate all aspects of civil society to ANC leadership. Much of the township violence in the past year has been due to the ANC's aggressive recruiting efforts. The ANC has tried to sign up all black organizations, whether political or not, to its cause, and has used intimidation if consent was not voluntarily forthcoming. This has provoked tensions between the ANC and its erstwhile allies. For many years, the black trade union organization, COSATU, and its predecessors stood together with the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. Now that apartheid is falling apart, however, and the prospect of an ANC government looms on the horizon, it is not so clear that ANC interests will coincide with those of COSATU. It is perhaps for this reason that the trade unions over the past year have sought to distance themselves from the ANC by forbidding their leaders to sit on the executive committees of political organizations. This has not gone down very well with the ANC, which would like to see the unions function as its labor wing.

Then there is the whole question of the ANC's attitude toward the rule of law. It is of course unreasonable to expect blacks to respect a constitution and legal system that was turned against them so overtly for so many years, and the ANC has long followed a policy of undermining respect for an unjust rule of law by organizing rent and electricity boycotts, staging "people's trials" for collaborators in the townships, winking at or even encouraging "necklacing," attacking local elected officials, and the like. As it faces the prospect of coming to power, this attitude toward the law will have to change rapidly if South Africa is not to degenerate into a more generalized anarchy (the townships are already on the way to being ungovernable), or else into another African dictatorship. Unfortunately, the behavior of Winnie Mandela and of her many supporters within the ANC, and their effort to brand the verdict against her as purely political, does not inspire a great deal of confidence in this regard.

The big question for the future is the degree to which the ANC's instinctive Leninism on economic and political issues will change as it approaches the prospect of political power. The ANC has already come a great distance in its programmatic statements over the past five years. Its spokesmen are now careful to insist that they don't want old-fashioned nationalization of industry, and that their goal is a "mixed economy" with a healthy private sector. A recent ANC policy document called for state spending of 35 percent of GNP, compared to the present 27 percent—the basis for an extremely high rate of inflation, but at least still within the same universe of discourse as the government.

Terrible as it is, the township violence may be having one salutary effect insofar as it is forcing the ANC to accept the necessity for a degree of pluralism. The ANC has been disappointed in its expectation that it would be able rapidly to sign up a large proportion of South Africa's blacks to its own ranks; to date, its official membership stands at only 300,000. There may be a growing recognition that the black community, let alone South

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Africa as a whole, is too large and diverse to be controlled by a single, centralized party.

Three Scenarios

IN THINKING about future scenarios for South Africa once a new government, based on one man, one vote, is in place, it is useful to think in terms of analogous futures. The first, and most optimistic scenario, is that the future South Africa will be like Germany—that is, the developed part of the country will peacefully absorb the less developed part and, while suffering a temporary drop in living standards, will ultimately bring it up to its level. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the nightmare of Lebanon: the current township violence will spread and become the future of the country as a whole as increasingly it is partitioned between different ethnic and racial communities that have taken up arms to defend themselves. In between is the Latin American model where decline is not so much political as economic: massive increases in public spending followed by hyperinflation, leading to a situation like that of Brazil (if one is optimistic) or Peru (if one is not).

Of these different futures, the one most clearly out of the question is the German model. Indeed, the Germans themselves are discovering that absorbing their formerly communist neighbors, who share a common language, ethnicity, and culture, is going to be far more costly and difficult than they initially thought. It is a widespread misconception, fostered for many years by the apartheid regime but believed by many blacks, that South Africa is a relatively rich First World country that has simply failed to share the wealth adequately with its black population. It is in fact a middle-income developing country with a per capita income on the level of Mexico or Poland, and an absolute GNP about the size of Argentina or Indonesia. Economic growth over the past decade has been averaging 1.5 percent in real terms, falling behind the rate of population growth. Just under half of South Africa's nearly 30 million blacks live in the countryside, many of them at subsistence levels or lower, so that a number of rural areas face the prospect of starvation, just as in Mozambique and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly, no amount of redistribution of wealth away from the country's 5 million whites will be sufficient to bring so large a population up to First World standards, quite apart from the effect that massive redistribution itself and the consequent undermining of property rights would have on the country's ability to create wealth. Barring a sudden and unlikely jump in the price of gold, any efforts at black economic empowerment will have to take place in conditions of declining per capita income.

The second scenario—that South Africa will come to resemble Lebanon, with persistent civil strife among its constituent ethnic populations—is suggested by the current township violence. This is the fate that has befallen Southern Africa's two most recent ex-colonies, Angola and Mozambique, with truly horrific results. Many of the same ingredients exist in South Africa, including a fearful white population suddenly losing its monopoly of political power, Marxist-Leninist political parties ready to impose doctrinaire ideological blueprints, ethnic and tribal antagonisms, now liberated from the need to form a common front against the whites, and a deteriorating economy.

Much as this scenario is on the minds of many, I found a surprising degree of equanimity on the part of South African whites as they contemplated the prospect of sharing power with the ANC, and a self-confidence that they could avoid being dragged into the political free-fall that characterized Angola and Mozambique. There are a number of reasons for this. South Africa has a large and relatively healthy market economy in which the interests of blacks and whites are inevitably intertwined. The whites know that they are the best-armed and most cohesive tribe in South Africa; if push comes to shove, they are positioned to defend themselves and could send the black economy into a rapid and abysmal tail-spin. The international climate is also

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much more favorable for a peaceful transition than it was when Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in the 1970s. The civil wars in those countries were made much more intense by outside intervention—by the Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa itself, and the United States. Soviet attitudes toward the liberation struggle in South Africa have changed dramatically. Moscow has neither the inclination nor the resources to cause real trouble now, nor do the other frontline African states bordering South Africa, which on the contrary have a considerable stake in the health of the South African economy.

As for the domestic political scene, many white South Africans are confident that, despite the troubling policy positions taken by the ANC, there is a flexibility and lack of fanaticism in black political culture that will make it possible for the radicals to be "brought along" to support a core of Western liberal economic and political institutions.[9] Many blacks and whites share a commitment to Christianity. It is remarkable that for all of the objective grounds for bitterness and hatred that exist on the part of the black community, there is a surprisingly good level of race relations day-to-day.

If a future South Africa will resemble neither Germany nor Lebanon, and if its economy remains too strong for it to sink into African poverty in the short-run, the question then becomes which Latin American country it will take after. For if it seems just possible that South Africa can skirt a political maelstrom of instability and violence, it is hard to see how it can avoid a long-term economic deterioration. The starting point for this deterioration is the evident need for the redistribution of wealth within the country. To a much greater degree than in other developed countries, it is possible to say that the rich in South Africa got their wealth at the expense of the poor and that it is important to remedy the situation.

The problem is that any large-scale attempt to right these wrongs over a short period of time would be self-defeating in that it would wreck the economy, and thereby undermine the basis for wealth creation that is the only hope for black South Africa itself. It is here that the evolution of the ANC's economic thinking over the next few years will be critical. Both the ANC and SACP have asserted that they want to preserve a "mixed economy," but the precise mixture of public and private could spell the difference between "muddling through" and total disaster.

Were the ANC to attempt to implement its current economic program today, it would begin by massively increasing public spending on precisely those social services that were so lacking for blacks in apartheid South Africa.[10] The ANC has a rather naive belief in how much foreign capital it can attract, based in part on overzealous promises by Western sympathizers. Like others around the world, its leaders are believers in the Cargo Cult of the 1990s, the mythical "Japanese investor" or American foundation that will bring capital to South Africa once its industries have been "democratized." In fact, financing would have to be largely internal, coming in part from higher taxes on individuals and corporations, and in part from larger government deficits and higher rates of inflation.

The ANC would seek to use the public bureaucracy and the parastatals to boost black employment, in the first instance for its own political supporters.[11] In doing so, it would simply be following the unfortunate example of the Afrikaners after 1948, whose

[9]This attitude shades over into a conservative and rather racist one that believes that Africans are simply not to be taken seriously, and a guilt-ridden liberal one that cannot believe that the ANC will do anything bad or undemocratic. Both of these views on the part of whites can lead to a dangerous complacency.

[10]For example, the ANC has proposed a five-year, 58.8 billion rand ($22 billion) spending program for items like housing, employment training, adult literacy, rural infrastructure, and the like. See *Mayibuye* (April 1991), pp. 40–1.

[11]Despite its free market program, it is not clear that Inkatha is any more in favor of further privatization than the ANC.

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success would be very hard for a much larger black community to duplicate. Since capital would not flow automatically to struggling black businesses, the state would be tempted to make it available through credit subsidies or the takeover of the banks, and when the parastatals began to lose money, the government would step in and cover their losses to prevent them from going bankrupt. All of the conditions would then be ripe for Brazilian-style hyperinflation, and as capital started leaving the country for more stable shores, the government would intervene with even stricter currency controls than at present, allowing it to manage an even larger part of the economy.

But while the state can prevent the exodus of capital, at least in the short term, it cannot prevent the exodus of skills. And it is this that presents the greatest dilemma for the ANC or any future black government. However unfair the current degree of white property ownership, and however insulted and injured the black population has been by the apartheid system, the future economic prospects of South Africa will depend to a very large extent on whether the whites can be persuaded to stay on in a nonracial, post-apartheid democracy. The same sort of bitter irony also characterizes the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where former communist managers and party bosses are ending up as the entrepreneurs and businessmen of the region's marketizing economies. While it does not seem fair that people who prospered under the previous oppressive system should do so again in the new one, such an outcome is perhaps inevitable for the foreseeable future, since they are the ones with the know-how and connections necessary to make the economy work.

The whites will not be persuaded to stay unless the new government undertakes to protect their property rights, ensure their physical security, and maintain the quality of schools and health care. First to go if these conditions are not met will be the English-speaking business community, which feels emotionally bound to Europe in any case and has plenty of alternatives outside South Africa. It is frequently said that the Afrikaners will stay to the last because they have nowhere else to go, but this exaggerates. History has unfortunately provided many examples of communities far more rooted in a particular territory—like the Jews of Europe or even the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique—who nonetheless fled abroad to escape political and economic chaos.

IT IS HARD to overstate the potential economic disaster that would await South Africa were this to happen. The rest of sub-Saharan Africa has been moving backward economically at a breathtaking pace for most of the 1980s. While South African per capita GNP has been falling, the rate of decline is nowhere near that of the rest of the continent: absolute GNP for the six most populous economies of sub-Saharan Africa fell at an average rate of 0.8 percent per annum between 1981 and 1987, while GNP per capita fell at a rate of some 4 percent per year. Africa's cities have been de-industrializing, its roads and communications systems collapsing, and its environment undergoing rapid degradation. All of this region's 450 million people now produce about as much wealth as Belgium's 10 million, and many parts of Africa are poorer than when they gained independence.[12] Sadly, it would appear that colonialism, far from having been responsible for Africa's poverty, was in fact a major source of skills and infrastructure, and that the region has become worse off economically the further from colonialism it gets. This is not meant to justify either colonialism or apartheid, but only to be realistic about the economic dangers facing this part of Africa. Brazilians say that their land has such natural

[12] According to World Bank figures, countries like Nigeria, Niger, and Liberia (prior to the recent civil war) have experienced calamitous drops in per capita GNP of 25 percent since 1980. African indebtedness as a percentage of GNP is also the highest of any region in the world, including Latin America.

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plenty that they can repeatedly mess up economic policy and still not starve; South Africa, for all of its mineral wealth, does not have this kind of margin for error.

South Africa would be doing very well indeed if, a decade from now under a black government, it could emulate Brazil which, despite a state of perpetual economic crisis, has nonetheless managed to sustain a record of growth. But Brazil would seem to represent the very upper limit of economic possibilities, while Peru, with its constant economic crisis and long-term stagnation, may be a more probable model given current ANC plans. And if the ANC's more radical redistributive policies are implemented, the Peruvian future could be merely a way station on the road to becoming a Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Tanzania.

American Policy

THE UNITED States does not and probably never did have any serious strategic interests in Southern Africa.[13] American interests in the region all along have been political and ideological—that is, the promotion of democracy, stability, and economic growth among the various countries of Southern Africa. Such an understanding of U.S. interests, incidentally, provided plenty of grounds for actively opposing the Soviet-Cuban position in the region. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it should now be possible to look at U.S. policy aims very largely in regional terms, without recourse to Cold War geopolitical arguments.

In retrospect, it would appear that Congress' passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) mandating sanctions against South Africa had a real, though secondary effect in achieving its goal. But if sanctions were a useful tool of policy in the mid-1980s, their relevance in the present transitional period is growing more questionable day by day. It is very likely that the remaining conditions stipulated in the CAAA for lifting sanctions—the release of all political prisoners, the repeal of the Population Registration and Group Areas Acts, and the agreement to negotiations without preconditions—will have been met by Pretoria at the end of the current parliamentary session in July. It is for this reason that Archbishop Desmond Tutu has suggested that anti-apartheid forces now reconsider the need for sanctions. The ANC and its allies continue to lobby their Western friends to maintain sanctions past the fulfillment of the CAAA's conditions until there is actually a black government sitting in Pretoria. Its interest in doing so is clear: the government has held the high ground in determining the pace and scope of the negotiations to such an extent that in the All-Parties Conference, the only real leverage the ANC has to enforce its point of view is the threat to break off negotiations—a not very credible option which they have already sought to exploit—and its ability to urge the end of sanctions. It is obvious that this latter card will be played only with a great deal of care.

Sanctions are unnecessary for "keeping Pretoria's feet to the fire," for too much of the National Party government's prestige is committed to renegotiating the constitution on the basis of one man, one vote to consider turning back now. Indeed, it must have a new constitution in place before the next all-white election, scheduled for 1994. The main issue is no longer whether to dismantle apartheid, but rather the shape of the political and the economic system that will emerge after the new constitution. In that struggle, orthodox liberal democrats in the West, no matter what their sympathy with the original anti-apartheid cause, are going to end up siding much more with the government than with the ANC.

The United States does have an interest in helping South Africa write a constitution like its own, based on majority rule and

[13]This point is made cogently by Robert B. Shepard in "South Africa: The Case for Disengagement," *The National Interest* (Winter 1985/86), pp. 46–7.

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respect for individual rights. It has no interest in promoting a constitution drafted with the help of experts from the former East Germany (now disgraced in their own country) with economy-busting guarantees for rights to employment and health care. Maintaining sanctions past the point when the South African government has fulfilled all of Congress' original conditions for lifting them would be to inject ourselves into the latter debate, but on the wrong side. In the meantime, sanctions continue to hurt all South Africans, black and white, and will make the task of the first majority-rule government that comes to power under the new post-apartheid order all the more difficult.

But if sanctions are lifted because of the dismantling of apartheid, there is the danger that Americans will respond not with an enthusiastic effort to help build democracy in South Africa but with indifference. The chief interest of many American liberals was to be seen struggling against a hated white minority government; it will be much less appealing for them to oppose yet another socialist African regime sliding into dictatorship and economic decay. Many conservatives, on the other hand, regard the ANC as a communist-front organization whose interests are inimical to our own, and would want nothing to do with it were it to come to power. Both are likely to treat post-apartheid South Africa as just another part of a backward, powerless, and unfortunate continent.

But the United States does have an interest in seeing democracy succeed in South Africa, as it does in Eastern Europe and Latin America, since the success of liberal democracy abroad will affect the vitality of democracy at home and is the best guarantee of regional peace. A necessary condition of success is that the ANC drop its socialist agenda, and internalize concepts of pluralism and civil society. This suggests that Americans ought to consider a policy of "constructive engagement" with the ANC and its allies, much as the Reagan administration did with the Botha regime. If the United States was willing to deal with the latter, it can hardly shun the former. The purpose of such an engagement would not be to further lionize Mandela or the ANC, but to engage them frankly in a serious discussion of the meaning of rights and constitutional government, economic policy, and the like. This engagement does not have to be underwritten by the U.S. government; the German Chamber of Commerce, for example, has invited an ANC delegation to visit both halves of their formerly divided country to see the effects of socialist planning firsthand. The people who need to be reached include the ANC's lower ranking leadership who will staff the national bureaucracies in the future, and the hardliners whose horizons are no broader than the townships or perhaps the metropolis of Lusaka.

South Africa and Worldwide Democracy

IF THERE is any single answer to the question of why South Africa is moving toward full democracy at the beginning of the 1990s, it is because it, like the Soviet Union, China, South Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan, has gone through a period of authoritarian modernization that completely transformed the social and economic character of the country's elites. These liberalizing revolutions are connected to one another not so much through the international system as by a common internal pattern of socio-economic development.

Socio-economic modernization is neither a sufficient, nor even a necessary, condition for democracy. It is merely very helpful. There are numerous examples of economically modern countries—ranging from the Germany of the 1930s to present-day Singapore—that are not democracies, and conversely, of predominantly agricultural countries that are—like Costa Rica or the United States in 1776. One still needs democratic ideology and politicians who are willing to act on it. The "demonstration effect" of other democratic transitions, and a broader intellectual climate that accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy,

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prepared the way for F.W. de Klerk's own moves. His predecessor, P.W. Botha, by contrast, began the current liberalization process in South Africa, but could not bring himself to face the consequences of true democracy, and to this day he regards de Klerk as a traitor to the Afrikaners.

The best long-term guarantee for stable democracy in a future South Africa would be for the black population to undergo the same process of social evolution as the Afrikaners, from poor illiterate farmers to literate blue collar industrial workers to college-educated white collar managers and professionals. South Africa's problem is that the forces of economic modernization have only begun to operate on the much larger black community, whose starting point was in any case considerably behind that of the Afrikaners. In many townships, it is impossible to recreate even the sweatshops of Hong Kong, since potential seamstresses cannot read the instructions of their sewing machines.

The architects of the apartheid system have themselves to blame for much of this state of affairs, since apartheid sought to obstruct the social modernization of the black community. This bad situation was made much worse, however, by the politicization of the past fifteen years. Blacks have retreated significantly in social terms: there is an entire generation of township "comrades" who refused what education they were offered and are now part of a semi-criminal underclass. For this, the ANC must share the blame.

Unfortunately, the main obstacle to black social modernization in the future may well be the belief in socialism on the part of the ANC and its communist allies. Capitalism, if left to itself under a system of truly equal political rights, will tend to modernize South African society and bring about what Tocqueville called an "equality of condition." Unplanned and without resort to coercion, capitalism fosters an enormous social revolution, tearing people away from traditional attachments and forms of authority and bringing about a new order in which education, skill, and work rather than race or tribe determine a person's status.

Socialism has always presented itself as a higher and more progressive form of social organization than capitalism. But in the contemporary world, socialism has been revealed to be an obstacle to social and economic modernization—the hallmark of a certain kind of backwardness that needs to be overcome, just like illiteracy and superstition. The countries of Eastern Europe are now moving rapidly backward into the future, undoing the legacy of forty years of dictatorship and socialist planning. Let us hope that South Africa, as it makes the necessary transition to democracy, does not move forward into the past.□

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Religion and the Third Wave

Samuel P. Huntington

THREE WAVES of democratization have occurred in the modern world. The first one, lasting a hundred years from the 1820s to the 1920s, had its roots in the American and French Revolutions, and was chiefly a North American and European phenomenon. Starting with the end of World War II and continuing until the mid–1960s a second, shorter wave of democratization occurred. Allied occupation promoted the inauguration of democratic institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, and Korea; Turkey, Greece, and much of Latin America moved toward democracy; and the beginning of Western decolonization launched several new democracies in Asia.[1]

The first two waves were each followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the countries that had made the transition to democracy reverted to nondemocratic rule. The first reverse wave began in 1922 with the march on Rome and Mussolini's easy disposal of Italy's fragile and rather corrupt democracy. Over the next two decades, dictatorships came to power in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe and Latin America. These regime changes reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and militaristic ideologies. In 1921, over thirty countries had democratic regimes; in 1942, eleven did. The second reverse wave began at the end of the 1950s; military coups overthrew civilian governments in Greece, Turkey, and most Latin American countries, while semi-authoritarian regimes in Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines were replaced by full-scale authoritarianism. By one estimate, one-third of the thirty-two working democracies in the world in 1958 had become authoritarian by the early 1970s.

A third and still continuing wave of democratization began with the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974. Since then democratic regimes have replaced authoritarian ones in more than thirty countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In other countries, considerable liberalization has occurred in authoritarian regimes. In still oth-

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[1]Following the Schumpeterian tradition, this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.

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ers, movements promoting democracy have gained strength and legitimacy. Although resistance and setbacks have occurred, as in China in 1989, many observers argue that the movement toward democracy has taken on the character of an almost irresistible global tide, moving from one triumph to the next.

Rapid economic development and rising living standards provided much of the impetus and context for democratization in the 1970s and 1980s. Other factors, however, also contributed. One of the most important was religion. Historically, Protestantism and democracy were linked with each other. The first democratic impulse in the Western world came with the Puritan revolution in the seventeenth century. The overwhelming majority of the countries that became democratic in the first wave in the nineteenth century were Protestant. The second-wave countries after World War II were religiously diverse. Nonetheless, in the 1960s a significant relation existed between these two variables. Kenneth A. Bollen's 1979 study of ninety-nine countries, for instance, concluded that "the greater the proportion of the population that is Protestant, the higher the level of democracy. . . ." In contrast, Catholicism was associated with the absence of democracy or with limited or late democratic development. Catholicism, as Seymour Martin Lipset noted in another study, "appeared antithetical to democracy in pre-World War II Europe and Latin America."

THREE PLAUSIBLE reasons have been advanced to explain why Protestantism favored democracy and Catholicism did not. Doctrinally, Protestantism stressed the individual conscience, the access of the individual to the Holy Writ in the Bible, and the direct relation of the individual to God. Catholicism emphasized the intermediary role of the priesthood epitomized in the Latin mass. Second, Protestant churches were themselves more democratically organized, stressing the supremacy of the congregation with no, or only a limited, bishopric. The Catholic Church, in contrast, was an authoritarian organization with its ranks of priests, bishops, archbishops, and cardinals, culminating in the pope and the doctrine of papal infallibility. Catholic countries, as Pierre Elliot Trudeau noted, "are authoritarian in spiritual matters; and since the dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal may be very fine or even confused, they are often disinclined to seek solutions in temporal affairs through the mere counting of heads."[2] Finally, there was the Weber thesis: Protestantism encouraged economic enterprise, the development of a bourgeoisie, capitalism, and economic wealth, all of which facilitated the emergence of democratic institutions.

Until the 1970s these arguments and the association they explained between religion and democracy seemed unchallengeable. That is no longer the case. In its first fifteen years the third wave was overwhelmingly Catholic. Two of the first countries to democratize in the mid–1970s (Portugal, Spain) were Catholic. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the democratization wave swept through South America, the world's only Catholic continent, and then into Central America. In the mid–1980s the wave moved on to East Asia, manifesting itself first in that region's only Catholic country, the Philippines. In the late 1980s, the democratization of Eastern Europe began in Poland and Hungary, that region's two Catholic countries. Everywhere, Catholic societies were in the lead, and roughly three-quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were Catholic.

How can this be explained? One partial answer, of course, is that by the early 1970s, most of the major Protestant countries in the world had become democratic. The principal exceptions were East Germany and South Africa. If many more countries were to become democratic, they would have to be

[2]See Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, John Charles Torres, "Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy" (Unpublished paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1990), p. 29.

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Catholic, Orthodox, or non-Christian. The question remains: why Catholic? A partial explanation may lie in the reversal of another previously existing unfavorable Catholic correlation. Historically, the economic development of Protestant countries was more rapid than that of Catholic ones, and Protestant countries achieved higher levels of economic well-being. Catholic countries were poor countries. Beginning in the 1950s, however, they began to have higher rates of economic growth than Protestant ones. In large part, of course, this was because they were generally at lower levels of economic development to begin with. Economic growth, nonetheless, facilitated transitions to democracy in several Catholic countries.

Bishops and Ballots

A MORE pervasive cause of the surge to democracy in Catholic countries was change in the Catholic Church. In Iberia, Latin America, and elsewhere, the church historically had been associated with the local establishment, the land-owning oligarchy, and authoritarian government. In the 1960s, the church changed. Those changes brought a powerful social institution into opposition to dictatorial regimes, deprived those regimes of whatever legitimacy they might claim from religion, and provided protection, support, resources, and leadership to pro-democratic opposition movements. Before 1960 the Catholic Church usually accommodated itself to authoritarian regimes and frequently legitimated them; only rarely did it oppose such regimes. After 1970, the church almost invariably opposed authoritarian regimes; and in some countries, such as Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, Poland, and in Central America, it played a central role in the efforts to change such regimes. This repositioning of the church from a bulwark of the status quo, usually authoritarian, to a force for change, usually democratic, was a major political phenomenon of the 1960s. The social scientists of the 1950s were right: Catholicism then was an obstacle to democracy. After 1970, however, Catholicism was a force for democracy because of changes within the church itself.

These changes occurred at two levels. At the global level, change was introduced by Pope John XXIII and stemmed from his own style and commitment and from the doctrines articulated in his encyclicals. Most important, however, the changes flowed from the Second Vatican Council which he called and which met from 1962 to 1965. Vatican II stressed the legitimacy and need for social change, the importance of collegial action by bishops, priests, and laity, dedication to helping the poor, the contingent character of social and political structures, and the rights of individuals. Church leaders, Vatican II asserted, have the responsibility to "pass moral judgments, even on matters of the political order whenever basic personal rights. . . make such judgment necessary." These views were reaffirmed and elaborated in the Latin American Bishops' Conferences in Medellin in 1968 and in Puebla in 1979 and in gatherings of bishops elsewhere.

Simultaneously, equally significant changes were occurring in popular involvement and priestly activity at the base of the church. In Spain in the 1960s, for instance, as Juan Linz pointed out:

> New generations of priests, some of them late vocations, perhaps a less rural recruitment of the clergy, a greater awareness of social injustice and contact with the de-Christianized working class, sociological studies of religious practice, the identification of the clergy with the cultural, linguistic minorities in the Basque country and Catalonia, and above all, the impact of the Second Vatican Council, produced a ferment of criticism and unrest among young Catholic intellectuals, laymen, and clergy and conflicts with authority.

In Brazil the 1960s and 1970s saw the rapid spread of popular ecclesiastical base communities, which by 1974 numbered 40,000 and gave an entirely new character to the Brazilian church. Simultaneously in the Philippines a "Christian left" developed that in-

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cluded priests and grass-roots activists, some of whom were Marxist and others of whom supported a social democracy that was both anti-imperialist and anticommunist. In the late 1970s in Argentina, the church shifted dramatically away from its previous conservative coloration with priests mobilizing a massive youth movement leading to what one observer termed "an extraordinary evangelical revival." Similarly, in both Poland and Chile, according to Jackson Diehl of the *Washington Post*, a "grass-roots politicization of the church" occurred:

> The foundation of the church's position in each country can be traced to movements of aggressive, young priests who have strongly identified themselves with the aspirations of local society and sought to organize or protect authentically representative and nonviolent social movements.

These new streams of grass-roots mobilization combined with the new doctrine coming from the Vatican created a new church which almost invariably came into opposition to authoritarian governments.

In noncommunist countries, the relations between the church and authoritarian governments tended to move through three phases: acceptance, ambivalence, and opposition. Initially, conservative elements within the hierarchy were usually dominant, embodying the historical position of the church as establishment partner and defender of social peace. Church leaders in most instances welcomed the establishment of the authoritarian regime. In Spain the church helped Franco to victory and long bolstered his government. Brazilian bishops enthusiastically supported the 1964 coup. In Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere the church similarly legitimated military takeovers.

As the authoritarian regime sustained itself in power and usually intensified its repression, and as the converging trends from the grass-roots and the Vatican were felt in the national hierarchy, the position of the church typically shifted. In Brazil, the Philippines, Chile, Central American countries, and elsewhere, two strands of opposition thought and activity tended to develop within the church. A socialist or "red" strand preached social justice, the evils of capitalism, the overwhelming need to help the poor, and frequently incorporated into its thinking substantial Marxist elements of "liberation theology." The latter influence did not lead the church in the direction of democracy, but it did help mobilize Catholics in opposition to the existing dictatorship. In most countries a moderate or "yellow" strand (as it was known in the Philippines) of opposition also developed which typically included the major segment of the episcopacy and which emphasized human rights and democracy. As a result of these developments, the overall position of churches usually shifted from accommodation to ambivalence.

Breaking Points

AT SOME time, in most countries, a breaking point came in church-state relations when the national bishops' conference or a top church leader explicitly placed the church in opposition to the regime. In Chile the initial brutality of the military regime concerning human rights led to an early break and the formation of the Vicariate of Solidarity in January 1976. In Brazil the break also came early in the life of the military government, when the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops issued a paper denouncing the government's national security doctrine as "fascist" and paved the way for active church opposition by warning Brazilians of Nazi Germany where Christians "accepted government doctrines without recognizing that they contradicted the true demands of Christianity." Shortly thereafter the cardinal of São Paulo dramatically confirmed the break when, in a calculated insult, he refused to celebrate a birthday mass for the military president of Brazil. In Spain the break came much later in the history of the regime with the convening of a unique Assembly of Bishops and Priests in Madrid in September 1971. For the Spanish church,

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this was an extraordinarily democratic gathering whose proceedings were widely reported. In the words of Alfred Fierro Bardaji, it "provided a lesson in democracy" to the Spanish people and passed resolutions endorsing "the right to freedom of expression, free association and free union meetings, in effect all the rights whose exercise has always been very limited during the Franco regime." As a result of the Assembly "the Church clearly separated itself from the state and abandoned the role of legitimizer of the regime." These changes were fully supported by the Vatican. In the Philippines the break came in 1979 when Cardinal Sin demanded the end of martial law and new elections in which Marcos would not run. In Argentina it came in 1981 with the church's issuance of a document on "Church and National Community." In Guatemala the church became an advocate of social justice, reform, and democracy when, between 1983 and 1986, the bishops issued a series of public denunciations and pastoral letters calling for social, economic, and land reform and respect for human rights. In El Salvador the church under Archbishop Romero similarly broke with the government after 1977.

In virtually all the cases where church leaders denounced the regime, the regime retaliated with intensified attacks on Catholic clergy, activists, publications, organizations, and property. Priests and church workers were often seized, tortured, and, on occasion, killed. Martyrs were created. The result was often political, ideological, and economic warfare between church and state. The church became, as in Brazil according to Thomas P. Skidmore, "the most conspicuous opponent" of the authoritarian state and in Chile, according to Mark A. Uhlig, "the center of moral opposition to the regime." In the Philippines and in other countries the church became the principal institution denouncing repression, defending human rights, and pushing for the transition to democracy. The one interesting exception in a deeply Catholic country was Poland, where, beginning in 1980, Solidarity monopolized the role of principal opposition and the Polish church, under the cautious Cardinal Glemp, played a mediating role between government and opposition for several years.

THE NATIONAL churches brought many resources to their war against authoritarianism. Church organizations and church buildings provided refuge and support for regime opponents. Church radio stations, newspapers, and periodicals articulated the opposition cause. As a country-wide and popular institution, the church had, as in Brazil, a national network of members who could be mobilized. It was, in a sense, a latent national political machine with hundreds or thousands of priests, nuns, and lay activists who could provide "people power" for opposition causes. The church often had leaders, such as Cardinals Arns in Brazil, Sin in the Philippines, Romero in El Salvador, and Kim in Korea, who were highly skilled politically. The church created organizations such as the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile to provide support to the opposition and the second National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL or "Nunfrel" as it was often called) in the Philippines to promote a return to the electoral process and to insure honest elections. (The first NAMFREL had been created for similar purposes by the CIA in 1953.)

In addition, of course, the church was a transnational organization. Vatican influence could be brought to bear on occasion, as well as that of other national churches and Catholics in other countries. For instance, the Brazilian church, according to Skidmore, mobilized support abroad "through the Vatican, sympathetic clergy and laymen in Europe and the U.S., and other human rights activists outside Brazil, thereby generating protests in the U.S. and European press. Criticism from those quarters made the Brazilian military especially uneasy."

With the accession of John Paul II, the pope and the Vatican moved to center stage in the church's struggle against authoritarianism. In his first encyclical in March 1979,

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John Paul II denounced violations of human rights and explicitly identified the church as "the guardian" of that freedom "which is the condition and basis for the human person's true dignity." Papal visits came to play a central role. John Paul II seemed to have a way of showing up in full pontifical majesty at critical points in democratization processes: Poland, June 1979, June 1983, and June 1987; Brazil, June-July 1980; the Philippines, February 1981; Argentina, June 1982; Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, March 1983; Korea, May 1984; Chile, April 1987; Paraguay, May 1988.

The purpose of these visits, like that of his many visits elsewhere, was always said to be pastoral. Their effects were almost invariably political. In a few cases, as in Korea and the Philippines, local supporters of democratization expressed regret that the pope had not been more outspoken in backing their cause. More generally, however, he was quite explicit in supporting local churches in their struggles against authoritarian governments, and in Poland, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, Paraguay, and elsewhere, he clearly identified himself with the opposition to the regime. His greatest impact, of course, was in Poland, where his dramatic 1979 visit, as one Polish bishop said, altered "the mentality of fear, the fear of police and tanks, of losing your job, of not getting promoted, of being thrown out of school, of failing to get a passport. People learned that if they ceased to fear the system, the system was helpless." This "first great pilgrimage," Timothy Garton Ash observed, was the "beginning of the end" of communism in Eastern Europe:

> Here, for the first time, we saw that large-scale, sustained, yet supremely peaceful and self-disciplined manifestation of social unity, the gentle crowd against the Party-state, which was both the hallmark and the essential domestic catalyst of change in 1989, in every country except Romania (and even in Romania, the crowds did not start the violence).

Confronting Pinochet in Chile in 1987, the pope spelled out the relation of democracy to his mission: "I am not the evangelizer of democracy; I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the Gospel message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and, if democracy means human rights, it also belongs to the message of the Church."

FINALLY, church leaders and organizations at times intervened politically at critical moments. In 1978 in the Dominican Republic, the church denounced the effort to stop the vote counting and prolong the tenure of President Belaguer. In 1989 in Panama, church leaders similarly denounced Noriega's stealing of the election and invited Panamanian troops to disobey orders that they act against opposition demonstrators. In Chile Cardinal Fresno, like his predecessor, Cardinal Enriquez, was in the forefront of the struggle against the Pinochet regime and in August 1985 played an active role in bringing together the leaders of eleven political parties to sign the National Accord demanding constitutional reform and elections. At a crucial moment in 1986 in the campaign for democracy in Korea, Cardinal Kim in an open political move explicitly endorsed the need for "constitutional revision" and stated, "We have to bring democracy to Korea urgently."

The most extreme political involvement of a church leader was undoubtedly in the Philippines. Cardinal Sin negotiated the arrangements between Aquino and Laurel to join together on a united opposition ticket. A month before the election, the cardinal sent a letter to all 2,000 parishes in the Philippines instructing Catholics to vote for "persons who embody the Gospel values of humility, truth, honesty, respect for human rights and life." This was unlikely to leave any doubt in people's minds as to whom the cardinal was supporting, but he followed it with a virtually explicit endorsement of Aquino. After Marcos attempted to steal the election and the military revolt occurred at Camp Craeme, Sin used the church organization and radio station to mobilize the populace on the military's behalf. As Rosalinda Pineda Ofrenco observed:

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> The religious overtone of the three-day revolt could not be mistaken as nuns and priests occupied the front lines of the human barricades, and rebel generals hoisted up the statue of the Virgin Mary before the crowd. After Marcos had finally gone to Hawaii, Cardinal Sin presided over a triumphal thanksgiving mass at the Luneta, chanting "Cory" and flashing the Laban sign.

Cardinal Sin may have played a more active and more powerful role in bringing about the end of a regime and a change in national political leadership than any other Catholic prelate since the seventeenth century.

All in all, if it were not for the changes within the Catholic Church and the resulting actions of the church against authoritarianism, fewer third-wave transitions to democracy would have occurred and many which did occur would have been delayed. In country after country the choice between democracy and authoritarianism became personified in the conflict between the cardinal and the dictator. Catholicism was second only to economic development as a pervasive force for democratization in the 1970s and 1980s. The logo of the first fifteen years of the third wave could well have been a crucifix superimposed on a dollar sign.

The Western Christian Connection

BY 1990, however, the Catholic impetus to democratization had largely exhausted itself. Most Catholic countries have democratized or, as in the case of Mexico, liberalized. The ability of Catholicism to promote further expansion of democracy without converting non-Catholics is now pretty much limited to Paraguay, Cuba, and a few African countries. In addition, the democratization of East Germany has removed and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa is removing the principal Protestant hold-outs against democracy. Almost all countries in which Western Christianity is the predominant religion are now democratic.

The future of the third wave—whether or not it becomes a truly "global" democratic revolution—thus depends on the extent to which Western Christianity expands into societies where it is now weak or absent and on the extent to which democracy takes root in societies that are not predominantly Christian. Some observers, such as George Kennan in *The Cloud of Danger*, have argued that democracy is an appropriate form of government only for northwestern European countries and their overseas offshoots. Democracy has "a relatively narrow base both in time and in space; and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of government for peoples outside those narrow perimeters." Others have argued that while some non-Western religions may be receptive to democracy, others are not.

Western Christianity is clearly not a prerequisite for democracy—witness Greece, India, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Japan. Yet apart from these countries, very few non-Western Christian societies have sustained democratic politics for any length of time. The nondemocratic countries in the world are now concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In Africa, the primary obstacle to democracy is economic; Christianity, however, is spreading and Christian churches are in the forefront of efforts to promote human rights and democracy. In Eastern Europe, the key political line replacing the Iron Curtain may be, as William Wallace has suggested, the eastern boundary of Western Christendom in 1500. Beginning in the north, this line now runs south roughly along the border between Finland and Russia, the eastern borders of the Baltic republics, through Byelorussia and the Ukraine separating the Catholic Western Ukraine from the Eastern Orthodox Ukraine, south and then west in Romania, cutting off Transylvania from the rest of the country, and then into Yugoslavia roughly along the line separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. The prospects for democracy north and west of this line appear much greater than south and east of it, where Orthodoxy and Islam historically prevailed. In Russia, for centuries the Orthodox Church was the supporter and pillar of the czars.

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During the Soviet period, it was suppressed, persecuted, and prostituted to the purposes of the communist dictatorship. Glasnost has given it new freedom and new vigor. Whether Orthodoxy will become a force for democracy in the Soviet Union or its successor states, however, remains to be seen.

The principal other areas where democracy remains in scarce supply are the Islamic world, stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, and the East Asian countries where Confucianism and Chinese culture have been dominant influences. Three questions are relevant as to whether Islam and Confucianism pose serious obstacles to the expansion of the third wave. First, to what extent are traditional Confucian and Islamic values and beliefs hostile to democracy? Second, if they are, to what extent have these cultures in fact hampered progress toward democracy? Third, if they have done this, to what extent are they likely to continue to do so in the future?

Confucianism vs. Democracy

ALMOST NO scholarly disagreement exists on the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic. The only moderating element was the extent to which in the classic Chinese polity the examination system opened careers to the talented without regard to social background. Even if this was the case, however, a merit system of promotion does not make a democracy. No one would describe a modern army as democratic because officers were promoted on the basis of their abilities. Classic Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and, in diluted fashion, Japan emphasized the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights. Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that individual rights did exist, they were created *by* the state. Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance the state at the national level. "In traditional China," Yu-sheng Lin pointed out in *Confucianism and Modernization*, "there was no conception of the separation of the sacred from the profane, the spiritual from the secular. Political legitimacy in Confucian China rested on the Mandate of Heaven, which defined politics in terms of morality." There were no legitimate grounds for limiting power because power and morality are identical, and "to think that power may be corrupt and requires institutional check and balance is a contradiction in terms."

In practice, Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy. In East Asia only two countries, Japan and the Philippines, had sustained experiences with democratic government prior to 1990; and in both cases, democracy was the product of an American presence. The Philippines, moreover, is overwhelmingly Catholic and Confucianism is virtually absent. In Japan Confucian values were reinterpreted and merged with its autochthonous cultural tradition.

Mainland China has had no significant experience with democratic government, and democracy of the Western variety has been supported over the years only by relatively small groups of radical dissidents. "Mainstream" democratic critics have not broken with the key elements of the Confucian tradition. The modernizers of China have been, in Lucien Pye's phrase, the "Confucian Leninists" of both the Nationalist and Communist Parties. In the late 1980s when rapid economic growth in China produced new demands for political reform and democracy on the part of students, intellectuals, and urban middle-class groups, the Communist leadership responded in two ways. First, it advanced a theory of "new authoritarianism," based on the experience of Taiwan, Singa-

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pore, and Korea and justified by the argument that, for a country at China's stage of economic development, authoritarianism was necessary to achieve balanced economic growth and to contain the unsettling consequences of development. Second, the leadership violently suppressed the democratic movement in Beijing and elsewhere in the summer of 1989.

In China economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy. In Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea spectacular economic growth created the economic basis for democracy by the late 1980s, but economics clashed with culture in shaping political development. In 1990 Singapore was the only non-oil exporting "high-income" country (as defined by the World Bank) that did not have a democratic political system, and Singapore's leader, Lee Kwan Yew, was an articulate exponent of Confucian values. Americans, Lee argued, believe in "multi-party, dissent, discussion, robust discourse, conflict—and out of conflict comes enlightenment. . . . [But] the marketplace of ideas, instead of producing harmonious enlightenment, has, from time to time, led to riots and bloodshed." Political competition is "not the way the Japanese, or the Chinese or the Asian cultures do it. That leads to contentiousness and confusion." Adversarial politics is particularly out of place in a multiracial society like Singapore, and in Singapore, Lee stated, "no one has the right to subvert me." Lee made the teaching and promulgation of Confucian values a high priority for his city-state. Vigorous measures were also taken to limit and suppress dissent and to prevent the circulation of media critical of the government and its policies.

In the late 1980s, Christianity was reported by the *New York Times* to be "stirring in [mainland] China, particularly among young people," although the numbers involved were still extremely small. The Chinese Communist authorities reacted vigorously. They detained scores of Catholic and Protestant clergy and lay activists, launched a campaign against those "conducting superstitious activities," denounced the Vatican for promoting democracy in Eastern Europe, and accused the pope of harboring "reactionary and subversive intentions" toward China. In contrast to China, Singapore is very small, extremely wealthy, highly capitalistic, and vigorously pro-Western in everything, with one exception. On Christianity, the attitudes of the Singapore government have paralleled those of the PRC authorities. Perhaps 5 percent of Singapore's population is Christian, but the government has expressed increasing concern over the spread of Christianity and has become involved in bitter struggles over its repressive policies with the Catholic archbishop of Singapore and the executive leadership of the Catholic Archdiocesan Justice and Peace Commission. Among the wealthy countries of the world, Singapore thus remains an authoritarian Confucian anomaly. The interesting question is: Will it continue to be that once Lee Kwan Yew, who created the state, disappears from the political scene?

The Case of Taiwan and Korea

IN THE late 1980s both Taiwan and Korea moved in a democratic direction. Historically Taiwan had always been a peripheral part of China. It was occupied by the Japanese for fifty years, and its inhabitants rebelled in 1947 against the imposition of Chinese control. The Nationalist government arrived in 1949, humiliated by its defeat by the Communists. As Pye noted in *Asian Power and Politics*, this defeat made it impossible "for most Nationalist leaders to uphold the posture of arrogance associated with traditional Confucian notions of authority." Rapid economic and social development further weakened the influence of traditional Confucianism. The emergence of a substantial entrepreneurial class, initially composed largely of native Taiwanese, created in very un-Confucian fashion a source of power and wealth independent of the state dominated initially by mainlanders. This produced in Taiwan a "fundamental change in Chinese political culture, which has not occurred in China itself or in Korea or Vietnam—and

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never really existed in Japan. . . ." In Taiwan spectacular economic development thus overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian legacy, and in the late 1980s Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui responded to the pressures produced by economic and social change and gradually moved to open up politics in their society.

IN NORTH Korea American efforts to promote democracy after World War II failed before the authoritarianism of Syngman Rhee in the 1950s, the military regime of General Park Chung Hee in the 1960s and 1970s, and the brutal military dictatorship of General Chun Doo-hwan in the 1980s. The failure of democracy was congruent with traditional Korean religion and culture. In Korea the classical culture included elements of mobility and egalitarianism. Yet it also contained Confucian components uncongenial to democracy, including a tradition of authoritarianism and one-man rule. As one Korean scholar put it in the *New York Times*, "people did not think of themselves as citizens with rights to exercise and responsibilities to perform, but they tended to look up to the top for direction and for favors in order to survive." In the Confucian tradition, toleration for dissent had little place, and unorthodoxy was disloyalty. "In the Korean religious tradition," a Korean religious leader also observed, "negotiation and compromise are not recognized as a social norm, but as selling out. Confucian scholars never used the word compromise. They had to maintain their purity of conscience, and that cultural trait is still here. How then can we form a democracy where compromise is a way of life?"

In 1987, however, Korea did form a democracy. Chun retired from office, his successor, Roh Tae Woo, was elected president in a relatively fair and highly competitive contest, and the following year opposition parties gained control of the parliament. What caused this transformation? It was primarily the result of Korea's spectacular economic development and the consequent urbanization, higher levels of well-being, increased education, and substantial expansion of the middle class. Religious change, however, also played a highly significant role. At the end of World War II Korea was primarily a Buddhist country with a Confucian overlay. Perhaps 1 percent of the population was Christian. By the mid–1980s, roughly 25 percent of the population was Christian, four-fifths Protestant (largely Presbyterian), and one-fifth Catholic. The Christian converts were primarily young, urban, and middle class. Their reasons for espousing Christianity stemmed from the profound social and economic change taking place in Korea. "For the millions who poured into the cities," as Henry Scott Stokes described it, "and for many who stayed behind in the altered countryside, the quiescent Buddhism of Korea's agrarian age lost its appeal. Christianity with its message of personal salvation and individual destiny offered a surer comfort in a time of confusion and change."

Christianity also offered a surer doctrinal and institutional basis for opposing political repression. Christianity, as one South Korean put it, "made a difference because it promotes the idea of equality and respect for some authority independent of the state." Confucian authoritarianism and Buddhist passivity were replaced by Christian militancy. In 1974 five bishops led 5,000 Roman Catholics in the first major demonstration against President Park's martial law system. Many of the principal leaders of the opposition movements, such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, were Christian, and Protestant and Catholic clergy, such as the Reverend Moon Ik Hwan and Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan, were leaders in attacking the repression of the military government. By the early 1980s the churches had become the principal forum for opposition to the regime. In 1986 and 1987 Cardinal Kim, other Catholic leaders, and the principal Protestant organization, the National Council of Churches, all strongly supported the opposition campaign for direct election of the president. Sook-Jong Lee has noted that, in the conflict with the government,

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> Churches and cathedrals provided an institutional basis for the activities of human rights and justice, and a public space to share dissenting opinions and faiths. Catholic priests, Roman Catholic Association of Young Catholic Workers and Urban Industrial Mission and protestant ministers were politicized and began to represent an important part of the anti-government movement. Myongdon Cathedral in Seoul had been a symbolic site for political dissidents. . . .

Korea thus, in a sense, reversed the Weber connection: economic development promoted the expansion of Christianity, and the Christian churches, their leaders, and communicants were a major force bringing about the transition to democracy in 1987 and 1988.

The East Asian Variety

THE INTERACTION of economic progress and Asian culture appeared to generate a distinct East Asian variety of democratic institutions. As of 1990, in no East Asian country except the Philippines (which is, in many respects, more Latin American than East Asian) had a turnover occurred from a popularly elected government of one party to a popularly elected government of a different party. The prototype was Japan, unquestionably a democracy, but a democracy that has not truly met the test of turnover. The Japanese model of dominant-party democracy tended, as Pye has pointed out, to spread elsewhere in East Asia. In 1990 two of the three opposition parties in Korea merged with the government party to form a political bloc which would effectively exclude the remaining opposition party, led by Kim Dae Jung and based in the Cholla region, from ever achieving national power. Korean President Roh Tae Woo justified this merger by the need to "achieve political stability" and to counter the "explosion of long-suppressed strife between different classes, generations, and regions. . . ." We must end, he said, "confrontations and splits over partisan interests."

In the late 1980s, democratic development in Taiwan seemed to be moving toward an electoral system in which the Kuomintang was likely to remain the dominant party with the Democratic Progressive Party formed in 1986 confined to a permanent opposition role. In Malaysia the coalition of the three leading parties from the Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities first in the Alliance Party and then in the National Front similarly controlled power in unbroken fashion against all competitors from the 1950s through the 1980s. In the mid–1980s, Lee Kwan Yew's deputy and successor, Goh Chok Tong, endorsed a similar type of party system for Singapore:

> I think a stable system is one where there is a mainstream political party representing a broad range of the population. Then you can have a few other parties on the periphery, very serious-minded parties. They are unable to have wider views but they nevertheless represent sectional interests. And the mainstream is returned all the time. I think that's good. And I would not apologize if we ended up in that situation in Singapore.

A first criterion for democracy is equitable and open competition for votes between political parties with an absence or minimal levels of government harassment or restriction of opposition groups. Japan clearly met this test for decades with freedom of speech, press, and assembly and reasonably equitable conditions of electoral competition. In other Asian dominant-party systems, for many years the playing field was tilted, often heavily in favor of the government. At the end of the 1980s, however, conditions were becoming more equal in some countries. In Korea the government party was unable to win control of the legislature, and presumably this failure was a major factor in its subsequent merger with two of its opponents. In Taiwan restrictions on the opposition were gradually lifted. It is thus conceivable that other East Asian countries could join Japan in having a level playing field for a game which the government always won. In

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1990 the East Asian dominant-party systems thus covered a continuum between democracy and authoritarianism with Japan at one extreme, Indonesia at the other, and Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore in between, more or less in that order.

A dominant-party system could meet the formal requisites of democracy, but still differ significantly from the democratic systems prevalent in the West. In some Western societies, such as Sweden, one party has remained in power through many elections. More generally, however, in the West, political parties and coalitions not only freely and equally compete for power but also over time take turns in power. In contrast, the East Asian dominant-party systems which may be emerging seem to involve competition for power but not alternation in power, and participation in elections for all but participation in office only for those in the "mainstream" party. It is democracy without turnover. The central problem in such a system, as Pye has observed, is drawing the boundaries between "the domain of the dominant party and the degree of tolerance of an opposition." This type of political system represents an adaptation of Western democratic practices to serve Asian or Confucian political values. Democratic institutions work not to promote Western values of competition and change but Confucian values of consensus and stability.

Western democratic systems are less dependent on economic success than are authoritarian systems. The incumbents, not the system, receive the blame for poor economic performance, and the ouster and replacement of the incumbents leads to the renewal of the system. The East Asian societies that adopted or appear to be adopting the dominant-party democracy model had unequalled records of economic success from the 1960s to the 1980s. What happens, however, if and when 8 percent GNP growth rates disappear, unemployment, inflation, and other forms of economic distress escalate, and social and economic conflicts intensify? In a Western democracy the response would be to turn the incumbents out. In a dominant-party democracy, however, that would mean a revolutionary change in a political system based on the assumption that one party would always be in power and other parties always out. If the structure of political competition does not allow that to happen, unhappiness with the performance of the government could well lead to demonstrations, protests, riots, and efforts to mobilize popular support to overthrow the government. The government then would be tempted to respond by suppressing dissent and imposing authoritarian controls. The question thus is: To what extent does the East Asian dominant-party combination of Western procedures and Confucian values presuppose sustained substantial economic growth? Can this system last during prolonged economic downturn or stagnation?

The Prospects for Islamic Democracy

"CONFUCIAN democracy" is clearly a contradiction in terms. It is unclear whether "Islamic democracy" is. Egalitarianism and volunterism are central themes in Islam. The "high culture form of Islam," Ernest Gellner has argued, is "endowed with a number of features—unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic—that are congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernization." They are also generally congruent with the requirements of democracy. Islam, however, also rejects any distinction between the religious community and the political community. Hence there is no equipoise between Caesar and God, and political participation is linked to religious affiliation. Fundamentalist Islam demands that in a Muslim country the political rulers should be practicing Muslims, *shari'a* should be the basic law, and *ulama* should have a "decisive vote in articulating, or at least reviewing and ratifying, all governmental policy. . . ." To the extent that the governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine and

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religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics.

Islamic doctrine thus contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy. In practice, with one exception, no Islamic country has sustained a fully democratic political system for any length of time. The exception is Turkey, where Mustafa Kemal Ataturk explicitly rejected Islamic concepts of society and politics and vigorously attempted to create a secular, modern, Western nation-state. Turkey's experiment with democracy also has not been an unmitigated success. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, Pakistan attempted democracy on three occasions, none of which lasted long. While Turkey has had democracy interrupted by occasional military interventions, Pakistan has had bureaucratic and military rule interrupted by occasional elections. The only Arab country to sustain a form of democracy for a significant period of time was Lebanon; its democracy, however, really amounted to consociational oligarchy, and 40 to 50 percent of its population was Christian. Once Muslims became a majority in Lebanon and began to assert themselves, Lebanese democracy collapsed. Between 1981 and 1990 only two of the thirty-seven countries in the world with Muslim majorities were ever rated "free" by Freedom House in its annual surveys: the Gambia for two years and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for four. Whatever the compatibility of Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone together.

Opposition movements to authoritarian regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe, in Latin America, and in East Asia almost universally espoused Western democratic values and proclaimed their desire to introduce democratic processes into their societies. This does not mean that they invariably would have introduced democratic institutions if they had had the opportunity to do so. At least, however, they articulated the rhetoric of democracy. In authoritarian Islamic societies, in contrast, movements explicitly campaigning for democratic politics in the 1980s were relatively weak, and the most powerful opposition tended to come from Islamic fundamentalism.

In the late 1980s, domestic economic problems combined with the snowballing effects of democratization elsewhere led governments in several Islamic countries to relax their controls on opposition and to attempt to renew their legitimacy through elections. The principal initial beneficiaries of these openings were Islamic fundamentalist groups. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front swept the June 1990 local elections (the first free elections since the country became independent in 1962), gaining 65 percent of the popular vote and winning control of Algiers, 32 of 48 provinces, and 55 percent of 15,000 municipal posts. In the Jordanian elections in November 1989, Islamic fundamentalists won 36 of 80 seats in parliament. In Egypt, many candidates associated with the Moslem Brotherhood were elected to parliament. In several countries, Islamic fundamentalist groups reportedly were plotting insurrection against the existing regimes. The electoral showings of the Islamic groups reflected in part the absence of other opposition parties, either because they had been suppressed by the government or because they boycotted the elections. Nonetheless, fundamentalism seemed to be gaining strength in Middle Eastern countries. Among the groups that appeared most sympathetic to fundamentalism were merchants and younger people. The strength of these tendencies induced secular heads of government in Tunisia, Turkey, and elsewhere to adopt policies advocated by the fundamentalists and to make gestures demonstrating their commitment to Islam.

Liberalization in Islamic countries thus enhanced the power of important social and political movements whose commitment to democracy was questionable. The position of fundamentalist parties in Islamic societies in the early 1990s resembled, in some respects, the position of Communist Parties in Western European countries in the 1940s and again in the 1970s. Comparable questions arose concerning them. Would the existing governments

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continue to open up their politics and hold elections in which Islamic groups could compete freely and equally? Would the Islamic groups gain majority support in those elections? If they did win the election, would the military, which in many Islamic societies (e.g., Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia) is strongly secular, allow them to form a government? If they did form a government would it pursue radical Islamic policies that would undermine democracy and alienate modern and Western-oriented elements in society?

The Limits of Religious Obstacles

CONCEIVABLY, Islamic and Confucian cultures pose insuperable obstacles to democratic development. Several reasons exist, however, to question their permanence. Similar arguments about religion have not held up in the past. As has been noted, at one point many scholars argued that Catholicism was an obstacle to democracy. Others, in the Weber tradition, argued that Catholic countries were unlikely to develop economically in the same manner as Protestant countries. Yet in the 1960s and 1970s Catholic countries became democratic and, on average, had higher rates of economic growth than Protestant countries. Similarly, at one point Weber and others argued that countries with Confucian cultures would not engage in successful capitalist development. By the 1980s, however, a new generation of scholars saw Confucianism as a major cause of the spectacular economic growth of East Asian societies. In the longer run, will the thesis that Confucianism prevents democratic development be any more viable than the thesis that Confucianism prevents economic development? Arguments that particular cultures are permanent obstacles to development in one direction or another should be viewed with a certain skepticism.

Furthermore, great historic cultural traditions, like Islam and Confucianism, are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, writings, and behavior patterns. Any major culture, including even Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic. Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confucian society need not be. The question is: What elements in Islam and Confucianism are favorable to democracy and under what circumstances can these supersede the undemocratic elements in those cultural traditions?

Finally, even if the culture of a country is at one point an obstacle to democracy, cultures historically are dynamic, not passive. The dominant beliefs and attitudes in a society change. While maintaining elements of continuity, the prevailing culture in a society in one generation may differ significantly from what it was one or two generations previously. Spanish culture in the 1950s was usually described as traditional, authoritarian, hierarchical, deeply religious, honor-and-status oriented. By the 1970s and 1980s, these words had virtually no place in a description of Spanish attitudes and values. Cultures evolve, and economic development is a primary force for cultural and religious change. As they develop economically, non-Western societies are more likely to see virtues in political democracy than in Western Christianity and they will become more likely to reinterpret their religious and cultural traditions so as to make them compatible with the democratic political practices. Catholicism made that adjustment. If the third wave is to lead to global democracy, comparable changes will have to occur in Confucianism and Islam.□

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Winners and Losers

A Postwar Balance Sheet

Fred Barnes

WHEN GENERAL Norman Schwarzkopf, the Desert Storm commander, returned from Saudi Arabia and visited the White House on April 23, his reputation preceded him. He was regarded as demanding, hard to please, and often brutally critical of those who let him down. Though Desert Storm was a plum assignment, at least one general thought seriously about seeking a transfer because he found Schwarzkopf impossible to work for. Among the Pentagon brass, including Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Schwarzkopf was viewed, by the end of the war, as a chronic publicity-hound. This especially irritated General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who advised Schwarzkopf to curb his time with the press. Schwarzkopf didn't. He sat for a TV interview with David Frost in which he seemed to question President Bush's decision to end the war abruptly on February 28.

At the White House, where he ate lunch with Bush and chatted with senior officials, Schwarzkopf was a different person. He was meek. When Bush asked him questions, he was terse, practically tongue-tied. After their meeting, the president and Schwarzkopf stepped outside the Oval Office for a photo opportunity on the steps to the Rose Garden. Bush was relaxed and jovial, while the general stood at rigid attention. When reporters shouted questions, Bush refused to respond, but encouraged Schwarzkopf to answer. "Norm, go ahead," he said. Schwarzkopf stepped toward the clutch of reporters, then thought better of it. "If the president isn't going to answer any questions, I damn sure am not going to answer any," he said. And he didn't.

Schwarzkopf's behavior points up what I think is the most tangible and inarguable of the consequences of the war with Iraq: Bush was hoisted several notches above the common run of world leaders and American political figures. Polls, which measure superficial popularity, don't quite catch the stature enhancement that has occurred. But you see evidence of it in the way people act toward Bush: they're awed, respectful, and eager to please in a way they weren't before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Schwarzkopf acted like a schoolboy in the presence of his headmaster. Senator Sam Nunn, the chief Democratic spokesman on military matters, has gone silent. Even when Bush turned cautious after the war and balked at aiding Kurdish and Shiite insurrections against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Democratic leaders were wary of criticizing him. And foreign leaders who weren't full allies in the anti-Saddam coalition—King Hussein of Jordan, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan—are desperate to get in Bush's good graces.

Before assessing the other consequences of the war, let's remember two things. One is

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the unique context of the entire crisis. Saddam couldn't have picked a worse time to seize Kuwait. The Cold War was over, but the United States still had a Cold War-sized military machine. "Those two things only overlapped for a little while," says a senior White House official. A smarter man than Saddam would have waited five years until the downsizing of American forces was completed. Then, it's doubtful the Pentagon could have deployed 500,000-plus troops in the Persian Gulf. But bullies are impatient. Saddam picked a fight with a lavishly armed superpower at the very moment Iraq was losing its own superpower patron, the Soviet Union.

The other thing is the dog that didn't bark. Imagine what the world, the Middle East in particular, would be like if Saddam hadn't invaded or if he'd retreated from most or all of Kuwait by the January 15 deadline. Saddam would be firmly in power. The pre-war notion that he couldn't afford to abandon Kuwait because he'd lose face and be overthrown—what nonsense this proved to be! After all, Saddam kept power even after suffering a humiliating military defeat in which Iraq's modern infrastructure was destroyed and its armed forces crushed. If this wasn't enough to prompt a coup, a retreat certainly wouldn't have been.

Absent the war, Saddam would have his boot on the world's economic jugular, namely the Persian Gulf and its oil. He'd have enormous influence on the price of oil, even the ability to cut some countries off from OPEC supplies. His weapons of mass destruction would be intact, his program to develop nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles proceeding rapidly. He'd be on the verge of putting chemical weapons on missiles. Arab radicalism would have an aggressive leader ready to foment trouble for Israel. In panic, Israelis would respond by accelerating their nuclear program. Saddam would also be free to undermine America's moderate Arab allies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. The Middle East would be extraordinarily unstable. And if Saddam pulled out of Kuwait, the United States would still have to leave a large contingent of troops in the Gulf. Saddam would be an international menace, causing endless problems and stirring friction among America and its allies. And the principle of rolling back unprovoked aggression with military force would not be established.

My point is that we're better off for having had the war. Peaceful alternatives, including containment of Iraq by U.S. forces, wouldn't have achieved the same decisive results. Here's what the war produced—and didn't produce—in six areas.

The World

THE UNITED States, as the lone superpower, has more prestige and clout. How do we know this? Just look at Jordan, the world's best weather vane. Whoever wields the most power, that's whose side King Hussein of Jordan wants to be on. He sided with Saddam in the Gulf Crisis, denouncing the United States for waging "a war against all Arabs and Muslims, not just Iraq." Postwar, Hussein insists there was a terrible misunderstanding about what he'd said. He was all smiles after meeting with Secretary of State James Baker in April. "I believe that this is a milestone in terms of relations between our two countries, which have grown and developed over many, many years—suffered maybe in recent times—but this is a relationship based on mutual respect, friendship," the King said. This was one of the fastest crawlbacks in human history.

King Hussein isn't alone. Syria, without the Soviets as a superpower patron, is keen on building a relationship with the United States. That's one reason President Hafez al-Assad joined the anti-Iraq coalition in the first place. He's eager to get off the State Department's list of terrorist sponsors. If the United States hadn't defeated Iraq, Assad would have rejoined the radical Arab front. Iran has warmed a bit toward the United States, too. Its ceasefire initiative was partly aimed at opening a channel to Washington.

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And Iran was eager to obtain American aid in the postwar refugee crisis. Egypt knuckled under when the Bush administration said to cease attempts to revive Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Jordan also dropped its pro-PLO bid. Israel suddenly made concessions in the peace process, agreeing to an international conference with European nations involved. (Okay, Saudi Arabia didn't respond as well, but I'll get to that in a minute.) There were also events, predicted by the antiwar crowd, that didn't happen: mass anti-American demonstrations by Arabs, a wave of terrorism, the alienation of Morocco, Pakistan, Algeria, etc.

Soliciting U.S. favor isn't solely a Middle East phenomenon. The Soviets gave ground on both the agreement on conventional forces in Europe and the strategic missile talks (START). Japan and Germany, which declined to send military forces to the Gulf, pleaded for understanding. It was a one-way street; the United States wasn't courting them. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sought emergency meetings with Bush. He brushed them off. The war revealed the difference between economic superpowers and real superpowers. "Both Japan and Germany are hamstrung by their constitutions and their politics," says a senior Bush adviser. "Neither is able to translate their wealth into political and military influence." Kaifu had to beg Bush to meet with him in California in April, before Bush's scheduled session at the White House with former Prime Minister (and Kaifu rival) Noboru Takeshita and before a crucial election in Tokyo. Bush magnanimously agreed. He delayed his meeting with Kohl until three months after the war. Kohl was characterized pre-August 2 as "the most important politician in the world" (*Vanity Fair*). Not quite. Bush talked to Kohl only once while putting together the anti-Saddam coalition. At the time, Kohl was vacationing at a fat farm in Bavaria.

The war makes American military intervention politically easier in the future. With the Iraq experience, not Vietnam, to go on, both mass and elite opinion in the United States are far less isolationist. Vietnam taught that American intervention was morally wrong and militarily ineffective; the lesson of Iraq is the opposite. True, the conditions for intervention in Iraq were stringent: international support, the massing of an "invincible force" under UN auspices, the exhaustion of diplomatic alternatives. This was because Iraq was a militarily strong dictatorship, a regional power. North Korea may be the only other Third World country in this category. In other instances, UN approval won't be necessary. When the United States intervened a second time against a weakened Iraq—in April to protect the Kurds—Bush considered seeking UN approval, but decided against it. There was no international outcry.

The war didn't unleash U.S. interven-

Patrons and Clients

For weeks, the President has been proclaiming that the successful end to the war to drive Iraq from Kuwait signaled an end to the "Vietnam syndrome."

But it is clear now that he has been defining that generational problem in relatively narrow terms of America's ability to express its national will and is suddenly confronting the broader aspects of the Vietnam legacy: the risks of being drawn into a political quagmire.

"When I first became Secretary of State, I asked the policy planning staff to give me a memorandum on how a great power avoids becoming a satellite of a small country that is completely dependent on you," said Dean Rusk, who was Secretary under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. "They didn't come up with a very good answer for a problem that we had in our time and which I'm afraid Bush has now."

The New York Times, April 18.

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tion willy-nilly. Even when two necessary preconditions are met—moral cause, American interests affected—intervention won't be certain. Bush exaggerated when he exclaimed the day after the war ended, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." It was half kicked, the half that says intervention will fail because the U.S. military can't fight. But fear persists at the White House, State Department, and Pentagon of being drawn into a "quagmire." Bush used the word obsessively to explain his decision not to oust Saddam or help the Kurds or Shiites do it. The word caught on. "American military forces engaged in a civil war inside Iraq would fit the definition of quagmire, and we have absolutely no desire to get bogged down in that fashion," echoed Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft believes the United States needed to adhere tightly to its stated objectives of liberating Kuwait and destroying Saddam's offensive military capability. If the United States overstepped, its intervention would reek of imperialism, and the world would be leery of U.S. intentions in the future. Maybe, but in any case the Bush administration hasn't gone intervention crazy.

The Middle East

THE BALANCE of power was altered here. The security of Israel is now assured for the foreseeable future. Egypt, neutralized by the 1979 peace treaty, isn't a problem. The defeat of Iraq means the radical eastern front coalition against Israel no longer exists. Syria has plenty of missiles and tanks, but it won't confront Israel without a partner (Iraq) or patron (Soviet Union). Nor will Syria confront the region's dominant power, the United States. For Syria, the message from the war is: if the United States will fight for Kuwait, it will fight for Israel. Moreover, the PLO is discredited and impoverished. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states have stopped referring to the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. They also stopped bankrolling the PLO. And the threat to Israel from Lebanon is manageable, all the more so with a weak PLO and tame (for now, anyway) Syria. Finally, the free flow of oil was secured and the prospects of anti-American mischief in the region minimized.

All this was the product of war. Bush, Scowcroft, and Secretary of State James Baker assumed success at war would lead automatically to success in peace. Baker talked of a "window of opportunity" opening in the Middle East peace process. He was dreaming. Forging a permanent settlement meant muscling allies, which was more than Bush was willing to do. It required Bush to follow the logic of *Pax Americana* and act like an imperial president. He declined, settling for limited intervention and shuttle diplomacy among Middle East capitals by Baker. The United States wouldn't lean on the ally that owed it the most, Saudi Arabia. During the war, the Saudis hinted to American officials about detente with Israel. After the war, they reneged, and Bush let them get away with it. It wasn't the first time they'd betrayed the United States: In 1979, they spurned the Camp David accords; in 1983, they indicated they'd back the Israel-Lebanon treaty, then didn't when Secretary of State George Shultz came to Riyadh to sign them up. As a result, Shultz became pro-Israel.

If Bush had wanted to re-order the Middle East, he was free to do so. The Soviet Union, once a roadblock, isn't a serious player anymore. Bush could have ordered American forces to head for Baghdad. President Turgut Ozal of Turkey believes this would have prompted Saddam to flee and allowed a more democratic government to emerge in Iraq. Then, Bush could have injected himself in the peace process, asserting publicly that now is the time to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and inviting the parties to Washington for talks with him. He could have told them exactly what he expected, and pressured them to accept. He could have pushed arms control, first by leaning on the

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suppliers (Europeans, Soviets, Chinese), then the users. But rather than imperial ambitions, Bush was motivated by the desire to limit American intervention. He gave up the idea of a postwar trip to the Middle East. If Arabs and Israelis were ready to move toward a settlement, Bush would help. Bush settled for the same role the United States played before the war—broker, not boss.

Washington

CHENEY, Powell, Vice President Dan Quayle up; Baker down. That's shorthand for the change in the balance of power inside the administration. Neither Cheney nor Powell had a close, intimate relationship with the president before the war. Scowcroft, not Bush, had spearheaded Cheney's nomination as defense secretary after the initial pick, John Tower, was rejected by the Senate. Cheney, in turn, elevated Powell to chairman of the Joint Chiefs. "Cheney was by far the most benefited," says a White House official. "He was transformed from a cabinet secretary with an unattractive job, reacting to events rather than shaping them, overshadowed by Baker, to a war hero." He gained Bush's confidence. He reinforced Bush's hawkishness during the Crisis and his desire to disengage afterward. Cheney's new stature was reflected in the muted criticism of his base-closing proposal a few weeks after the war; prewar, his proposal would have ignited congressional rage.

Powell emerged as probably the strongest JCS chairman ever. He tutored Cheney on strictly military matters. Cheney, concentrating on his relationship with Bush, gave Powell nearly full rein at the Pentagon. Quayle "gained in the president's estimation," says a senior Bush aide. Quayle's advice was consistently correct. He thought the possibility of mediation with Saddam was slim, and persuaded Bush that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir could be worked with and wouldn't blindly thrust Israel into the war if attacked. Alone among Bush's top advisers, Quayle favored American protection for the Kurds, a position Bush later adopted.

Baker was slow to come around to Bush's hawkishness, which caused him to be shut out of the inner war cabinet (Bush, Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft). Baker made two blunders, neither of them forgotten at the White House. In November, his aides leaked that Baker was restraining Bush's eagerness to go to war. "He has been a brake on any immediate impulse to use military force," wrote Thomas Friedman in the *New York Times*. White House officials saw the story as Baker's effort to posture himself as a skeptic in case the Bush policy failed. In January, two weeks into the war, Baker issued a joint communique with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh. It said the United States would accept a ceasefire if Iraq began withdrawing from Kuwait, and it promised the Soviets a role in postwar peacemaking. Baker was freelancing. The communique hadn't been approved by the White House. Bush was blindsided on the night of his State of the Union address. Scowcroft was furious because he felt Baker had lied in claiming to have informed a White House aide of the communique. Baker's survival was never in doubt, so close is he to Bush. But he's less trusted now.

There's another balance of power in Washington, Congress versus the presidency. The conventional wisdom is that the White House gained the upper hand because of the war. I don't think so. Bush's personal stature soared, but the clout of his administration on Capitol Hill didn't. Personal attacks on Bush abated, but he didn't pick up votes on any issues. And Congress actually increased its say in foreign policy by having a war vote. Bush didn't want one, Cheney even less so. Bush said he had the authority to go to war, no matter how Congress voted. Nonetheless, he lobbied hard and won the vote. But Democratic leaders, even while losing, made it more likely that future decisions on war will be accompanied by a congressional vote.

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Politics

THERE'S a reason Democrats keep losing the White House (five out of the last six), and the war reinforced it: they're weak on defense. They can get by with liberal social policies, high taxes, and lavish domestic spending. In fact, except for taxes, these help Democrats win Senate, House, state, and local races. But the presidency is unique; presidents must protect the national security. As commander-in-chief, the president is sometimes required to use force. Democrats have balked at this for two decades. Republicans haven't. The result is a split-level realignment in which Republicans have an advantage in presidential races, but not in lesser races. In 1988, Bush played on this in an ad that showed Michael Dukakis in a tank. It cruelly mocked his pretension to being commander-in-chief.

By opposing the war and arguing lamely that sanctions might have worked, Democrats damaged themselves badly at the presidential level. The memory of this war won't fade. The run-up consisted of six months of national apprehension about fighting a well-armed and ruthless enemy. Every moment was covered on TV. The six-week war released nationalist fervor pent-up since the loss of Vietnam. Bush, vindicated, was amazed at the wildly emotional response his appearances evoked. This was no Grenada. Even if Democrats nominate a pro-war presidential candidate in 1992, he'll have a lot of explaining to do for his party.

Senator Al Gore of Tennessee voted for the war, but just barely. He asked for speech time from both Democrats and Republicans and didn't decide until the morning of the vote. Since then, he's pandered to Democratic isolationists rather than trumpet his vote. Still, he's better off than Governor Mario Cuomo of New York, who suggested that Saddam be bought off with chunks of Kuwait. Or Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, who argued endlessly about the superiority of sanctions to war. Or House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, who suggested in a stolen moment that Democrats might cut off funds for American troops in the Gulf. Or Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, whose decision to turn dovish just this once was politically catastrophic. Nunn sacrificed his most valuable asset, his reputation as a pro-defense Democrat willing to use force and knowing how to do it. Dim Democratic prospects for president in 1992 are one thing, House and Senate races another. Voters usually don't hold members of Congress responsible for national security. They want services, tax cuts, etc. The war issue should help the GOP only marginally in congressional elections next year.

The Press

REPORTERS came close to a day of reckoning over their anti-administration, anti-Pentagon attitude. They were spared by the swift military triumph. "Reporters became part of the victory," says Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary. "There was a feeling the military won and the press lost," says Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams. "That's not the case." The public forgot its irritation with press hectoring of officials, whining about restrictions, broadcasting from Baghdad. A postwar Times-Mirror survey found that in the afterglow of victory huge majorities of Americans liked both the coverage (84 percent) and Pentagon limits on coverage (83 percent).

The press ought to be chastened by having churned out so many bad or misinformed stories. It isn't. My favorite was a piece by Patrick Tyler of the *New York Times* which said American bombing had failed to dent the combat effectiveness of Saddam's Republican Guards. Another, by Bart Gellman of the *Washington Post*, said Saddam could win by losing—that is, lose the war militarily but win politically. Only a Washington reporter could believe that. The press wanted to cover Vietnam again, focusing on Pentagon foibles and lies. That line of reporting reached its apex when hundreds of Iraqi civilians were killed by a bombing raid on a

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Baghdad bunker. Bill Blakemore of ABC, reporting in Baghdad, appeared outraged. Reporters in Washington were doubtful of Pentagon explanations. Saddam tried to milk the incident for propaganda, but then stepped on the story by proposing a ceasefire and withdrawal. The press shifted its attention to his peace bid.

A legacy of Vietnam was the grudge the military held against the press. A legacy of the war against Iraq is the grudge the press holds against the military. Reporters and editors are convinced the military kept them from covering much of the story. Never mind that there was more coverage of this war than of any in history. There was live TV coverage from Baghdad and of Scud attacks on Israel. Reporters like John King of the Associated Press wandered all over Saudi Arabia. Correspondents accompanied every combat division in Desert Storm. The public felt it was inundated with information. But the press hated Pentagon-run pools and the few trivial instances of censorship. Unlike Vietnam, every reporter was not free to go wherever he wanted, whenever he wanted. The consequence of all this? Reporters, harboring the myth they weren't allowed to cover the war, are bent on thwarting all restrictions next time.

The Military

THE BUDGET won't change, force downsizing will continue, and new powers granted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to the JCS chairman and field commanders-in-chief like Schwarzkopf will remain.[1] What's new is the reputation of the American military and its weapons. Soviet military officials had predicted the advent of electronic warfare and warned that the Soviets couldn't keep up with American technology. Their worst fears were realized in Iraq. The F–117 Stealth and its precision-guided weapons performed almost flawlessly. Not one F–117 was shot down or hit. In World War II, it took 300 bombs to be certain you'd hit one target. In Vietnam, 30. In Iraq, 1. This is as revolutionary a development as the submarine was years ago. The United States now has the ability to enter a fight—or start one—unobserved. Though an attack on Iraq was anticipated, the United States still managed tactical surprise. Stealth technology and precision-guided weapons loom large in military planning. Cheney is a believer. So is General Merrill McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff.

One other thing didn't change: the reluctance of the Pentagon to commit troops to combat. Powell initially wanted Bush to pursue a containment strategy against Iraq, as Bob Woodward disclosed in *The Commanders*. That would have taken a year or two, with American troops languishing in Saudi Arabia. I don't think it would have ever forced Saddam out of Kuwait. Cheney confided to associates that Powell was a lot closer to his dovish predecessor, Admiral William Crowe, than people outside the Pentagon knew. Powell's advice might have prevailed if Bush hadn't been determined to move decisively against Saddam. Of course Powell carried out the president's strategy ably. The lesson here is that in a crisis there is no substitute for bold presidential leadership.

Last December, Democrat Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, volunteered for Air Force reserve duty and spent nine days in Saudi Arabia. He sat in on briefings, attended staff meetings, read the target plans for the first forty-eight hours of air war, talked to F–117 pilots. "They knew they'd pull it off," he said. "Their confidence was infectious." McCurdy came away convinced the air war would go phenomenally well and wouldn't take long. He concluded that the worst case scenario wasn't credible. Most Democrats in Congress, some administration officials, and millions of Americans thought it was. Next time, they'll know better.□

[1]On this point, see Kurt Campbell's "All Rise for Chairman Powell" in the Spring 1991 issue of this magazine.

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In the Sacred Name of Anti-Imperialism

At 5am on February 28, President George Bush, on the advice of his chiefs of staff, ordered a halt to all military activity in the Gulf. How many of us, I wonder, waking up to that decision, did not breathe a sigh of relief? And when General Schwarzkopf appeared before his map at his final press conference that afternoon, and pointed out that the road to Baghdad had lain open but that the allies had chosen not to take, it, I remember thinking: thank God. Here, at last, was a war which had been fought, and brought to an end, entirely within the remit of international law.

Looking today at the terrible plight of the Kurds, the rightness of that decision is less obvious. Yet it seemed perfectly clear at the time. To have carried on fighting would have greatly widened the scope of a war that had, supposedly, a single aim: the liberation of Kuwait. It would have made a mockery of Bush's repeated assurances that this was not a battle to destroy the Iraqi dictator.

It would have exceeded the authority granted by the United Nations. It would have enraged the Soviet Union. It would have split the coalition. It would have killed tens of thousands more Iraqi troops. It would, in short, have brought down on the White House the wrath of liberal opinion across the world—including, I have to confess, my own liberal opinion. . . .

Yet what has actually happened since the ceasefire should prompt all thoughtful people, especially those on the left, to ask themselves a hard question. Are not the Kurds in their wretched encampments, and the thousands still being imprisoned, tortured and murdered in northern Iraq, paying the price for our tender consciences of two months ago? Are not the Kurds—and the Shi'ites in the south, for that matter—the victims not of our imperialism but of our anti-imperialism?

For the past 46 years, anti-imperialism has been a strong force in world politics. One by one, the main imperial powers have been de-imperialised. . . . Half a century ago, a true imperialist would have known precisely what to do with Saddam: find him and execute him (or, if you were British, find him, try him, and then execute him). Baghdad would have been garrisoned. The Kurds and the Shi'ites would have been given a measure of self-government. Iraq's oil wealth would have been seized; the money used to pay for the occupation and for the rebuilding of Kuwait. And who is to say, looking now at the nightmarish pictures on television, that such an outcome would not have been the most merciful course, for Kurd and Iraqi alike?

Instead of which, in the sacred name of anti-imperialism, we washed our hands of the problem. . . .

The Kurds have only one hope: that the United States, Britain and France will guarantee them a secure zone north of the 36th parallel and that, in time, this region will form the nucleus of a Kurdish state, its existence forced on Baghdad, by military might if necessary.

Straight lines drawn on maps in the chancelleries of the West; frontiers imposed on distant regions by alien powers in the name of the greater good; maybe even airstrips—the hill forts of the 20th century—strategically placed in dusty mountain valleys. . .

Does this all not have a familiar ring? Could it be that the wheel has come full circle, and that Western imperialism offers the Kurds their best chance of salvation?

Robert Harris, *The Sunday Times* [London], April 14.

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Cheap Excuses

Germany and the Gulf Crisis

Alan Sked

I have always found the word Europe in the mouths of those who are asking of others something they don't dare impose on themselves.

—Otto von Bismarck

The Germans must realize that they cannot expect the United States, Canada and the countries of western Europe to assume the sacrifices that arise from the creation of a defense front, while Germany makes no contribution.

—Konrad Adenauer

We must not allow the developments of recent weeks to become a cheap excuse for not establishing political union.

—Hans-Dietrich Genscher, February 1991

THE GULF WAR has highlighted the gap between aspiration and reality in Europe. Jacques Delors, president of the EC, himself confessed to the World Economic Forum in February that "the European Community has been ineffectual. Its inadequate response has cast doubt over the whole process of European union." In Great Britain, both the prime minister and the leader of the opposition agreed. In January, John Major told the House of Commons that Europe was "not ready" for political union, and Neil Kinnock explained that, "Since the EC should really have no competence in defense matters, and will, in any case, have great difficulty in developing credibility in defense matters, the arguments for retaining NATO as the functioning security structure remain."

The French, Belgian, Italian, but especially the German, foreign ministers took a different line. "Nobody," said Herr Genscher, "will be allowed to hide his reticence over Europe behind developments in the Gulf." He added: "We must strive ever more resolutely to act as one in foreign and security matters" (*The Times* of London, February 4). As far as Britain was concerned, he was not prepared to listen to any "cheap" excuses about Germany's role in recent developments. Predictably, he was backed by the prime minister of Belgium, whose role in Gulf War diplomacy had been equally criticized. Both men wanted to use the disparity of effort and commitment displayed by European governments vis à vis the Gulf as an excuse (though of course not a "cheap" one) to continue the drive toward unity. Herr Genscher, like Herr Kohl, believed that "the vision of a federal state must be the cornerstone of a European peace order."

In all likelihood there will be a second gulf war, one fought over the gulf between the federalists and the anti-federalists in Europe. It is a war that the anti-federalists must

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win, for it is now clear that the defense of liberty cannot be entrusted to a European federal state dominated by an inward-looking, provincial, and pacifist Germany; a Germany which may yet establish a special relationship with Moscow rather than Washington. The free world will simply not remain free for very long if the American eagle is obliged to mate with a teutonic, double-headed European ostrich.

Europe's Farcical Response

IN THE bland words of British Prime Minister John Major, "There [was] clearly a considerable disparity in the extent to which individual European countries. . . committed themselves to the problems of the Gulf." Junior Defense Minister Alan Clark was less polite: "One of the arguments of those plugging the Euro-unification argument was that we were going to move into a common foreign policy, military and financial policy. But at the first test, they all ran for their cellars." The British alone passed the test. Over 30,000 British troops plus a considerable number of ships and aircraft were sent to the Gulf.

Around Europe, the war brought chaos, even farce. In France, President Mitterrand met the British prime minister at the Elyseé immediately before the expiration of the UN deadline and deliberately neglected to inform him of a French peace plan which was to be proposed to the UN Security Council within the hour. Meanwhile, heading the Ministry of Defense was Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a founding member of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship Society who, according to London's *Evening Standard* (January 29), described Saddam as a "fine and honorable leader, a man devoted to the promotion of peace in the region," one "much admired by the people of France." His commitment to the war in the Gulf was demonstrated by sending the aircraft carrier *Clemenceau* to Djibouti, with helicopters rather than planes aboard. It eventually sailed home, and he eventually resigned after two weeks of war, at which time his faction in the governing French Socialist Party claimed that the crimes of Saddam in no way exonerated America's desire for war. Another of his colleagues accused Mitterrand of "hypocrisy" and of having "made a bad joke" of affairs. The former Gaullist defense minister, Pierre Messmer, more appropriately, accused the president of prevarication.

If the French attitude was less than robust, the refusal of the Belgian government to sell 155-mm artillery shells to British troops was downright shameful. Belgium, after all, is a British creation, a country that would not have come into existence were it not for Lord Palmerston's diplomacy in the 1830s. It was Britain, moreover, that safeguarded Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War; Britain that went to war in 1914 over Belgium ("brave little Belgium"—how things change!); and Britain that helped liberate Belgium in 1944. A Belgian Euro-MP, Elio Di Rup, having described Saddam Hussein as "a pretty intelligent, straightforward and determined character," explained Belgium's response:

> People in the West have become too important for their own good. They have lost the ability to recognise a regional conflict when they see one. This war is not something for countries like Belgium to get involved in. We know it isn't really anything to do with us. But then the U.S. says it has, so all the governments like Britain fall in behind. I hope ours doesn't (*Evening Standard*, January 30).

One wonders at the inability to ponder what would have happened to Belgium in two world wars had the Americans, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders adopted a similar view of "regional conflicts." As it was, on the day that war broke out in the Gulf, it was discovered that the Belgian Foreign Office had issued a visa to one of the Middle East's leading terrorists, a man who was first arrested in the Grade Place in Brussels and then released. The Belgian defense minister, meanwhile, is rumored to be a pacifist whose main interest outside politics is the study of Eastern philosophies.

Little wonder then that retired Belgian

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General Robert Close formed an "Ashamed to be Belgian" faction and declared: "Our policy makes me sick." Belgium eventually flew a few elderly jets to Turkey and provided medical and other supplies to the allies. But this, as in so many other European cases, was a matter of gesture, not commitment.

Austria, for example, after weeks of prevaricating, offered just over $11 million to help relieve the refugee crisis in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, and 900 domestic hospital beds (but not blankets or nursing care) for war casualties. Meanwhile, outraged demonstrators took to the streets claiming that the country's neutrality had been infringed by permission given to British and American military planes to fly overhead, despite the fact that the aircraft were not allowed to carry weapons. According to one diplomat, Austria's application to enter the Community might well be affected by this performance, though given the general European response, this would seem positively unfair.

The key question, however, is why the Germans were blind to their responsibilities in the Gulf Crisis. They, after all, populate the largest and richest country in the Community; they have been the most vocal in pursuit of political union; they acknowledge a special responsibility toward Israel; and they are the most dependent on the import of Middle Eastern oil. On this last point, Mrs. Thatcher observed to me during the conflict: "The paradox is that it is those with the oil who are doing the fighting, and those without it who are not."

The Generous Germans

GERMAN policy on the Gulf provides a somber, if timely, warning for the West. The official response to the Gulf War was quite straightforward. In a "toneless voice" (*Die Zeit*), Chancellor Kohl told the German *Bundestag* that "Germans will never fight in the Gulf." Nor, at first, did it seem as if they would help anyone else fight there either. Officials in Munich confirmed that between the invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of war—a period of five and a half months—Bonn refused to sanction the delivery of spare parts for allied Tornadoes flying in the area. Bonn also refused, right up until the third week of the war, to rescind the official ban that had been imposed the previous September on low-flying Tornado practice flights in Germany. The London *Daily Telegraph* reported that

> Tornado pilots, who need to practise flying below 250 feet at least twice a week in order to be fully prepared for combat, are bitter and concerned that Bonn refuses to make an exception to last September's ban. "Half the squadron is unable to practice properly. Those who are practicing are having to travel to Scotland from our German bases" said a pilot at RAF Bruggen.

It was reported that after the loss of several aircraft in the first weeks of the war, the German military attaché in London was told that German policy must shoulder part of the blame. Tornado pilots heading for the Gulf were eventually allowed two weeks' low-flying practice before leaving Germany.

The reaction of Britain and America to Germany's initial response was withering and alarmed many German commentators. According to the *Bild Zeitung* at the end of January: "NATO feels contempt for Germany. In 10 days Bonn has ruined a reputation it took three decades to construct." Karl Kaiser of the German Institute of Foreign Policy said: "I think German foreign policy is building up a debt that will take a long time to pay off." Volker Ruehe, the general secretary of the ruling Christian Democrats, declared: "There are light years between debates in the British and French parliaments and those in Germany. The German stand is making a nonsense out of European union." Not surprisingly, therefore, German policy changed. By the middle of February, up to $10.5 billion was committed to allied expenses (including up to $950 million for Israel). The British were to get $560 million. Nineteen ships (including destroyers, frigates, and minesweepers) were sent to the Mediterra-

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nean (not a conflict zone), while 18 aging Alpha jets and 300 airmen, together with 420 airmen in 11 air defense units, were sent to Turkey. All this was not only meant to repair the diplomatic damage but to allow the Germans to claim (as did one counsellor of the German Embassy in London to me) that they were contributing more to the war than the British! Along the same lines, *Die Zeit* felt able to carry an article by Frank A. Meyer entitled "No Nation Is So Generous" which ended:

> The question is not whether Germany is sufficiently generous with the pledges. The question is whether Germany can finance all the pledges made to all sides. Germany is today with a probability bordering on certainty, the most generous nation in the world, and that in the cause of democracy and freedom.

The change in German policy on the Gulf under allied pressure should not go unnoticed. Nor indeed should its financial contribution. Yet even its more recent stance should be put in perspective. I am not here referring to the fact that since the Gulf Crisis began, there has been a 54 percent increase in the number of Germans claiming exception from military service on the grounds of conscientious objection; nor to the reported forty *Luftwaffe* pilots who resisted transfer to Turkey; nor even to the 7,000 military reservists who told the German Defense Ministry that they were unwilling to be mobilized. What really must be addressed—and critically addressed—are the following themes: Germany's constitutional position and the implications for defense; Germany's attitude toward NATO; Germany's attitude toward the Middle East; and Germany's attitude toward the world in general. Only then can we make some sort of assessment regarding foreign and defense policy priorities for the West as a whole.

Clauses vs. Clausewitz

"THE GERMAN constitution prevents German troops being deployed outside NATO territory." So wrote the German ambassador to Britain in the London *Sunday Times* on February 3. The same claim was repeated by the German chancellor, the German foreign minister, and nearly all German politicians. Certainly the German political parties appeared to have agreed to agree on this. But is it true?

According to *Die Zeit* (February 8), "there are contradictory opinions" on the matter. The distinguished editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* opined (on January 10) that "the constitution nowhere restricts defense to a NATO context. . . . The constitutional objection and the 'out-of-area' objection are cheap excuses." Jochen Thies, the editor of *Europa Archiv*, agreed in an article in the *World Today:* "The German *Grundgesetz* [Basic Law] has never explicitly forbidden the stationing of German soldiers outside the NATO area." Bonn's insistence that it does he condemns as "nothing but a feeble compromise" between the political parties. Even German President Richard von Weizaecker admitted as much in his interview with *Die Zeit* (February 8) in which he stated that Germany should change its attitude toward UN peacekeeping activities by contributing troops. When asked whether a change in the constitution would be required, he proclaimed:

> The constitution is a binding expression of our historical-political situation and introspection. It is accessible to new developments. *That we can follow no other policy is not because we have a clause in the constitution* [emphasis added]. It has much more to do with the complete agreement that emerged between the victorious powers, all our neighbours, and our own German sensibilities during the whole post-war period, that German military activities should remain limited to the defense of our own country and the territories allied with it.

It should by now be fairly clear that the objection to Germany fighting in the Gulf was based on political considerations, not constitutional imperatives. The German constitution came into effect in 1949. Germany did not enter NATO until 1955. It would be remarkable indeed if there were any direct

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Euro-Disease

A new spectre is today haunting the political stage of Europe: *xenophobophilia*. The term applies not only to those who contribute directly to the increase of hostility to foreigners, in order to exploit it politically, but also to those who, while not actively approving of xenophobic tendencies, nevertheless attempt to draw political profit from them.

Report by the European Parliament's investigating committee on Revival of Fascism and Racism in Europe, 1985
Reported by *European Affairs* (April/May 1991).

references to NATO in the Basic Law. And there are none. In fact, the constitution has very little to say about the role of armed forces abroad and what it does say is very straightforward. The truth is that its authors were more worried about the control of the armed forces within Germany than its role outside the country. The result is that the armed forces are always described as "defensive." Thus Article 87a(1) states: "The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defense purposes. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget." Other articles describe how democratic control of the armed forces will be maintained if and when Germany is attacked ("state of defense") or experiences a "state of tension." None of this is relevant, however, to the question now at issue.

In this case all there is to go by is Article 87a(2) which reads: "*Apart from defense* [emphasis added], the armed forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." It is in this context that we arrive at the real substance of the constitution on this matter, by which I refer to Articles 24(2) and 26(1). The first reads: "For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe *and among the nations of the world* [emphasis added]." Article 26(1) reads: "Acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be a punishable offense."

Clearly, unless the German government believed that the Gulf War was an "aggressive war" on the part of the allies, there was no possible constitutional objection to the use of German troops in the Gulf. Far from restricting their use to Europe, the Basic Law explicitly allows German troops to help "secure a peaceful and lasting order . . . among the nations of the world" as part of "a system of collective security." If "defensive" means only to be used in case of an attack on NATO or Germany, a question arises as to the nature of the rest of NATO's forces. Were the British, U.S., and French forces not "defensive"? Were their respective governments using them aggressively? Were they acting therefore in a sense punishable under Article 26(1)? If they were, then the German government should say so plainly. If they were not, then the Germans are deprived of their ultimate excuse. In any case, it is impossible to believe that the authors of the Basic Law were so stupid as to hold that armed forces can be defined as "defensive" or "aggressive" simply on account of their geographic location. It is little wonder, then, that the political parties have never attempted to actually test the constitution.

EVEN SO, the matter, alas, cannot be disposed of so easily. While we may agree with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that the constitutional objections were "invented," the German political parties are nonetheless maintaining their pretense. This is doubly dangerous, not merely because of the dishonesty involved, *but because they are threatening to introduce a constitutional clause which would indeed restrict the ability of German troops to fight abroad.* All the parties are

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now agreed that German troops should be able militarily to support UN policies. The Christian Democrats would define this as allowing them to support future operations such as those that took place in the Gulf. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, would restrict the use of German armed forces to UN "peace-keeping missions" (*Blauhelmen* or "blue helmets") in the narrowest sense of the UN Charter, and only then after a two-thirds vote of approbation by the German *Bundestag*. The Free Democrats find themselves in the middle, supporting a clause which would also restrict German activity to peace-keeping missions but after a simple majority vote of approval.

Probably nothing will change, but if there should be a move to alter the constitution, the likelihood is that, given that constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in the *Bundestag*, the Free Democrat position will prevail. And, given the true interpretation of the Basic Law, that would represent a step back rather than a step forward. To quote the editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (January 19) once again:

> The Opposition with the aid of the FDP wishes to insert in the constitution a formula, which would link the use of German troops "out of area" to a motion of the United Nations or the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. This would really lead to a constitutional barrier, which today is just an excuse. The United Nations is an assembly of the Third World; the present unity of the great powers in the Security Council behind sanctions is an exception, not a breakthrough to a better UN. Germany can do a lot of good for the CSCE. But she should never make the disposal of German troops dependent on the votes of Malta, Bulgaria or Cyprus. It thus becomes a duty precisely *not* to change the constitution.

The prospect, therefore, is that whether Germany changes its constitution or not, it will be interpreted by German politicians to mean that, as far as military operations are concerned, there should be no support for future operations like the Gulf War. Others will be expected to die in defense of European interests, but not the Germans—at least not unless the *Vaterland* itself is attacked. Even NATO allies, as will be seen, will not be able to expect "automatic support."

Summer Soldiers

DURING the Gulf War, only one of Germany's NATO allies was under threat of attack from Iraq. That ally, Turkey—which made proportionately greater economic sacrifices than Germany over the Gulf by cutting the Iraqi oil pipeline and supporting sanctions—discovered that acquiring economic aid from Germany by way of compensation was not easy, although funds eventually found their way to Ankara. President Ozal, however, had more than economic aid to worry about. Iraq had warned that Turkey would be "held fully responsible for the act of aggression" it had committed by allowing American planes to use the Incirlik air base to launch bombing raids on Iraq. Yet Germany, it was clear, would be unwilling to aid Turkey if it were attacked. Meinhard Miegel of the Institute for Economic and Social Issues echoed most German academic opinion in insisting that there was no obligation to help:

> NATO was shaped and created for different purposes. . . . If Turkey had stayed away from the conflict, American planes would not have attacked Iraq from Turkey. If Turkey gets attacked, it is self-inflicted.

It was only after Ozal's blunt complaint that "Germany has become so rich that it has completely lost its fighting spirit," that the aging Alpha jets and their reluctant crews were eventually dispatched to help. Yet Genscher and his party stated repeatedly that there would be no "automatic guarantee" for Turkey, a view backed overwhelmingly by German public opinion. According to *Die Zeit* (February 8):

> Two things are without doubt. First, the decision to support or not is not a legal but a highly political one. Secondly, even if there is a case

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> for lending support, it is not an automatic one but as always a matter of sovereign decisions for alliance partners as to how they translate their obligations into aid.

Most Germans were reluctant to support Turkey, unless Iraq invaded.

The whole issue of whether Turkey should be aided for siding with America is, to say the least, an unfortunate one. The basis of the Alliance, it is true, is not an automatic guarantee: Article 5 of the 1949 NATO Treaty restricts the obligation of each Alliance partner to "taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. . . . " The whole history of NATO, on the other hand, has been a successful attempt to get the Americans to forget about this. For example, in 1957, President Eisenhower stated:

> Speaking for my own country, I assure you in the most solemn terms that the United States would come, at once and with all appropriate force, to the assistance of any NATO national subjected to armed attack. This is the resolve of the United States—of all parts and of all parties.

De Gaulle, of course, did not believe in an automatic American guarantee, especially a nuclear one, and so withdrew France from the integrated NATO military command in 1966. Yet the continuous resistance to any U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe has been the consistent policy of all other European NATO allies.

The fear of U.S. "disengagement" or "decoupling" also lies, it will be remembered, behind the Twin Track Policy of 1979, of which Helmut Schmidt was so fond. At that time it was decided not to ask for a "dual key" to Cruise and Pershing missiles, precisely with the aim in mind that U.S. troops would be "automatically" engaged in any war in defense of Germany, should one break out. It is therefore incredibly stupid of the Germans to display such extraordinary sensitivity over Article 5 of NATO now. Given the possibility of Gorbachev's overthrow in the USSR, or of a return to an East-West military confrontation there, this is not the moment to remind the United States of its limited legal obligations in the Alliance. Germans should surely be praying that if things go wrong in Moscow, America will not suddenly rediscover Article 5 or begin to invent constitutional obstacles as covers for a political consensus—perhaps one of disgust at the performance of some of its allies. The Genscher-Dumas alliance must be seen in this light too. Little wonder that Dutch Foreign Secretary Hans Van den Broek told *Le Monde* (February 8):

> Europe must not give the impression of being only interested in the American military capacity; she must also assure the United States, which is a partner, not a rival, of a certain political concertation. . . . The Twelve cannot monopolize security policy in Europe. It is necessary to think in larger terms, within the framework of NATO, for the question of defense covers a vastly greater area than merely the Europe of the Twelve. . . .

Perhaps the Germans in particular should begin to think in larger terms.

Germany and the Middle East

GERMANY appears to have only two roles to play in the Middle East, one of them, as it happens, contradicting the other. First there is the special obligation felt toward Israel. Belatedly this was given substance through military and financial aid. The other role, though hardly an official one, seems to be as the prime supplier of technology for atomic, chemical, and biological warfare. The German constitution quite explicitly bans this under Article 26(2), yet there have been no public demonstrations over this clause of the Basic Law. The German government has made little effort to live up to its obligations in this respect. One hundred and ten German firms have now had to be investigated at the allies' request. According to an early 1991 television program, German companies are even at this moment constructing a huge chemical and nuclear complex for Libya on a site just

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twenty-five miles from Tripoli. This confirms Roland Kollert's conclusion in *Die Zeit* (February 8) after his investigations into the making of the Iraqi bomb:

> In the Federal Republic there are no and there have been no competent authorities for controlling exports of atomic materials. The Federal Bureau for Economics, which was under the Economics Ministry, was responsible. Applications for nuclear exports were approved by one single chemist.

Unless the German government decides to clean up the German record in the Middle East it is going to get many more complaints from Israelis that Jews are still threatened with death by gassing, thanks to German enterprise and anti-Semitism. How different things might have been if Israelis had been able to see troops from a democratic Germany actually take up weapons and participate in the war against a vicious dictator alongside their European, American, and other allies. That would have contributed to destroying the burden of the past in a dramatic fashion. As it was, all the old sins of legalism, emotional extremism and provincialism got in the way.

What's Good For Germany . . .

ARTICLE 2 of the NATO Treaty is another legal nicety which is almost always forgotten. This imposes on its members the obligation "to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies" and to "encourage economic collaboration between any and all of them." Yet thanks in no small part to Germany's desire to protect the interests of Bavarian farmers, that magnificent vehicle for the furtherance of world free trade—the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations—has been derailed. In the words of William Rees-Mogg, writing in *The Independent of London* (January 28):

> The first talks broke down because the Germans backed the French obstinacy in defending the Common Agricultural Policy last Autumn. . . . The policy of Bonn has been one of kowtowing to the political interests of the French government, and to the German farming lobby. On that issue the whole future of world trade has come to turn. There is a serious risk of a world trade war between the U.S., Europe and Japan; if that war happens, German policy will be most to blame, in all its short-sighted, provincial inadequacy. If the trade war is allowed to happen, the Nineties could be a decade of depression, the worst since the Thirties. As a major exporting power, Germany will be one of the greatest sufferers.

The British have particular reason to complain of German policy affecting the GATT. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which the Germans are defending not merely nullifies the efforts of former colonies—the "Third World"—to develop their economies (British "imperialism" was positively benevolent in comparison), but it inflates the price of land and housing, and imposes an enormous burden on the British taxpayer. According to James Bartholomew in an article in the London *Daily Telegraph* (January 29):

> Internationally traded food is currently cheaper (after allowing for inflation) than at any time since the Depression. But one would not think so to judge by prices in the supermarket. We have to pay the special higher prices which the Community guarantees to Europe's farmers. The extra cost on a family of four's weekly shopping bill was £8 [approximately $15] in 1989, according to the National Consumer Council. The taxes we paid to subsidise agricultural exports cost the family another £6 [approximately $11] a week. This extra cost is hidden. If it were brought into the open and called the "European Farmers' Community Charge," it would amount to £728 [approximately $1,383] a year per family.

German support of the CAP thus not merely risks a world trade war and depression, but adds significantly to the burdens borne by the average British consumer. And all this is done to support vested interests and at the expense particularly of the Third World. Is it not high time for Germany to take a wider perspective?

The same may be said for German policy toward monetary affairs. The recent German

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interest-rate rise was predicated on German, not European, considerations. Yet Germany is all too well aware that the *Bundesbank* under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism now functions almost as a Eurofed. The response of *Bundesbank* President Poehl to criticism, on the other hand, was to tell his European partners at Davos that if they wanted more influence they would have to agree to establish a European Central Bank. He then contradicted himself by saying that such an institution would have to be constitutionally independent. In short, what is good for the German economy must be good for Europe's. To quote William Rees-Mogg once again:

> In recent months recession has been spreading through the other European countries, now to France and Italy as well as Britain. German monetary policy has been solely dictated by German and not by European economic conditions; Germany's particular economic conditions have been dictated by reunification and an irresponsibly large budget deficit. No leadership on the Gulf, no leadership on trade, no leadership, and not much cooperation.

Germany's present favorable economic position is not solely the result of Germany's own hard work. It is less the constitution of the *Bundesbank* which accounts for relatively low German inflation than the combination of German psychology (*Volk*-hatred of inflation engendered by memories of 1923 and the period between 1945 and 1948) and the lack of any persistent need to borrow. The latter, it must be conceded, was due in large part to the fact that, unlike its allies, Germany did not have to spend money on military expenditures overseas. On the contrary, the allies invested their money in Germany by dint of their occupying forces. The present economic balance of power in Europe would surely be very different if this had not been the case. Germany's leaders should perhaps reflect that, just as others have borne considerable economic and military costs in the past to defend Western interests, costs in which the Germans did not share but from which they undoubtedly benefitted, it may now be time for Germany itself to play a more prominent part. The time for introspection is over.

A German Europe?

THE FATE of Europe hinges more than ever before on the decisions of the German government. Germany, however, in recent months has proved provincial in the extreme, placing narrow, national interests before those of Europe and the free world. The GATT negotiations have been frustrated; European monetary priorities have been ignored; and, on the Gulf War, constitutional excuses have been offered instead of leadership and troops. It might all have been very different. Germany could have offered a European partnership to the United States and dramatically demonstrated to Israel its willingness to make amends for the past. But lacking both courage and imagination, Germany can only offer a greater version of itself: a federal Europe. Unfortunately, this is not enough. Under inevitable German domination, a federal Europe would appease the Soviet Union and alienate the United States. It would soon become an inward-looking, bureaucratic, pacifistic, protectionist bloc, paying any price to co-exist as an economic partner of the USSR. Germany will choose *Mitteleuropa* rather than the West. Germany's special relationship will not be with Washington, but with Moscow.

Britain's interest in all this is to retain as free a hand as possible and to ensure that it is not inextricably involved in a political or economic union. Britain's aim must be to fashion Europe as a free-trade area with as much cooperation over foreign policy as is consistent with its national interests. With regard to defense, the priority must be to maintain the special relationship with the United States. For only by strengthening that essential link between the continents can freedom hope to flourish in the world. No other powers have such a global perspective, and few others indeed, as recent events have shown, have such a gut instinct for security.

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Germany may one day yet mature into a natural defender of a liberal world order. But the prospects are remote. Perhaps France will prove able to restrain Germany from its *Drang nach Osten*, but France will have to decide where its own future lies. If France is sensible at all, a Gaullist foreign policy will surely once again become fashionable. Indeed, in a move which Britain might well consider emulating, France has already announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Germany. The latter, meanwhile, has reached a turning point, but has signally failed to turn. If the report is true that copies of the Basic Law are replacing Gideon bibles in German hotel rooms, the omens for the future are bleak indeed.□

Postscript

Alan Sked's article occasioned an official protest by the Germany Embassy to the British Foreign Office when it was published in London in February. The Foreign Office referred merely to an "official communication," but described the article as "unhelpful and extremely ungenerously expressed," a rather predictable reaction in light of premier John Major's present "charm offensive" toward Bonn. In a conversation between the Germany Embassy and the Bruges Group headquarters in London, an irate counsellor, Matthias von Kummer, shouted: "You don't understand constitutions because you don't have one yourselves." When told this was a "silly" argument, he said: "You cannot call a member of the German Embassy 'silly,'" and then slammed down the phone. Later he confessed in the *Wall Street Journal*'s European edition to having been "emotional."

Germany's legal experts, on the other hand, agreed with Dr. Sked. Dr. Franz Moeller, the official legal spokesman of the governing CDU/CSU faction, admitted on March 5 that the constitution allowed Germany to contribute troops both to peacekeeping missions and to "steps taken to implement the resolutions of the UN Security Council to uphold world peace." On April 5, Enno von Loewenstern, editor of *Die Welt*, wrote in the *Wall Street Journal:* "Actually nothing in the constitution prohibits German soldiers from fighting in Antarctica or the South Seas and *Mr. Kohl has finally admitted it* [emphasis added]." Meanwhile, in *Der Spiegel*, Judge Professor Albrecht Randelzhofer, Germany's leading expert, declared: "The government has no monopoly or primacy in interpreting the constitution." According to "prevailing opinion" among lawyers, it had got things wrong.

Today, the government coalition parties want to "amend" the constitution to clarify the new position. A very divided SDP still wishes to restrict troops to peace-keeping missions only. Since a two-thirds vote is required in the *Bundestag* for constitutional amendments, there is deadlock at present on the issue.

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Isolationism, Properly Understood

William R. Hawkins

FOR FORTY years, with few exceptions, American conservatives have favored the vigorous projection of U.S. power abroad. With the conclusion of the Cold War, however, some on the Right have begun to question that consensus, in the pages of this journal and elsewhere.[1] For some conservatives, it seems, containment of the Soviet Union, the major goal of postwar U.S. foreign policy, was the only goal that could justify a sustained American commitment abroad. For these new isolationists of the Right, there seems to be no intermediate position between a global crusade of which they approve and American withdrawal from the world.

This perception leads some to see crusades where there are none—for example, in the Gulf War. In the November 1990 issue of *Chronicles*, Samuel Francis, an editor of the *Washington Times*, claimed that President Bush had issued a "declaration of interdependence" subordinating the national interest of the United States to "the new transnational regime." The magazine's editor, Thomas Fleming, warned that Operation Desert Shield showed that "we are willing to surrender large portions of our national autonomy to the United Nations." Throughout the crisis, however, it was clear that the United States was the master, not the mercenary, of the United Nations. Although they criticized an alleged surrender of national sovereignty, Francis, Fleming, and others actually seem to have been concerned about the effects on American society of an overextended foreign policy. This concern was made explicit by Joseph Sobran, a senior editor of the *National Review*, in an October 15 essay that dissented from that magazine's position in favor of intervention: "With the end of the Cold War, conservatives ought to be redoubling their efforts to achieve the domestic goal of restoring a limited republic, not sacrificing this purpose to global empire."

The antiwar conservatives go beyond arguing the merits of American policy in the Gulf and elsewhere. They claim that they represent the mainstream of American conservatism, identified with an older isolationist tradition. Sobran, for example, longs for the United States to "just get back to normal." Like most myths, the idea of a Golden Age of conservative isolationism, which can be restored after the aberrant internationalism of the Cold War, diverges widely from fact. The historical record gives little support to the claim that isolationism has been the mainstream tradition of the Right.

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[1] See Patrick J. Buchanan, "America First—and Second, and Third," *The National Interest* (Spring 1990).

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The Interwar Precedent

THERE ARE several elements in the isolationist myth. To begin with, the opposition to Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and the League of Nations has been mischaracterized. Liberal historians have portrayed Wilson's nemesis, Henry Cabot Lodge (the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) as a reactionary isolationist. Yet the real split was between traditional power politics and liberal idealism. The partnership between Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt ran from America's first acts of overseas imperialism (the Spanish-American War, the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii, the Panama Canal) to the end of World War I. Both favored an early entry into the war on the side of England, and when war came, Lodge was one of the first to say that American troops should go to Europe. As Lodge's biographer William C. Widenor wrote:

> Those of Roosevelt and Lodge's persuasion had no difficulty in going to war. It was more their war than Wilson's. They accepted war as a necessary risk in international affairs and based their advocacy of war on the threat posed to the national interest by the possibility of German hegemony.

It was Wilson who was by nature the isolationist, holding out against the hawks until Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. Even then he felt that the need to defend Americans from attack was not enough to justify war. A split in liberal ranks had already occurred when Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan resigned in 1915 because he felt Wilson's protest of the sinking of the *Lusitania* had been too strong. War aims had to be elevated from the national to the universal level of a "war to end all wars," a war to "make the world safe for democracy." Wilson's statement to the Senate that he intended to wage "a war without victory" particularly infuriated Lodge and Roosevelt, who held the traditional view that the advantages gained by victory were the only compensations that could make good the sacrifices of war. Indeed, the disillusionment with world affairs after the war stemmed from the belief that since Wilson's idealism proved unworkable and the United States received few tangible material gains, the loss of over 112,000 American lives on European battlefields had been in vain.

It is the period between the wars, popularly known for its isolationism, to which today's dissident conservatives most often harken back for inspiration. But there are serious flaws in making a scant twenty years of dubious achievement the basis for a grand conservative tradition. For one thing, most of the leading isolationists were members of the radical Left. This group included people like Alfred Bingham, editor of *Common Sense*, who argued that "Capitalist democracy cannot become the bulwark against Fascism. The only alternative to Fascism is a Socialist democracy"; and Oswald Garrison Villard who wrote for the *Nation* and helped found the NAACP. The ranks of the isolationist cause also included such Socialist leaders as Jerome Frank, Stuart Chase, and Norman Thomas. Even the respected historian Charles Beard, whose narrow "continentalist" view of the national interest seems to have inspired conservatives like Patrick Buchanan, was a supporter of the New Deal and an opponent of the "conservative Anglo-Saxon spirit" which he thought dominated American colleges.

Major interwar isolationist groups included the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, and the Women's League for Peace and Freedom (all of which later joined the New Left in the anti-Vietnam War movement). As Guenter Lewy has said of these groups:

> The pacifist organizations that were founded during and after World War I included a strong core of socialists, and all pacifists stressed the importance of opposing the imperialism of the capitalist order, of ending the arms race and achieving economic and social justice in order to remove what they considered to be the root causes of war.

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Many isolationists and peace activists considered the most important of these causes to be the "merchants of death," later known less dramatically as the military-industrial complex. This led to the famous 1934–36 hearings on the munitions industry conducted by Democratic Senator George Nye, and to the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 by which Congress intended to prevent a president from involving the country indirectly in war through arms sales.

CERTAINLY there were also anti-war/isolationist Republicans. For example, the activist "World Peace through World Law" group, which fostered an array of arms control conferences during the 1920s and co-sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact, sought to eliminate war, thereby also eliminating the need for entangling alliances or foreign interventions. But this naive attempt to establish a global regime of law that would supersede national aspirations has little appeal to today's Old Right.

Instead, it is the America First movement led by Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, and Charles Lindbergh that the Old Right has in mind as a model. Yet this is also an odd choice. There may have been excuses for underestimating the extent of Nazi ambitions in the 1930s—but not in retrospect. These isolationists were motivated less by events overseas than by domestic politics, fearing that President Franklin Roosevelt would use a war as a pretext for becoming a dictator. Beyond this, Hoover, Taft, and Lindbergh had the same basic feeling of disillusionment about world politics as did most liberals. They saw world politics as nothing more than a battle to redraw borders, enhance national power, and gain economic advantage rather than as a struggle to advance democracy or other noble ideals. Nor was America First a purely conservative group, since it attracted many arch-liberals like Chester Bowles and John T. Flynn who thought war would overturn New Deal reforms. Flynn's anglophobic essays appeared in the *New Republic*, which followed an isolationist line until the fall of France in 1940.

The dangerous strategic situation that followed that event, and particularly the German use of ports along the occupied French coast, led the United States into an "undeclared" naval war in the North Atlantic to keep the sea lanes open to Britain. Greenland and Iceland were brought under U.S. protection by the summer of 1941 and American warships started escorting convoys west of Iceland in the fall, with the result that three American destroyers were attacked (and one sunk) by U-boats during September and October. Even so, it would take the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December to galvanize the nation into full-scale war.

The conflict with Japan was based not on ideology but on conventional power politics: Japan's threat to America's access to Asian markets and America's threat to Japan's access to raw materials, particularly oil. A conflict over dominance in the Pacific had been building for decades, but Tokyo, looking at the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States, did not believe the American people would have the stomach to fight.

The Japanese should have known better. True, at the time of the Munich Crisis in 1938, the U.S. Army was smaller than Portugal's. Yet American troops were deployed overseas in the interwar period, and not just in Central America where intervention was frequent (Haiti, 1910–20; Santo Domingo, 1916–24; Nicaragua, 1922–25 and 1926–33). In China some 5,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines stood guard in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, not only to protect American lives but also to deter the expansion of Japanese and Russian influence. American gunboats patrolled Chinese rivers and the Navy's Asiatic fleet stood offshore. Isolationist sentiment did not prevent threats to U.S. interests, it only weakened the country's ability to meet them.

All in all, the interwar period does not provide much support for a 1990s isolationism based on principles that are either realistic or conservative. Which is why, despite the use of the Old Right label, the real inspiration for today's antiwar conservatives is the clas-

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sical liberalism of the last century, which has been carried forward by today's well-financed and prolific libertarian movement. The Committee to Avert a Mideast Holocaust—which was formed in September 1990 to oppose American military action in the Persian Gulf—attracted Fleming and Sobran as members but was dominated by representatives of libertarian organizations. At the end of November, the new John Randolph Club met in Dallas to provide a common forum for traditionalists and libertarians to discuss a variety of issues including "a foreign policy of noninterventionist nationalism."

A Liberal Creed

A LOOK back at classical liberalism, therefore, is quite relevant to today's debate. At the core of that liberalism was hatred of government. This attracts many modern conservatives. In the nineteenth century, however, the bloated and intrusive welfare state had not yet been instituted, and it was military preparedness, great power diplomacy, and imperialism that liberalism attacked in language that would warm the heart of any New Leftist. As historian Bernard Semmel said in *Liberalism and Naval Strategy:*

> The liberal conscience came more and more to insist that those who wished for peace must abandon not merely preparation for war but even the thought of war. . . . Strategy, any plan for exerting or projecting military or naval power, was ipso facto wrong.

For example, the French liberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say—known for "Say's Law," the foundation for the classical assurance that self-regulating markets would provide full employment—was a true radical on foreign policy. In regard to national security, he felt that "far from protecting it, a great military apparatus is what most jeopardizes it." Say held the fashionable view that standing armies and large fleets invited war rather than deterred it. Like Jeremy Bentham, Say called for an end even to the diplomatic corps: "It is not necessary to have ambassadors. This is one of the ancient stupidities which time will do away with." They would be replaced, he thought, by consuls whose function would be to promote free trade.

An exaggerated opinion as to the benefits of free trade was a hallmark of liberalism. The British radical Richard Cobden claimed that "commerce is the grand panacea" and that under its effect "the desire and motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great navies. . . will die away." He failed to understand that as international economic connections became more important, they would have to be increasingly reinforced by political ties and military protection.

Sentiments similar to those of Say and Cobden can be found in the works of Immanuel Kant, David Ricardo, James Mill, and Frederic Bastiat among others, culminating in John Bright's dogmatic defense of appeasement: "Any peace is better than the most successful war." Semmel has argued that this attitude led many English liberals to abandon *laissez faire* and support the welfare state by the beginning of the twentieth century:

> Seeing a working class still in the grip of instinct, as its enthusiasm for the war in South Africa had recently demonstrated, they acted to block labor support for a neo-mercantilist and aggressive Tory policy by promising such reforms as old-age pensions and sickness and unemployment benefits. . . to enlist the interest of the trade unions against the alternative use of available tax revenues for armaments.

Reactionary regimes could not be trusted, but once the state machinery was in the hands of enlightened thinkers the prejudice against big government could be relaxed. The first opportunities for such liberal reforms came in domestic policy, but eventually it became possible to substitute progressive foreign policy goals for the old immoral schemes of power politics. Indeed, only such a substitution could make overseas action acceptable. Control of resources and strategic geography or a favorable balance of power and trade were no longer legitimate

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goals within the framework of liberalism. The suppression of the slave trade was one of the rare instances in which liberals saw any need for a fleet for any purpose beyond defense of the coasts.

Some liberals, including Matthew Arnold, Fitzjames Stephen, Walter Bagehot, J.R. Seeley, Henry Maine, and Edward Dicey broke with the orthodoxy to urge a defense of the empire from foreign threats. After the Franco-Prussian War even John Stuart Mill had had enough. He denounced liberalism as being "smitten with imbecility," called for universal military training, and declared that he "shall henceforth wish for a Tory government."

But the main body of liberalism rolled on as before. A week before the start of World War I, the Liberal chancellor of the exchequer, David Lloyd George, citing the growing international movement against armaments, predicted a major cut in the navy budget for 1915. Even Winston Churchill succumbed for a while. Crossing over to the Liberals in 1904 on the free trade issue, he also voted against increased armaments. He later admitted his error, writing that "we were absolutely wrong in relation to the deep tides of destiny."

Tricked by Tradition

THE MYTH that the United States once had an isolationist Golden Age has had the perverse effect of hooking conservatives into defending in the name of tradition a philosophy of liberalism that they have otherwise deplored. Without a doubt, the United States has benefitted from its insular position, separated from rival power centers by the oceans. But the practical effect of this geographical advantage has been to facilitate expansion. The development of thirteen colonies along the coast into a continental superpower was not accomplished by following liberal principles. Winning control of North America often required coercive diplomacy and not a few wars (for example, Spain's sale of Florida in 1819 to the United States following General Andrew Jackson's raid into the territory the previous year).

American economic interests took the Navy to distant seas early in the republic's history. The battles against the Barbary (1801–05) and Algerian (1816) "pirates" are well known compared to other incidents, such as the expedition to Sumatra in 1832 in support of America's monopoly of the pepper trade and Commodore Perry's use of a squadron of warships to "open" Japan in 1854.

The most dramatic example of the clash between national interest and liberal philosophy was the Mexican War of 1846–48. Through this war, the United States gained California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, most of Colorado, part of Wyoming, and confirmed the annexation of Texas. With this victory, the United States eclipsed the only other potential power center on the continent, whose large, well-equipped army was expected by many Europeans to defeat the smaller ad hoc American army. The war also served to block a feared British expansion down the Pacific coast from Canada. In terms of power politics, it was one of the most successful wars in history—and, as icing on the cake, the American casualty toll was small.

Yet the liberals hated the war. The Whig Party, representing the commercial middle class and urban intellectuals, blasted away at what was then the more conservative and populist Democratic Party. The Whig *American Review* denied that the war served any national interest since "We want no more territory. . . . The country is ample enough, the people have room enough." It condemned the conflict as one of "conquest and spoliation" and alleged that President Polk had made unconstitutional use of his executive authority when he ordered offensive military action without a declaration of war. (By ordering troops into a disputed border area without first going to Congress, the Whigs charged, Polk had obligated Congress to support the troops after they were attacked by the Mexican army.) The *National Intelligencer* called the entire concept of Manifest Destiny

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"clap-trap" and proclaimed that "We are, it appears, of the Anglo-Saxon race—of a lineage of land-stealers, a progeny of plunderers!"

When such intemperate opposition proved to be unpopular, some opponents of the war sought to cover themselves in ways that today sound familiar. Abraham Lincoln, accused by Senator Stephen Douglas in the first of their famous debates of "taking the side of the common enemy against his own country," tried to turn the question to whether he had "opposed our soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican War." On that point Lincoln replied:

> Whenever the Democratic Party tried to get me to vote that the war had been righteously begun by the President, I would not do it. But whenever they asked for any money, or land warrants, or anything to pay the soldiers there, during all that time, I gave the same vote that Judge Douglas did.

After taking this pro-soldier, antiwar position, Lincoln lost his House seat in the first postwar election (1848) and lost his Senate challenge to Douglas in 1858.

A less repentant dissident was Charles Sumner, who denounced those who supported the war for having imbibed the "narrow sentiment of heathen patriotism" and for expressing a "selfish and exaggerated love of country." Earlier he had said: "In our age there can be no peace that is dishonorable and no war that is not dishonorable." Yet when abolition was the issue rather than national expansion (or even survival), Sumner was willing to spill blood in large quantities.

The New Left antiwar activist Staughton Lynd cited Sumner along with Thomas Paine, Henry David Thoreau, and William Lloyd Garrison in his 1968 book *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism* as examples of those who placed their politics above the nation-state. Is this really the tradition that the dissident conservatives now wish to advance? They claim to defend the national interest, yet are prepared to embrace a liberal/libertarian/leftist creed that denies the very legitimacy of national interest, if indeed not the legitimacy of the nation-state itself.

What the dissident conservatives fail to understand is the difference between a foreign policy that seeks to advance the power and influence of the nation on a global stage, and a "globalist" policy that seeks to supplant the nation with some "higher" but fantastic structure. All major states have a desire to protect their own security and to advance in the world the principles upon which their polity is built. American foreign policy has expanded along with the nation over two centuries: first establishing the independence of an Atlantic coast republic in a world of rival colonial empires, and then supporting expansion through the "empty" continent of North America. The early nineteenth century was marked by the Monroe Doctrine which sought to contain, block, and eventually remove European powers from the New World. But the end of the century was marked by the Open Door, meant to allow the United States to compete on equal terms with the Europeans in the penetration of Asia.

America's isolation was not broken by intrusion from the outside but by the natural growth of external interests and connections forged by an energetic people who continued to seek new frontiers. The United States is, after all, the offspring of the Western civilization that created the first world-wide network of trade and diplomacy. America cannot escape the fact that it was brought into existence (discovered, colonized, and fought over) by people who thought in global terms.

Conservatives understood the development of a global security strategy with regard to communism, but some are having trouble with regard to other threats. The split on the Right is now mainly between those who, having concentrated on ideology, have lost their direction and sense of purpose following the collapse of an ideological challenge and those who, having focused on the nation and its interests, still have their star to follow.□

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Hollywood's Foreign Policy

Utopianism Tempered by Greed

Richard Grenier

THE HOLLYWOOD foreign policy establishment, if one can call it that, got off to a blazing seasonal start last Christmas with two important and costly movies: the Sean Connery-John le Carré *Russia House* and Robert Redford's $50 million *Havana*. A doggedly faithful film adaptation of le Carré's novel, *The Russia House* is a story of what Jeane Kirkpatrick was first to call "principled treason." The hero (Sean Connery), an agent of British intelligence, betrays his country for love—both of "Russia" and a contrived "woman," a totally implausible gender construct for which le Carré has a well-proven knack. In marked contrast to the Secret Service officer Connery used to play in the James Bond series, the British agent here delivers the deepest and darkest military secrets of Britain and America to the KGB, which is portrayed as a highly honorable organization that has "always kept its word." Though the hero is presented in both novel and film as a figure of high virtue, the movie was soundly rebuked at the box office.

Redford's *Havana* is a virtual remake of the legendary Humphrey Bogart-Ingrid Bergman World War II movie, *Casablanca*. Robert Redford, in real life, has been received sumptuously by Fidel Castro in Cuba, made much of, flattered. His Sundance Institute maintains warm official ties with Castro's Havana-based Foundation for New Latin American Cinema. Redford wanted to make his film in the real Cuba, but was refused permission by Washington and made it instead in the Dominican Republic. A shy, decent, not very knowledgeable man, Redford probably made the same movie he would have made if Fidel Castro had not received him so handsomely. The transposition of the *Casablanca* story, with its Nazis, collaborators, and members of the French Resistance, is interesting: the French Resistance leaders become revolutionary Fidelistas, the Nazi collaborators become officials of Castro's enemy, Fulgencio Batista. And with whom do the collaborators collaborate? Who is the Nazi-like overlord of occupied Cuba? Why, the United States, represented by a villainous collection of hoodlums and other evildoers ranging from CIA men to the Mafia's Meyer Lansky. The film ends with the joyous triumph of Fidel's *revolucion*, confetti in the air, Havana delirious, people dancing in the streets. *Variety* called the opening week of *Havana* "among the worst major openings of the year."

From *Havana*, which endorses Fidel Castro, and *The Russia House*, which endorses treason on behalf of the Soviet Union, can we infer a coherent Hollywood foreign policy? Or is there variety among American filmmakers, some favoring Castro and the Soviet Union, some opposed? Do American film-

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makers generally have one foreign policy while, in their less articulate way, American movie audiences have another? And if the foreign policies of moviemakers and the film-going public are different, why doesn't the need to turn a profit—as much an imperative of the film industry as any other—cause the twain to meet? We shall see.

The Dictatorship of the Actor

WHEN A film fails at the box office it is not always easy to know exactly why, since so many factors come into play: the drawing power of the star, the "visuals," the "story." Were Redford and Connery too old? Had they lost their looks? A movie's politics are rarely mentioned by reviewers, who usually content themselves with giving higher marks than would seem justified to films with whose politics they agree (as with *The Russia House*), and lower than seem justified when they disagree. A film's politics play a major part in later weeks, however, via the all-powerful "word of mouth." Many a movie lauded by critics fails abysmally, while many an excoriated movie survives to surge into the stratosphere of all-time box office champions—Sylvester Stallone's Rambo series is a conspicuous example.

This did not happen to *Havana*, however, which both received terrible reviews and is scraping the very bottom for the year's big-budget releases. Perhaps even film reviewers, who give little sign of knowing much about Cuba or of reading the front pages of their own newspapers, were embarrassed by the film's ardent espousal of Castro's *revolucion*—which now enjoys diminished support in America's left-liberal community and is frankly out of favor in Moscow. Latin America's third richest country under Batista, Cuba under Castro is now one of the most backward countries in the hemisphere. How could Hollywood have put an estimated $50 million into such an anachronistic movie? The answer is simple.

Redford is "bankable." What he says goes. Perhaps no longer, but certainly while he was making *Havana*. Hollywood has come a long way since it was run by studio chiefs like Louis B. Mayer, Sam Goldwyn, Darryl Zanuck, and Harry Cohn—American superpatriots and vigorous anticommunists to a man. The "studio system" collapsed a long time ago, and the function of today's studios is to bankroll and distribute films. They put up money occasionally for a "hot property," but mostly for a "name" that in their judgment will assure crowds at the box office. A few highly publicized directors qualify, but most of Hollywood's bankable names are stars. What we have now in Hollywood is the politics of actors.

But here another drastic change has taken place, this one sociological. Most people tend to think that actors were ever thus, that they have always had the politics of Greenwich Village or some other appendage of the intellectual world. This is not so. In Hollywood's glory days before World War II, movie stars, as far as the public was concerned, had virtually no politics at all. The received wisdom of the time was that if a star said he was a Republican, Democrats wouldn't come to see his movies. And if he said he was a Democrat, Republicans wouldn't come. But even in their private lives movie stars in those times were not a highly political lot. Whether Republican or Democrat, they generally shared the views of the great mass of the American people. Few had gone to college or were from the privileged classes; most came not from centers of sophistication but from the American heartland, "white bread America" as they say these days in Hollywood.

The first time the American public became stunningly aware that there was such a thing as politics in Hollywood was during the wave of anticommunism that swept the country during the late 1940s and early 1950s, a period recalled in a highly egregious recent movie, Robert De Niro's *Guilty by Suspicion*. But the "Hollywood Ten," the ten "unfriendly" witnesses called in 1947 before the House Un-American Affairs Committee (the famous HUAC), were not film stars but consisted of one director and nine screenwriters. Despite

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the line taken by the De Niro movie, it should be said that there is not the slightest shadow of a doubt that all members of the Hollywood Ten, and virtually all 212 filmworkers blacklisted following the HUAC hearings of the early 1950s, were Communists and faithful followers of their great leader, Josef Stalin.

The biggest stars of the day in Hollywood's firmament, in fact, often volunteered to be *friendly* witnesses for HUAC. Gary Cooper, Robert Taylor, Robert Montgomery, George Murphy, Ronald Reagan (then president of the Screen Actors Guild), and even Walt Disney denounced communism from one end of Washington to the other. Cary Grant, James Stewart, Bing Crosby, and Bob Hope were well-known conservatives, as was, naturally, John Wayne. And when blacklisting became an issue after the 1951 hearings, the Screen Actors Guild was particularly savage, issuing a statement that "all participants in the international Communist conspiracy against our nation should be exposed for what they are—enemies of our country and of our form of government." A motion similar in spirit calling for blacklisting of all members accused of communism who pleaded the Fifth Amendment failed by only three votes before the Screen Writers Guild. Writers, however, were a different breed.

Hollywood in its greatest days was a Jewish industry, and the grand studio moguls were almost exclusively Jewish—and extremely conservative politically. The only studio chief not known to be Jewish was Darryl Zanuck. The Hollywood Ten and "unfriendly 19," however, were also mainly Jewish, and the scriptwriting community, Screen Writers Guild, and Hollywood Communist Party all bore a strong imprint of Jewish radicalism. The studio moguls were not educated men. They had emerged somehow from the Jewish immigrant community, were proud to be rich, even vulgarly rich, and it never occurred to them for a moment to aspire to membership in the elite culture. To the extent that they were even aware of a cultural elite, they hated it.

Hollywood writers were far better educated, generally university graduates. Some of them were from that section of the Jewish population that, it has been estimated, made up at one time some half the membership of the U.S. Communist Party. Others were merely literary, sensitive—like Theodore Dreiser and Lincoln Steffens (neither of whom was Jewish)—to the highflown idealism and moral uplift provided by what Eugene Lyons described as the "Red Decade." Screenwriters, men on the bottom of the Hollywood totem pole who were sometimes dismissed as a "necessary evil," also usually loathed and despised their mogul bosses, who, it must be said, were not always loveable men. An observation of the time had it that, because of their antagonistic and sometimes humiliating relationship with their studio chiefs, Hollywood writers were the highest paid people in America to preserve the fanciful notion that they were "workers."

DURING THE 1960s it was said that the politics of New York's low-status City College had gained the ascendant over the politics of high-status Harvard. And something oddly similar has taken place in Hollywood. Through the improbable medium of the community's star actors, the spiritual attitudes, if not the specific politics, of powerless screenwriters have gained the ascendant over the attitudes of the earlier age's all-powerful studio moguls. The key element of change here is that Hollywood actors, over these last few decades, have been annexed by America's intellectual elite.

Movie stars of the earlier age were entertainers with a vast popular following but little intellectual prestige. Director Alfred Hitchcock referred to them as "cattle." Today they are artists. Movie stars now think, ostensibly. They have opinions. They attend fashionable institutions (Jack Lemmon, Harvard; Jane Fonda, Vassar; Jodie Foster, Yale; Brooke Shields, Princeton; Meryl Streep, Vassar and Yale; Paul Newman, Kenyon and Yale; Sigourney Weaver, Stanford and Yale; William Hurt, Tufts; Chevy Chase, Bard;

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director Oliver Stone, Yale . . .). Our stars now take positions on public affairs, sometimes strident ones. Their views are treated with respect. They criticize "mindless patriotism" and "American boosterism," having utterly absorbed the estrangement from contemptible national self-interest that is such a common trait of America's artistic class—the most demented sector of the intellectual class in general. Actors' concerns are now universal, internationalist, global. They worry publicly about death squads in Central America and the tropical rain forest in Brazil.

The absorption of the entire film industry into the elite culture has been marked flamboyantly by the pattern of awards accorded annually by the Motion Picture Academy of Arts and Sciences. Traditionally, as late as the 1970s, to have a chance of winning an Academy Award, whether for acting, directing, screenwriting, or special effects, the candidate had to be part of the winning team of a hit movie. With one or two exceptions, this was generally recognized to be a necessary qualification. Suddenly, in 1980, the pattern broke with Robert Redford's *Ordinary People*, which, only an indifferent success commercially, won three of the top Academy Awards including best picture and best director. From then on the Academy has behaved more like the awards committee for the Nobel Prize, Pulitzer Prize, or MacArthur Foundation. The unwashed public be damned. The Academy now honors what it considers to be the artistic, the idealistic, and the socially progressive no matter how mediocre the movie's record at the box office.

Unlike the tenured radicals of the academic world, however, film industry figures and particularly actors are compelled to remain popular with an extremely large audience to preserve themselves as saleable products. This circumscribes their penchant for idealism. John le Carré's novel, *The Russia House*, was a bestseller. The rule of thumb in publishing is that a bestseller is any book that in the hardback trade edition sells 100,000 copies, and a book can turn a profit with far less. On the other hand, Hollywood tradition holds that to end up in the black a movie must be seen by seven million people. The fact that *The Russia House*, condoning treason, could succeed as a novel and fail as a movie—even with the thawing of the Cold War and a touching performance from Michelle Pfeiffer in the female lead—may tell us something about the differing political affinities of the American reading public and the far larger movie-going public.

Hollywood often plays to ignorance. Isak Dinessen, author of the book from which Meryl Streep drew her *Out of Africa*, was one of Adolf Hitler's favorite writers. But American audiences don't know this. In real life Baroness Blixen (Isak Dinessen was her pen name) believed in aristocracy, class, and race. The opening line of her book of African memoirs is, "I had a farm in Africa"; true enough if one calls a plantation employing 12,000 black people a "farm." She had some sort of love affair with a World War I British war hero named Denys Finch Hatton, the younger son of an earl. In the movie version, Meryl Streep is a fighter for racial equality, and the much-decorated war hero Hatton, played by Robert Redford, is miraculously transmuted into a war resister. The public is swimming in ignorance here.

But filmgoers know a bit more about the Soviet Union than they do about Isak Dinesen. At least they've heard of Lenin and Stalin. And in 1981, as much as Warren Beatty watered down the politics of American Bolshevik John Reed, a boyhood hero of his, he appears to have been chastised for the political proclivities of *Reds* at the box office. As have been, in recent months, the makers of both *The Russia House* and *Havana*.

Market Forces

A NINETEENTH-century wit once said that the system of government of czarist Russia was "autocracy tempered by assassination." And it could be fairly said that the present politics of Hollywood is "utopianism tempered by greed." Obviously, more movies are shot in Holly-

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wood to make money than to build a better world. Also obviously, no Hollywood producer shoots a movie consciously thinking, "This baby's going to lose money all right, but it's a blow for peace and social justice." But self-deception is a constant factor. A producer is persuaded by a star actor or director that such and such an idealistic movie will make money, too. And after all, the producer already has his bankable star.

In the early 1980s, Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter (*The Media Elite*), noting the prominence I gave to leftist thinking in Hollywood in a series of essays in *Commentary*, conducted a study of Hollywood's elite. (The opposing viewpoint—that Hollywood had no political bias but was impelled by the profit motive only—was put forth by a film industry executive and friend of mine, David Chasman.) The study had an omission in that it was unable to survey leading actors, but by examining the views of directors, screenwriters, and even producers, it produced a political profile of the Hollywood establishment that was far to the left of the American public. If the U.S. presidential election of 1972 had been conducted only among these Hollywood leaders, George McGovern—who carried only one state—would have been elected president by a popular margin of over four to one. In a more recent study, the result of detailed analysis of some ninety films, Stanley Rothman, David Rothman, and Stephen Powers concluded, the Reagan years notwithstanding, that the trend continues and is in some respects becoming even more pronounced. They write that Hollywood movies express "extraordinarily critical views about American society that are quite different from those of the public as a whole," adding that the phenomenon cannot be explained by economic motivation. In fact, the authors speculate that Hollywood's left-liberalism might go farther yet if it were not for "market pressures from the public."

We are here at the heart of the matter, because "market pressures from the public" hold the artistic spirits of Hollywood in check most rudely in foreign affairs. On foreign policy, the financial record books of Hollywood are strewn with the corpses of spectacular left-liberal fiascoes that film studios, inveigled by some artistic person, believed would make money. Few of the titles are even remembered. On Africa: we had *In Another Country*, *A Dry White Season*, and *Cry Freedom*, all vehemently critical of apartheid in South Africa. But American audiences, even black audiences, wouldn't go to see these pictures, preferring Eddie Murphy instead. Aside from South Africa, for Hollywood the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is a blank and there is no recognition whatsoever of the oppression of black by black. On the Middle East: John le Carré's pro-Palestinian *The Little Drummer Girl* with Diane Keaton (still another le Carré bestseller that, like *The Spy Who Came In From the Cold* and *The Russia House*, failed miserably as a movie) and Costa-Gavras' pro-Palestinian *Hannah K*, also a resounding flop. Thus far, with South Africa and Israel as pariah states, Hollywood's foreign policy bears a strong resemblance to that of the United Nations in its most anti-American years, when the Arab-African alliance, with Soviet backing, called most of the shots.

ON LATIN America, Hollywood also produced an abundance of commercial disasters. Nicaragua? We had *Under Fire* (Nick Nolte, Gene Hackman) and *Walker* (Ed Harris), both strenuously anti-American (the production costs of the latter paid directly out of the Sandinista treasury). Argentina and Paraguay? There was the shamelessly pro-terrorist *Beyond the Limit* (Richard Gere), adapted from the equally shameless Graham Greene novel, *The Honorable Consul*. On the generalized Latin American Right, Hollywood gave us Robert Bolt's *The Mission* (Robert De Niro, Jeremy Irons) and *Moon Over Parador* (Richard Dreyfuss, Raul Julia). On Chile we had the pro-Allende and virulently anti-American *Missing* starring Sissy Spacek and Jack Lemmon, another guest of Fidel Castro. *Missing* was nominated for four Academy Awards, won the award for screenwriting, and carried away a highly

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unusual endorsement from the Academy, speaking *ex cathedra*, by having the commentator at the awards ceremonies present as unchallenged historical fact the film's dark contentions regarding the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende. As it happens, the Chilean people have now spoken regarding Allende. In recent national elections, Chilean communism, toward which Allende was plainly moving, was almost wiped out. In the vote for the Chilean Senate, 2 pro-Allende candidates were elected compared to 118 anti-Allende: as clear a repudiation as one is ever likely to get in politics. But for Hollywood, Allende is still a secular saint and the CIA, despite the findings of the Church Committee, is still responsible for the whole anti-Allende coup. As for the Mexican Revolution of the second decade of the twentieth century, Jane Fonda and Gregory Peck gave us in 1989 a movie version of Carlos Fuentes' wildly pro-revolutionary *Old Gringo*.

The same year produced Paul Newman's *Fat Man and Little Boy*, an anti-nuclear-weapons diatribe which, when I saw it during its opening week on Wisconsin Avenue in Washington, DC, had four people in the house. It was a rich year for left-liberal movie disasters, with, at the absolute bottom of the annual *Variety* listing, the most dismal failures of the year bar none: Jane Fonda's *Old Gringo*, Paul Newman's *Fat Man and Little Boy*, and Marlon Brando's *A Dry White Season*.

But there have been many such rich years. In 1983, for example, we had *The Year of Living Dangerously* about wicked American interference in the affairs of Indonesia (a terrific flop despite Mel Gibson and its catchy title); *Deal of the Century* based, in the middle of the Iraq-Iran War, on the premise that all wars in the Third World were caused by weapons dumping by American and other Western arms dealers (another terrific flop despite Chevy Chase in the lead); plus—again at the very bottom of the year's listing—the anti-nuclear-weapons *Testament*; and, if being a Soviet agent is considered a foreign policy issue, *Daniel*, Sidney Lumet's fervid attempt to prove the innocence of the Rosenbergs. With the borderline exception of *Missing* (forty-fifth for the previous year), absolutely all such films were financial disasters.

Oddly, Hollywood's foreign policy establishment was more successful on the subject of China with Bernardo Bertolucci's sumptuous *The Last Emperor*. Beijing had been stung earlier by another Italian Communist, Michelangelo Antonioni, whose *Chung Kauo*, in the years when the Moscow-Beijing rift was still sharp, was unenthusiastic, to say the least, about the Cultural Revolution. But in *The Last Emperor* Bertolucci, whose membership in the Italian Communist Party (not yet called the "Democratic Party of the Left") was legally attested to in his contract, delivered the goods—meaning the movie presents the final days of the Manchu dynasty and all succeeding Chinese events strictly according to the Beijing line of the hour. Richard Bernstein of the *New York Times*, author of *From the Center of the Earth* and a speaker of Chinese who spent several years in China, has called the film simply "Beijing propaganda." But this was lost on the American public, which saw *The Last Emperor* as a spectacle movie, and it was modestly successful. Details of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor are better known to Americans, however, and Steven Spielberg's ridiculing of the American patriotic reaction to the attack in his *1941* was one of the most expensive failures in Hollywood history. Spielberg's *Empire of the Sun*, about a young English boy's infatuation with Japan's fighter pilots during World War II (an interesting twist for a functional pacifist like Spielberg), was another fiasco, at least in America. It may have recouped its domestic losses by a strong commercial showing in, not surprisingly, Japan.

Vietnam: Worst Case Scenario

THE FOREIGN affairs list is longest, of course, for Vietnam. Here the record is less clear cut. For a long, long time—as long as the Hollywood Old Guard was influential—few Vietnam movies were made at all. In 1968 John Wayne did *The*

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Green Berets, which, incidentally, made quite a bit of money. Then came a time of silence. Suddenly in 1978, three years after the fall of Saigon, came two of many subsequent Vietnam films: Jane Fonda's antiwar *Coming Home*, another borderline success (thirty-seventh for the year); and Michael Cimino and Robert De Niro's patriotic, anticommunist *The Deer Hunter*, one of the year's top movies—major money. The following year—marked by a ruinous attempt to revive the counter-culture spirit of half a decade earlier with a film version of *Hair*—produced another big-budget Vietnam movie, the complex and confused *Apocalypse Now*, a reworking of Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* in a Vietnamese setting. Here virtuoso directing, a romantic Conradian story line, and outstanding performances from Marlon Brando, Robert Duvall, and Dennis Hopper seem responsible for the film's solid success. The next two years produced nothing.

In 1982, again abruptly, came an eruption of pro-military patriotism accounting for three of the year's top dozen movies: Clint Eastwood's enthusiastically anti-Soviet *Firefox*, Richard Gere's *An Officer and a Gentleman*, and, above all, Sylvester Stallone's *First Blood*, the first of the Rambo series. Two years later the anti-Soviet *Red Dawn* was a hit and the "moral equivalence" *Gorky Park* (another bestseller), a flop. Stallone's *annus mirabilis* came in 1985, when he starred in two of the country's top three movies, *Rambo: First Blood Part II* and *Rocky IV*. With Clint Eastwood capitalizing on the conquest of Grenada the following year in *Heartbreak Ridge*, and Tom Cruise flying to glory in *Top Gun*—the year's number-one movie, a virtual harbinger of the victorious air war in the Persian Gulf—the pattern seemed confirmed: Vietnam or no Vietnam, American moviegoers, in their entertainment mode, wanted a strong military and an assertive foreign policy. At the very least, the wisdom of carrying on the Vietnam War aside, they wanted their country, once engaged in a war, to win. The pattern seemed confirmed by the humiliating failure of Coppola's antiwar *Gardens of Stone* as later of Brian de Palma's *Casualties of War* and Mel Gibson's recent *Air America*. But to confuse things, when *Gardens of Stone* opened to empty houses, a giant "antiwar" hit, Oliver Stone's *Platoon*, was already playing. Confusion was compounded just last year with, on the one hand, one of the year's big winners the movie version of Tom Clancy's anti-Soviet *The Hunt for Red October* and, on the other, the creditable if lesser hit scored by Oliver Stone's film adaptation of Ron Kovic's violently anti-Vietnam War, anti-American *Born on the Fourth of July*—starring the same Tom Cruise as *Top Gun*.

WERE THESE hit films playing to different audiences? Were the same audiences enjoying them for dramatic virtues apart from their evident polemical content? Or perhaps movie audiences are mindless, loving our grunts in Vietnam in *The Deer Hunter* and hating them and the country they come from in *Born on the Fourth of July*? And what of Tom Cruise, without whose drawing power *Born on the Fourth of July* might never have been made? Perhaps he likes the U.S. military and an assertive American role in world affairs when we win (*Top Gun*), and turns against his country and its role in world affairs when we lose (*Born on the Fourth of July*). A sizeable share of the public is like this, of course, but it would make Mr. Cruise far less a leader than a follower, and not a man one would care to have on one's side in a tight corner. Jane Fonda, who recently congratulated Defense Secretary Dick Cheney on our victory in the Gulf, would appear to be another such person.

The movie public's attitude toward Southeast Asia is most ambiguous regarding Oliver Stone's *Platoon* and Roland Joffe's *The Killing Fields*. Joffe's film, a modest success in a year when *Rambo II* was the 800-pound gorilla, was made in accordance with William Shawcross' thesis (put forth in his book *Sidesbow*) that the United States was "indirectly" responsible for the Cambodian genocide. But this was a far from universal public perception of the movie. In France, for example, where leaders of the

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Khmer Rouge had studied and where *The Killing Fields* was an enormous hit, far bigger than in America (Cambodia being a former French colony), the film was seen as purely and passionately anticommunist. Not a single French movie reviewer even mentioned the United States. *Platoon* was in a way similar. Although it was the clear intention of Oliver Stone—a former undergraduate at Yale, decorated for valor in Vietnam—to condemn the Vietnam War, many proud Vietnam veterans adored the film. Indeed, the question of misperception comes up frequently with artistic works. Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the U.S.A.," for those who can hear the words, is unmistakably anti-military and anti-American: "They put a rifle in my hand / And told me to kill the yellow man." Yet when the Armed Forces Network broadcast "Born in the U.S.A." to American troops in the Persian Gulf, they loved it. It was their favorite number. Much like a distinguished American newspaper columnist, all the troops apparently could make out was the rock song's title, stirring indeed.

On balance it would be fair to say that the American moviegoing public—differing sharply from what Hollywood artists would have preferred—has with very few exceptions shown a decided preference for Vietnam War films that are at least perceived as patriotic and anticommunist, while usually staying away in droves from films it perceives as categorically anti-American. Even *Born on the Fourth of July*'s film version contains more than one fig leaf, and ends with Old Glory flying bravely. By contrast, though it is occasionally of two minds when the question of patriotism is posed too starkly, the Hollywood establishment, judging by its Academy Awards, has more often than not gone the opposite way from the public, honoring films opposing both the U.S. role in Southeast Asia and an assertive foreign policy.

Right Thinking

WHILE Hollywood's financial records are strewn with the cadavers of left-wing fiascoes, fiascoes embodying right-wing or nationalistic ideologies are remarkably hard to come across. There is good reason for this. Comparatively few "bankable" Hollywood people these days are interested in making such films to begin with. And the few who are must bring with them an almost triple-plated guarantee of success or sneak in as some kind of fluke. Clint Eastwood, working entirely abroad, had to become the world's biggest and highest paid movie star in a series of "spaghetti Westerns" (actually made in Spain), before he was accepted in Hollywood. Once there he horrified America's liberal community by plunging into his Dirty Harry series, his personal crusade against the Supreme Court's Miranda ruling. Sylvester Stallone's beginnings were even more eccentric. An unemployed actor, he wrote a screenplay: *Rocky*. But he wanted to play the lead himself and had little to show the executives of United Artists in the way of screen performances. He sent them a print of the small-budget *Lords of Flatbush*, in which he plays one of four young men in a gang. The executives found him not bad, took a chance, and signed. It was only when they saw the first dailies that they realized their mistake. "Good God!" said one of them. "We thought Stallone was the good-looking blond kid! He's the fat one!" Thus was born unto the world Sylvester Stallone.

The beginnings of *Rambo* were almost as peculiar. Most people—who usually see movies when they're already known to be hits or flops and have never viewed them in the lonely pre-release uncertainty of an executive screening room—seem to think the producers *knew* that the Rambo character would bring certain success. They did not. But Stallone had made a lot of money as Rocky. He insisted. Again, they took a chance. The critics absolutely hated the Rambo series (and there was indignation in some quarters when I chose to interview Stallone for the *New York Times*), but not so the American people. Now the name Rambo has entered the international lexicon, known from the Philippines to Iraq. In Hollywood, indeed, it is hard to compile a list of sad, little, jingoistic failures. In fact, Hollywood comes closer to being

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strewn with jingoistic hits. In the midst of the Vietnam War, George C. Scott brought in a giant winner in the celebratory *Patton*—with a screenplay by Francis Ford Coppola.

Action pictures, now all the rage, have traditionally been considered "right-wing" because of their emphasis on purposeful violence. But with Hollywood's heart beating on the left, a curious new hybrid has emerged: the red-hot, bang-bang, action movie with, stuck into the crevices, a few leftist pieties to show the filmmakers' true feelings. Probably less than one moviegoer in a hundred even noticed this, but in Bruce Willis' *Die Hard 2* (alternatively titled *Die Harder*), in which terrorists and mercenaries, bad people, take over Dulles International Airport in Washington, the mercenaries—we see their papers in a flash—have fought in Nicaragua (as *contras* of course) and . . . Afghanistan. The U.S. Congress at the time was sending Stinger missiles to aid the *mujahadeen*. Even Mikhail Gorbachev himself was soon to say the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a terrible mistake. But for certain Hollywood idealists anyone who fights against Marxist-Leninists or even against the Soviet Union is a bad person. In *Lethal Weapon 2*, another bang-bang hit with Mel Gibson and Danny Glover, the villains are officials of the South African government, which, from a fortified redoubt in the Santa Monica mountains, is revealed as operating the Western-hemisphere cocaine trade. When in a bad mood, nasty South African pilots strafe innocent Americans on the beaches of southern California.

Dreamers of Dreams

FOR ALL this, and despite my having for reasons of brevity used the words "left" and "left-liberal" throughout this piece, there is some doubt these days that the film industry—meaning most of its bankable names, stars, and glamour directors—is in any rigorous, orthodox way Marxist, socialist, anarchist, or even "left" in their approach to foreign affairs. These people are dreamers, utopians, seekers of human dignity, human brotherhood, a "better way." Very low these days on religious faith, the film world's artists, like other artists, want to believe in something noble, something good, something higher than this miserable, self-centered, selfish world they see around them (above all in Hollywood).

It is a matter of historical record that the European artistic class has for over 200 years been uneasy about liberal, commercial democracy, finding the kind of society it engenders sorely lacking in inspiring values. In France, the artistic and intellectual classes for much of this period called the French Republic *La Gueuse*, "the slut," their preferred corrective for such money-grubbing vulgarity being monarchy, royalty, nationalism, race. In the English-speaking literary world, many of the outstanding figures in the early twentieth century—T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, Yeats, Pound, Waugh—attacked capitalism and democracy from the right. It was only with Hitler and Auschwitz that right-wing thinking fell out of favor in the European artistic class. But bankable Hollywood movie stars don't know this. After all, they just got to be artists the day before yesterday. Before that they had hardly more intellectual status than circus acrobats. In addition to which, they are American. They bring to these matters a wonderfully innocent eye. What are all these foreign countries to them?

The unfixed, dreamy quality of the foreign-policy thinking of the finer spirits of today's Hollywood is suggested by a comparison of their present behavior with that of the militant Hollywood Left of the late 1930s and early 1940s, which followed the somersaulting Stalinist line on international politics with impressive devotion. I would hardly recommend that these finer spirits return to slavish obedience to the will of Moscow (if there is such a will), but the Soviet Union has for many decades been our great antagonist in world affairs, earning in the New Hollywood, thereby, a certain sympathy. But when in the late 1980s and early 1990s relations between Moscow and Washington im-

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proved dramatically, the two countries drawing close enough so that Moscow became a passive member of the coalition in the war against Iraq, did Hollywood's elevated spirits adjust and support American policy? They did not. Moscow, when it comes right down to it, carries no real weight with them. Nor does Beijing, nor Hanoi. If the truth were to be known, all of these, judged by proper standards, have been sad disappointments.

During the American military deployment in Saudi Arabia, a number of movie stars (Kevin Costner, Chevy Chase, Jodie Foster, Sally Field, Sissy Spacek, Whoopi Goldberg, Brooke Shields, Darryl Hannah), along with some rock singers, made a rock video, *Voices That Care*, to "support the troops." But the troops only. "I'm not here to justify the cause," the lyrics run clumsily. That is, out of humanity and to avoid the Vietnam-period embarrassment of appearing disloyal, the stars didn't want Americans to die. But, their attitude now pervaded by a kind of swamp-gas pacifism, they pointedly declined to support the U.S. government in its conflict with Iraq. Even when the Gulf air war began and Congress swung in massively behind President Bush, prominent Hollywood figures opposed the policy of the United States—without being for anybody in particular. In late January at Robert Redford's Sundance Film Festival held in Utah's ski-resort country, the closing night master of ceremonies, John Sayles—director of the much-praised, counterculture *Return of the Secaucus Seven*—called upon a full house of vacation skiers to vote to condemn the American role in the Gulf War. He was shouted down. He then called for a vote as to whether or not to *have* a vote, and was shouted down again. Rarely have moviemaker and movie audience met in such head-on doctrinal confrontation.

In sum, it would not be too far off the mark to say that Hollywood has two foreign policies: the foreign policy of the film world's artists, its sensitive spirits, and the foreign policy of hit movies. If the profit motive were the only operative factor, Hollywood would have stopped making movies with the politics of sensitive spirits long ago. But when these sensitive spirits are bankable, many of the properties they favor will make it to the screen, and sometimes even make money. As I've indicated, the expression "foreign policy" (or indeed any other policy) is slightly askew when applied to Hollywood stars. Basically, like many other artists today, most of these people have a weak sense of reality. They believe in a better world and consequently have difficulty giving their allegiance to anything so miserable, so filled with flaws and injustice and cruelty, as the United States of America. The global collapse of socialism, however, has greatly curtailed the ability of film artists to imaginatively locate their utopia in foreign parts, even the Third World. This leaves them with a problem.

The New Way to Commit Treason

THE RAGINGLY successful solution of the moment—the find of the year and perhaps the decade—is Kevin Costner's Academy Award-winning *Dances With Wolves*, in which he locates his imaginary world among the buffalo-hunting Plains Indians of the nineteenth century. These Plains Indians are not likely to disappoint admirers as they're not around anymore, at least in their former lifestyle. During the French and Indian War in the mid-eighteenth century, warfare against Indians was most decidedly a foreign policy issue for the English settlers of the Atlantic seaboard. In the 1860s, the period of *Dances With Wolves*, some of the greatest generals of the Union Army (Sherman, Sheridan, Custer) led American troops against the bloodthirsty Sioux, who erupted in the midst of the Civil War in one of the most savage Indian uprisings in history. Along the western frontier, the Sioux massacred. They pillaged. They raped. They burned. They carried women and children off into captivity. They tortured for entertainment. All this was their long-established custom, carried out, indeed, far more frequently against other Indian tribes than

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against whites. By converting these Sioux Indians into gentle, vaguely pacifist, environmentally responsible bucolics, Kevin Costner, in a state of holy empty-headedness, has falsified history as much as any time-serving Stalinist of the Red Decade.

He has done this with a sentiment of utmost piety. Benefiting from an astounding ignorance of the American past on the part of even patriotic and conservative movie audiences—an ignorance he apparently fully shares—Costner has stumbled onto a true godsend for those who want to denigrate the United States and celebrate an alien culture without appearing patently traitorous. American Indians, conveniently, are no longer a foreign policy issue but have been transformed into a racial minority, "Native Americans," benefiting from extensive civil rights legislation and even genuine compassion. It should be remembered, however, that in *Democracy in America* Alexis de Tocqueville considered Indians not only alien but inferior in every respect to the white civilization that was displacing them. Their fate was tragic, Tocqueville felt, but inevitable. The Indian culture, he wrote sadly, must "retreat or be destroyed."

Kevin Costner, in truth, also considers Indians alien, which is why he likes them. He far prefers them to "white America," which is to say his own civilization—not that he would go so far as to give up his private swimming pool in Pasadena or his private fax machine or cellular telephone. But about Costner's imaginary defection to the adversary still hangs an odor of treason, as his friend Michael Blake, author of the bestselling paperback on which *Dances With Wolves* was based, is willing to admit quite openly: "I was afraid that sooner or later someone would say: 'You've got a movie where the hero's a traitor to his country. You can't have a movie like that.' But it never happened."

Blake congratulates himself that, when one's country is foul and immoral, the commission of treason is not only tolerable but highly commendable. And, although he and Costner give their allegiance to no adversary of the United States currently in the field, one wonders what Hollywood might come up with next, and whether its elevated spirits will happen soon on another successful stratagem allowing them to be high-minded "traitors to their country" while pleasing an audience of seven million people. In Costner's new movie version of the adventures of Robin Hood, the income redistributionist of Sherwood Forest has returned from the Crusades with, as his bosom companion, a representative of a vastly superior culture: an Arab, played by black actor Morgan Freeman. Will audiences find this mythic "Arab" as appealing as the Sioux in *Dances With Wolves*? Will he remind them of Saddam Hussein? Or will the Arab's cultural identity be lost in a blur of action, crane shots, and medieval costumes? In whichever case, one can see the better sort of person in the movie world casting about hopefully for attractive new alternatives to his own society.□

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The Ultimate Resumé

Fareed Zakaria

Godfrey Hodgson, *The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867–1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). 402 pp., $24.95.

DURING THE week that George Bush ordered the air assault on Iraq, he was reportedly reading Godfrey Hodgson's admirable new biography of Henry L. Stimson. Half a century earlier, Stimson's commencement address at Andover had stirred the 18-year-old Bush to join the Navy to battle Hitler's Germany. The president is not alone in choosing this American statesman as his role model. Indeed, Stimson's ghost has been summoned to the White House before. At the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy turned to former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett for advice. Lovett's response was simple: "Mac, I think that the best service that we can perform for the President is to try to approach this as Colonel Stimson would." For men like Lovett and John McCloy, who had served under Stimson, he was, in McCloy's words, their "hero-statesman." On Stimson's death in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson compared him to George Washington.

Who was this much admired man? Henry Lewis Stimson had the kind of resumé that Washington insiders dream about: he was, successively, U.S. attorney for New York, secretary of war, presidential envoy to Nicaragua, governor general of the Philippines, secretary of state, and finally secretary of war again during World War II. In between these duties for seven presidents, he became one of New York's most eminent and highly paid lawyers. Hodgson takes the reader from Stimson's years at Yale, Harvard, and the New York bar through his long public career from 1905 to 1945. While more critical than Elting Morrison (Stimson's official biographer), Hodgson is quite taken by Stimson and the long shadow he cast. But a careful look behind the fancy titles reveals a reality that is less dazzling, and a record sufficiently ordinary to make one wonder why Stimson's name evokes such hallowed memories.

Stimson's first foreign policy appointment as William Henry Taft's secretary of war was an uneventful two-year stint in what was in 1911 the most insignificant job in the cabinet. The Army had only seventy-five thousand men, most of whom were scattered around the country at obsolete military posts looking out for Indians who by then were on reservations. Later, he was an ineffectual secretary of state, unable to convince either President Hoover or the Europeans to take his advice on debts and disarmament, unable to scare the Japanese after their invasion of Manchuria, unable to make the British and French agree even to a joint condemnation of the invasion. The doctrine that bears Stimson's name "didn't work," Hodgson admits. In fact, of all America's "named" foreign policy doctrines from Monroe's to Reagan's, the Stimson Doctrine is the most inconsequential.

Franklin Roosevelt made Stimson his secretary of war in an attempt to undercut Republican isolationists by appointing one of their party men to a high foreign policy post (the president had earlier considered Alfred Landon and Frank Knox). Stimson's role at the War Department was that of a benign chairman of the board, often working only four days a week, till four in the afternoon, nodding approvingly at all that went on, from D-Day plans to the internment of Japanese-Americans. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall bypassed

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him entirely, reporting directly to the president. Roosevelt did not take him to Yalta; Truman did not want to take him to Potsdam.

Hodgson spends one-fourth of the book on the momentous decision to build and drop the atom bomb on Japan. But while Stimson played a considerable role in the Manhattan Project, most key decisions were clearly Roosevelt's—Stimson himself spends less than one-tenth of his memoirs on the bomb. Whoever had been secretary of war from 1940 to 1945 would have been immensely important, presiding over the world's largest military build-up. But it is striking that even in such a post Stimson left no policy that one can point to as his lasting creation. Certainly a younger, more engaged man—Stimson was in his mid-seventies at the time—might have left firmer footprints.

To be fair, Stimson acquitted himself well in most of his appointments. He was an administrative reformer as secretary of war, he negotiated an ingenious armistice in Nicaragua in 1927, and he was well liked in the Philippines during his year as colonial governor. He worked hard at the State Department, but was not a landmark secretary as was, say, Dean Acheson or Henry Kissinger. He was a competent but not brilliant statesman, able but with few lasting achievements to his name. Even as a personality he was legendary only in his reserve. An aloof, laconic man, the press once dubbed him "the human icicle." What, then, is the great Stimson legacy that inspires awe in generations of American foreign policy-makers?

Stimson's memory is crucially important in the history of American foreign policy for two reasons. As is often mentioned, he was the founding figure in the creation of the American foreign policy "establishment." Equally important, if less often acknowledged, was the linking of American idealism and European *realpolitik* in Stimson's world-view in a way that has defined America's approach to foreign affairs ever since. Hodgson recognizes both legacies—though he does not articulate the second in these terms—and his book moves us closer to a true appreciation of his subject. Stripped of his titles and medals, Henry Stimson is deservedly identified with a legacy that is more permanent than the mystical memories of his fans.

WHAT HENRY Fairlie called "the Establishment" in the London of 1955 had been a much more powerful phenomenon in the late nineteenth century. British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher have argued that Victorian England's imperial policies were determined by an "official mind," a group of statesmen from both parties whose common background, education, and values gave them a shared world-view. "The establishment," on the other hand, is a looser term, encompassing supporting elites outside government. At the turn of the century, America certainly possessed an upper class. White, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, it was scattered around the northeast and was not as closely knit as London's clubby elite. More important, it was a commercial establishment, interested in money and scornful of government. Lord David Cecil paints a picture of the Victorian elite in his classic *The Young Melbourne:* "The Whig Lord was so often as not a minister, his eldest son an M.P., his second attached to a foreign embassy, so that their houses were alive with the effort and hurry of politics." New York's townhouses, by contrast, were preoccupied with the business of America's great railroad trusts, steel companies, banks, and law firms.

Elihu Root and Henry Stimson were among the first prominent members of this gilded society to devote themselves almost entirely to government service. Though leaders of the New York bar, they chose to spend most of their lives in appointed federal jobs, moving back into private life only when they had to. Stimson, having spent time and effort picking his juniors—from Felix Frankfurter to McGeorge Bundy—promoted them assiduously. He made glamorous the idea of government service because, while not born one, he lived as an aristocrat, building a country estate on Long Island, complete with annual fairs and grouse shooting. And he stuck around longer

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than most, spending almost all the years between 1905 and 1945 in government.

His lengthy tenure in government, however, is another indication that Stimson cannot be accused of having pursued bold policies. Longevity in Washington depends on doing enough to convince people that you are wise—"sound"—but not doing so much that they think you too clever. Dean Acheson and Henry Kissinger are the two secretaries of state of this century who most successfully pushed their world-views into policy—a reasonable measure of effectiveness in that office. But by readily displaying his intellect, by forcefully pursuing a grand strategy, and by refusing to abandon plans that faced opposition, each alienated enough people to ensure that he could never again be appointed to high office. Brent Scowcroft, by contrast, could probably get a job in any administration, even a Democratic one.

Hodgson deals adequately with the sociological aspects of this American establishment, but Stimson's life is not the best vantage point from which to study this phenomenon. He and others fostered an American foreign policy elite which, if not for World War II, would have been stillborn. The crisis in Europe mobilized internationally minded Americans as never before, and they entered government in droves filled with a common purpose and outlook. Forged in the fires of war, the bipartisan foreign policy establishment—for many of these rich East Coasters were Republicans in a Democratic administration—set the course of America's world politics in the crucial years after the war. The real story of the American establishment is the story of this successor generation, and it has been told superbly by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas in *The Wise Men*.

Even more important than Stimson's role in shaping the establishment is his place in the intellectual history of American foreign policy. This has remained obscure, and it is by focusing attention on it that *The Colonel* most enlightens us, even though Hodgson's own conclusions are an unsure guide to follow. Most scholars have tended to mix praise for Stimson with regrets that he was a "liberal internationalist." George Kennan, for example, branded his approach to the world "juridical." Armin Rappaport concurred, calling Stimson "a legalist who did not seem to realize that in international relations there was no clear cut categoric right and wrong." Others accused him of having harbored Wilsonian delusions about the League of Nations. While Hodgson follows the practice of labeling Stimson a liberal internationalist, his book provides evidence suggesting a statesman whose views were more sophisticated than either his fans or his critics realize.

HODGSON misunderstands liberal internationalism, defining the term as "a tendency to advocate restraint, to shrink from crude militarism or overbearing chauvinism, to show sensitivity to the still small voice of conscience about the use of force." This is quite wrong. Liberal internationalism is so named not because of either eagerness or reluctance to use force, but rather because its proponents, many of them liberals in domestic policy, believe that power abroad, like power at home, can be used to better the world. They trust that international social engineering can work, that commerce, democracy, and law can counter anarchy and violence. Far from advocating restraint, liberal internationalists from Wilson to John F. Kennedy have been widely criticized for abandoning prudence and caution in their obsessive pursuit of grandiose goals. Liberal internationalism may be contrasted with European-style *realpolitik*, which holds that states must act in this disordered world solely on the basis of self-interest, that power is the ultimate arbiter of international life, and that a country's domestic politics is its own business.

Liberal internationalism is America's principal approach to the outside world. The few who have advocated *realpolitik*—Nicholas Spykman, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger—have been European, by birth or intellectual pedigree. Conservatism itself, in the traditional European sense, is un-American. As Lionel Trilling noted: "Liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole

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intellectual tradition [in the United States]." Founded on John Locke's axioms, America, lacking ethnic homogeneity and a genuine aristocracy, has as its defining characteristic a liberal political philosophy.[1] So-called American "conservatism" is, for the most part, a variant of classical liberalism, emphasizing individual liberty and the free market.

LIBERALISM, bolstered by the isolation and security that two vast oceans and the absence of strong neighbors provide, has imparted to American foreign policy an unrealistic attitude toward power. Americans alternate between rejecting power as unnecessary and embracing it as omnipotent. In a short period of time, Woodrow Wilson combined both strands. He epitomized the former when he defended U.S. inaction after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, saying, "There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."[2] Within months of his speech, however, Wilson changed his mind and moved to the other extreme. He took America into World War I on a crusade that he believed would forever change the nature of world politics. American power was redemptive; it could make the world anew.

Conservatism, American-style, is also uneasy with the use of power; indeed, it is defined by its skepticism about power. James Madison and his famous handiwork, the Constitution, display a profound distrust of state authority, a distrust reflected in the outlook of staunch free-marketeers and in some sections of the American business community. Suspicious that foreign entanglements would expand the state at home, many businessmen—from the anti-expansionists of the 1890s to the isolationists of the 1930s to the supporters of detente in the 1970s—have argued for a severely restricted American role in the world, one limited primarily to protecting America's economic interests. It is no accident that recent calls for a new isolationism come from the American Right.

There does exist in America, however, a weak and precarious tradition combining a faith in liberal ideals with trust in national power. The patron saint of this tradition is Alexander Hamilton who, with other Federalists, pursued a foreign policy for the early republic that was hard-headed and sophisticated enough to secure the fledgling nation's existence. A small country surrounded by great powers—the British, French, and Spanish empires—the United States maneuvered with a supple diplomacy reminiscent of eighteenth-century Europe. Far from being a permanent renunciation of the Old World, Washington's Farewell Address—at least as Hamilton had drafted it—was a shrewd recognition that *at the time and in the prevailing circumstances* America's national interest lay in husbanding its meager resources. Washington promised that "at no distant period" the United States would become a "great nation," able to deal with Europe's titans as an equal. But as Europe retreated from continental America, domestic problems preoccupied the country for much of the nineteenth century. For almost one hundred years Hamilton had few heirs, and the lack of foreign involvements allowed liberal ideology to seep into America's world view.

At the end of the nineteenth century, with the United States wealthy enough to be a first-rate world power, a group of Americans rose to prominence in public affairs whom Samuel Huntington has labeled the "neo-Hamiltonians." Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the young Henry Stimson fervently believed that the United States must play a major role in the world's Great Power struggles. These men spoke comfortably in terms of national power and the national interest. If the dominant liberal tradition had been

[1]The important exception to this portrait of a monolithic liberal society is, of course, the antebellum South, which was conservative in the European sense.

[2]This belief has not died. William Pfaff's new foreign policy slogan for America is "Being is superior to doing." See William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91*, p. 48.

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affected by the legal profession's methods of resolving conflicts, the neo-Hamiltonians were influenced by the military creed. (Though a lawyer, Stimson once admitted that he naturally approached foreign policy from the perspective of military strategy.) This group supported increased arms, active diplomacy and, if necessary, war. Indeed, they were too eager in their support for the last. "I should welcome almost any war, for I think the country needs one," said Roosevelt privately in 1897. Stimson concurred: "A war would be a wonderfully good thing for this country."

THIS IMPERIAL tradition in American foreign policy peaked during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and then quickly died. Woodrow Wilson espoused an idealistic internationalism far more palatable to Americans than Roosevelt's call for national adventures. Roosevelt himself died in 1919, and the failure of Wilson's vision plunged the United States deep into isolation. But Henry Stimson endured. As Elihu Root's protégé and Theodore Roosevelt's friend, he was the surviving member of the neo-Hamiltonians. He was, writes Hodgson, "almost uniquely, the connection between their early dreams of American power and its later fulfillment." He was able to make this connection because he shaped American imperialism into a realism more acceptable—indeed more American—than that of the neo-Hamiltonians, with their brass bands and bayonets. And he made these adjustments while crossing the desert of American isolationism.

Stimson has been branded a Wilsonian internationalist for his tenure as secretary of state in the Hoover administration from 1928 to 1932. It is certainly impossible to reconcile that charge with his earlier career. At the sober age of fifty he had volunteered for combat duty in World War I and returned to write of the "joy" and "glamour" of war: "It reminded me of nothing so much as a good grizzly-bear hunt in my younger days." A supporter of Roosevelt, Taft, and Lodge, he opposed Wilson's plans for the League of Nations and thought that the president's refusal to recognize governments that had come to power by revolution was futile. He believed so firmly in the use of force as an instrument of policy that Herbert Hoover regarded his secretary of state as "at times more of a warrior than a diplomat."

As secretary of state, however, Stimson often invoked the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (notorious today as the utopian treaty in which nations promised to outlaw war "as an instrument of national policy"), the League of Nations, and the World Court. He authored a doctrine that condemned Japan's invasion of Manchuria morally and legally—but did nothing else. Hence his reputation. A closer examination shows, however, that Stimson was trying his best to hold the center between Wilsonians, many of whom in the 1920s and 1930s believed in world federalism, and the powerful isolationists who were inclined to brand any move away from strict neutrality as high treason. Stimson used the Kellogg Pact to point out that America could not be neutral once it had committed itself to opposing aggression. By working with the League when it suited American interests, Stimson thought he could cautiously move America to its rightful place on the world stage. He struggled constantly, trying to convince both the White House and Congress that America could not stand by and watch Europe commit suicide. "I make no claim to the verdict of history," Stimson said to a colleague during his last months as secretary of state, "but I hope all of you who are in the Department will realize all that I was able to accomplish with a pacifist President."[3]

Observers of American foreign policy are often struck by its apparent hypocrisy, what seems to critics to be its cloaking of cynical power politics in high-minded moralism. Even friends of America are dismayed by its penchant for rationalizing its interests in self-righteous rhetoric. But in truth, modern American foreign policy is a peculiar but genuine amalgam of liberalism and *realpolitik*.

[3]Cited in A. Hooker, ed., *The Moffat Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 48, 60.

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This, in its modern form, is Henry Stimson's legacy. Most American statesmen after him have tried to blend together liberalism and realism to pursue, in Herbert Croly's phrase, Jefferson's goals with Hamilton's means. Call it American Realism.

AMERICAN Realism proceeds from the assumption that the *Pax Britannica* of the nineteenth century was a blessing, preserving peace, trade, and travel around the globe. The United States has taken Britain's place as the balancer of the world, ensuring that expansionists are thwarted in their efforts to unsettle the world. By implication, of course, American hegemony is not feared because it is benign. While eagerly accepting national power and the need for force, proponents of this ideology tame the Rooseveltian imperial faith in war as a "moral adventure." They take from Europe's great power game the need for calculation, wariness, and an understanding of the limits of power, but they cannot play the game as unselfconsciously as the Europeans did. Admittedly, these lessons in skepticism have been difficult to master, and—as realists like George Kennan have often pointed out—many of America's foreign policy failures can be attributed to its inability to temper idealism with prudence.

Part of the problem is that advocates of American Realism, from Stimson on, have never been sure which aspects of liberalism they accept and which they reject. International liberalism can be divided into three components: *commercial*, *republican*, and *regulatory liberalism*.[4] In the past, American realists, even when they have forcefully promoted free trade, have considered commercial liberalism's faith in the pacific effects of commerce to be naive. Though they have often supported nasty regimes, American statesmen have frequently and increasingly accepted republican liberalism—believing that a nation's domestic system has an effect on its external behavior and that democracies are more peace-loving than dictatorships. And while European *realpolitik*'s principal criticism of liberalism is its misguided emphasis on collective security, American statesmen have never been able entirely to reject regulatory liberalism and its advocacy of international organizations, laws, and regimes. In practice, they have placed their faith in the pacific effects of free trade, democracy, and international organizations, believing that these measures enhance peace and stability, at least in the "civilized" world.

For all this intellectual confusion, many American foreign policy successes contain a wise blend of idealism and *realpolitik*. Consider the greatest triumph of Stimson's successors: the postwar rehabilitation of Europe and Japan. This rested on a belief that the greatest threat that Europe faced was not one involving military security—the focus of *realpolitik*—but rather a political threat. The solution was even bolder: domestic reconstruction. Europe had to be made socially, politically, and economically confident enough not to succumb to pro-Soviet communism.

The motives for American aid were, of course, part self-interest and part generosity, but more striking is the American faith that Germany and Japan could be rebuilt into peace-loving, prosperous democracies. No European great power, it must be said, was ever so generous with its vanquished enemies, and few had the arrogance to believe that ancient civilizations could be remade. On a much smaller scale Ronald Reagan and George Schultz stabilized key allies such as the Philippines and El Salvador by nudging them toward democracy. That the United States succeeded in its task, achieving liberal ends through often illiberal means, suggests that American Realism may have appreciated aspects of the modern world—the universal appeal of democracy and the promise of the free market, for example—which make it more *realistic* than the Old World's cynicism.

Stimson's legacy has been the transmission of a powerful and uniquely American

[4]These distinctions are drawn from Robert Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn's *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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world-view. He developed his views during the inter-war years, when the international system lay in uneasy multipolarity, Germany and Japan were rising powers, and Russia, obsessed by its internal affairs, had withdrawn from the world. Today's world bears some resemblance to this period. One important difference is, of course, American power. In the 1930s the United States was potentially the most powerful nation in the world, but that power remained dormant because men like Stimson were overruled. The Cold War, while bringing Stimson's protégés to power, further obscured his intellectual patrimony. The impetus to confront Soviet Russia for strategic as well as ideological reasons jumbled up America's liberals and conservatives, isolationists and expansionists. The dictates of that messianic conflict made Stimson's great power strategy for America seem quaint. But the Cold War has ended, the world moves again toward multipolarity, and the United States, diminished from its postwar heights, remains the first among equals. As this country approaches the third millennium, its surest guide may be Henry Stimson's American Realism.□

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Bush and the Stimson Doctrine

The Stimson Doctrine was promulgated in 1932 in response to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. As secretary of state, Stimson formally announced that the United States would not recognize any changes in international borders that were effected by force.

The Stimson Doctrine lay stillborn for almost half a century until August 1990, when George Bush responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait just as Stimson might have envisioned. The president seems to have decided to turn back the invasion of Kuwait not solely, as is often charged, because of its oil reserves, but because he believes that aggression breeds aggression and that an international system in flux needs stability. Stimson averred—among other places in his 1940 Andover commencement address to George Bush's graduating class—that World War II started because of the timidity of statesmen. The Bush Doctrine is the Stimson Doctrine with a Rooseveltian big stick.

Bush has gone well beyond pure balance of power politics, which would have recommended diminishing the Iraqi regime's power but leaving it strong enough to balance Iran and Syria and to maintain internal order. (Henry Kissinger's advocacy of sanctions and air strikes on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities is the clearest example of this school). But he has also been reluctant to go beyond rhetorical attempts to affect the domestic regimes of Iraq and Kuwait. Much like the Stimson Doctrine, Bush's approach combines American power with regulatory liberalism—multilateralism, collective security, and state (Kuwaiti) sovereignty as the key values.

In the short term, this mix of realism and liberalism may work, but collective security has a much poorer track record of creating long-term peace and stability than do democracy and free trade. The Middle East may not be ripe for the revolutionary prescriptions of commercial and republican liberalism. However, having gone beyond the dictates of *realpolitik* and having set revolutionary forces in motion—in Iraq, Kuwait, and to a lesser extent all over the region—the president is now holding onto the weak strand in international liberalism. And that could result in the unwinding of his version of American Realism.

—*F.Z.*

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In the Grand Manner

Marc Raeff

Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). 944 pp., $40.00.

WHEN WE consider the phenomenon of modern revolutions, we observe an interesting progression in their scope and nature. The English and American Revolutions, as Martin Malia has noted, were essentially political, or constitutional, and primarily involved the elites. The French Revolution of 1789 and most of those in the nineteenth century (including the 1905 Russian Revolution) were socio-economic as well as political, and actively involved segments of the urban populace and peasantry, as well as the elites. Starting with Russia in 1917, the revolutions of the twentieth century were totalitarian in fact (Russia, China) or intent (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy); they were highly ideologized and drew into their maelstrom all sectors of the population. The Russian Revolution of 1917, and more specifically the violent takeover by the Bolsheviks, was the first truly totalitarian revolution—one that replaced the old order with the utopian "construction" of a new society and human type.

The Russian revolutionary ferment evolved over a decade and a half, and through a number of stages. From 1900 to 1907, waves of unrest, bolstered by economic crisis and military defeat in the unpopular Russo-Japanese War, led to a political restructuring. The resulting form of representative constitutionalism left the autocratic power of czar and bureaucracy pretty much intact. The next stage, 1907 to 1917, was marked by the repression of revolutionary unrest and the attempt to forge a new relationship between state and society based on *Duma* (an elected legislative assembly) participation in the public debate and the consolidation of individual property rights (Stolypin's land reform). The crippling economic and social burdens of World War I in the face of military defeat and political incompetence led to the collapse of the imperial regime, in February 1917, and the anarchic breakdown of Russian society and institutions. The hesitant efforts of liberals and moderate socialists to stem the disintegration were negated by the interference of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets, the refusal of the Kerensky government to countenance Russia's exit from the war, and its procrastination on land and constitutional reform. Lenin's Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the growing impotence of the Provisional Government, seized power and implemented their total reconstruction of the country's political, economic, and social spheres. Only victory in the bitterly fought Civil War secured Bolshevik power in 1921 (even then, Lenin was forced into the temporary concession of the New Economic Policy [NEP] that permitted the peasantry to recover and the industrial machine to start up again). The Bolshevik Party, the only real power left in Russia, could embark at last upon its project of fashioning a "new Soviet man."

The Russian Revolution treats the first two of these stages as background to the more detailed examination of the period from February 1917 to the inauguration of the NEP in 1921. A sequel, promised for the near future, is to cover the Civil War, the reconquest of the borderlands, the NEP, and the consolidation of the Soviet system to fulfill the original Bolshevik project. One hopes that at that time, Professor Pipes will share his more general conclusions of the Russian revolutionary drama and its significance for our century.

Revolutions generate masses of paper—publications of party and government documents, newspapers and pamphlets, memoirs and correspondence, scholarly monographs, and political, social, economic, and philosophic interpretations. The Russian Revolution was no exception. But unlike the French

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Revolution, the Russian Revolution produced no Thiers, Michelet, Tocqueville, or Taine; nor even authoritative academic histories like those of Vandal, Jaurès, Mathiez, Lefebvre, and Furet. Oddly, even more than seventy years after the event, there exists only one fairly comprehensive and "objective" chronicle of the events (mildly biased, however, in favor of the victors) by the American correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, William Henry Chamberlin, published in 1935. It is woefully out of date in its documentation and perception. Professor Pipes' magisterial treatment, at long last, responds to a crying need.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, and again in the late 1950s and over the last decade, printed primary sources became available in quantity. Even without access to archival holdings, the mass of information to be digested and interpreted is staggering. Professor Pipes is to be commended for the tremendous industry with which he has marshalled an astounding volume of disparate primary and secondary sources in many languages, scattered in libraries around the world. He has truly justified his dedication: "To the Victims."

LET US cast a brief glance at the historiography of the Russian Revolution. We need not linger on the Soviet histories, all of which reflect party requirements and dictation; their interpretation is shallow and trite, even from a Marxist perspective, while their documentation is fragmentary and partial. We can also make short shrift of two other extremes of interpretation—the monarchist and the left-socialist. Both claim that the Bolshevik Revolution was the work of a band of conspirators abetted by outside forces (Jews or Germans) which irreparably harmed either the spirit of the Russian people (the monarchist view) or the ideals of a genuinely socialist revolution (the left-socialist view).

More important are the writings of the liberal intelligentsia, generally characterized by greater professionalism and a profound knowledge of Russian history and of the available literature. Among them were several historians of distinction—G. Vernadsky, M. Florinsky—as well as participants in the events—P. Miliukov, V. Maklakov, S. Melgunov. Their overall interpretation was shared by Western historians—including Sir Bernard Pares, B.H. Sumner, and W.H. Chamberlin. Whatever their differences in detail and nuance, these liberals agreed in their general interpretation. Since 1861 Russia had been developing, albeit too slowly, into a "modern" structured society with a high level of economic productivity. This resulted in a significant but unequal rise in the educational level and prosperity of the entire population. These trends, the liberals maintained, were inexorably leading to greater political liberalization. Had this evolution not been stifled by the stubborn resistance of the Establishment and the outbreak of World War I, the liberals believed, it would surely have led to genuine democracy and political freedom. Until the 1960s, this interpretative scheme held almost unchallenged sway in American universities. The sole dissents came from those Communists and fellow travelers who either hewed close to the official Soviet line or who, after breaking with Moscow, accepted the extreme radical left interpretations.

In the 1960s there arose a "revisionist" historiography rooted in the methodology and presuppositions of avant-garde, Marxist-colored, social history. These young historians were the first foreigners to gain access to some of the archival sources in the USSR, in order to work on topics approved by Soviet authorities. Unfortunately, although these works put into circulation an appreciable amount of new factual information, they are often marred by a "philosophy" of history that assumes the inevitability of revolution and justifies the Bolshevik coup for allegedly reflecting the dynamics of the proletariat's class consciousness and values. By ignoring this literature (with some merited exceptions) Professor Pipes implies its irrelevance for a genuine understanding of the events. I would agree; but he commits the rhetorical (and

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professional) mistake of not stating clearly and forcefully his reasons for ignoring it.

Finally, in the 1980s, another—and growing—"revisionist" trend has re-examined the revolution of 1917 and its immediate antecedents. Not only have some "non-persons" been restored to their historical roles (Bukharin, Kamenev, Trotsky, and so on), but heretofore suppressed information has been published. Against this background Pipes' book represents a magisterial and original synthesis and critical interpretation of the documented facts.

AS PIPES outlines, after two and a half decades of "counter reform" that endeavored to inhibit the effects of the "Great Reforms" of Alexander II (emancipation of the serfs, local self-government, limited censorship, universal military service, modern judiciary, university autonomy), and the alleged ineptitude of the government in coping with the famine of 1891, unrest seized the universities. In the first years of the twentieth century, fanned by worldwide economic depression, the unrest spread to the countryside and eventually to industry as well. In 1904, a wave of terrorist attacks on government officials brought about an easing of the regime's repressive policies; but the defeats and discontent triggered by the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) heightened the social and political tensions. A general strike in October 1905 finally forced Nicholas II to promise the convocation of an elected legislative *Duma*.

Meeting in the spring of 1906, the first *Duma* had an anti-governmental majority of liberals and moderate socialists. It confronted a government reluctant to cooperate with it and was dissolved. The *Duma* elected in 1907, under terms of a much restricted franchise, proved more pliable to the will of the energetic and reform-minded (albeit conservative) prime minister, Stolypin. Imposing martial law, Stolypin put a stop to violent unrest and introduced a series of land reforms. Their aim was to replace communal land tenure with individual and hereditary ownership in order to stimulate the rise of a loyal, conservative class of proprietor-farmers. At the same time Stolypin furthered Great Russian nationalism, which exacerbated the anti-Russian (anti-imperial) sentiments of the non-Russian nationalities.

What effect these policies might have had is an intriguing but unanswerable question. In any event, they lost their momentum after Stolypin's assassination in 1911, and were virtually abandoned when war broke out in July 1914. Severe military defeats and incompetent management of the home front brought about food shortages that triggered a revolt in Petrograd in February 1917 and toppled the imperial regime. The Provisional Government, ineptly led and forced to share power with a self-appointed and self-coopting "Soviet [Council] of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," let the country slide further and further into anarchy and violence. Eventually, after several attempts, Lenin managed to overthrow the Provisional Government in October and install a Bolshevik dictatorship. In the Constitutional Assembly, elected in November 1917, the Bolsheviks had only about 20 percent of the seats, and Lenin closed it after only one day in session.

Gradually, all institutions (including the Soviets) that competed for power with the Bolsheviks were either eliminated or cowed into submission. Signing a disastrous separate peace with the Germans at Brest Litovsk in March 1918 did not prevent (on the contrary, probably triggered) the outbreak of a civil war that soon engulfed virtually the whole country. However, the resistance of the peasantry and the total collapse of the economy forced Lenin to adopt, in March 1921, the New Economic Policy which restored agricultural production and enabled the country to regain some of its economic capacity—all the while eliminating the former social, cultural, and economic elites.

Professor Pipes tells this story in detail with consummate skill and great brio. He sets the record straight on a number of poorly known or contentious events—for example, Stolypin's assassination, the Kornilov affair, the details of abortive coups and eventual success of a Bolshevik seizure of power, and

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the macabre murder of Nicholas II and his family (the subject of a separate chapter that is chilling in its tangled and gruesome detail). His narrative political history is in the grand manner. It is replete with intrigue and drama; laced with irony, strongly held opinions, and moral judgments; and it sternly shows the errors (and worse) of omission and commission of all major actors. Detailed portraits of the major historical personages are drawn whenever the documentation permits it.

If Tocqueville, in his classic *L'Ancien régime et la révolution*, examined the roots of one revolution, then Pipes writes from the anticipatory perspective of what developed out of another. In great detail, Pipes maintains that the tradition of a "patrimonial" political culture (the main subject of his 1974 *Russia under the Old Regime*) generated an arbitrary autocratic government and fostered a weak sense of law and private property. This weakness significantly contributed to the political, economic, and social underdevelopment of the empire and ultimately to its collapse. Russia's paternalistic culture also explains, according to Pipes, the ease with which the Bolsheviks imposed their brutal dictatorship.

IN INSISTING on the existence of unchanging peculiarities of a national political culture, Pipes may be too close for comfort to the belief in an immutable national character. There are also shortcomings—in addition to great strengths—in his portrait of Lenin. No doubt, Lenin's (evil) genius as revolutionary tactician developed from taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the traditions of imperial Russia's society and government, as well as by historical circumstances. Pipes draws a chilling portrait of Lenin as one who craved total power for his party and himself, whatever the cost. Pipes ferociously depicts him as a megalomaniacal coward, scornful of all idealism and social concern for the people's good, ready to destroy all institutions, all traditions, all social ties. Nor did he stop at giving up territory and national resources (at Brest Litovsk and later) to gain the time necessary to consolidate his grip on Russia. In this connection it is particularly important to remember that Lenin knew how to take advantage of the greed and interests of foreign powers—witness the eagerness with which both the Germans and Allies in fact contributed to the Bolsheviks' survival. When Pipes is through, nothing is left of the "humane," modest, infallible, cultured, and dedicated Lenin-icon that Soviet propaganda has created. Yet obviously this was not the way his comrades saw him—for if it was would they have been so readily persuaded by his arguments and impressed by his leadership?

Pipes, it seems to me, does not fully appreciate the ideological dimension in Lenin's behavior. No doubt he was opportunistic, cruel, and power-mad; but in his own mind (and in those of his followers) this was necessary in the pursuit of a more vast ideological project: erecting not only socialism and communism, but creating the new Soviet man himself. This totalitarian thrust, and the hubris of re-enacting God's creation of man and re-ordering of the environment, distinguished the Bolshevik dictatorship from traditional czarist autocracy as well as from ordinary authoritarian dictatorships. In this light, the true follower of Lenin was Hitler. As Pipes points out, Lenin and his acolytes were the first to define entire categories of people (e.g., *kulaks*) as a "vermin" to be "exterminated" for the sake of the nation's health.

Naturally, Lenin's success was in no small measure due to the ineptness of his opposition. *The Russian Revolution* demonstrates how the intelligentsia, the "conscience" of Russian freedom and progress throughout the nineteenth century, lost its moral firmness and abdicated its function. Its misreading of the French Revolution as a model, its ignorance of the real Russian people, its constitutional refusal to see and hear evil on the "Left," and its uncritical clinging to utopian social reconstruction projects—all doomed the intelligentsia to ineffectiveness and capitulation. The Constitutional Democratic and Octobrist Parties fell victim to the

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chaos and violence in 1917, and Lenin easily eliminated them.

At first glance such a view of the dynamics of the Russian Revolution makes Lenin's triumph appear inevitable. But as a genuine historian, Pipes stresses that contingency and accident were crucial. At every moment in the chronicle of events we are confronted by the dramatic evidence of the role of the individual and his moral responsibility for omissions and commissions. Years ago, in *The Hero in History*, Sidney Hook argued that without Lenin there would have been neither a Bolshevik Revolution nor a Soviet regime. Pipes fully illustrates the truth of this judgment.

In that case, however, we may well ask: why pay attention to past social and institutional practices and traditional political culture? I believe there are two answers. In the first place, they account for the weakness of constituted bodies and intermediary institutions (Montesquieu's *pouvoirs intermédiaires*) as the country confronted the catastrophes of world war and the revolutionaries' determination to destroy the old order. The underdevelopment of Russia's social and institutional structures explains why the country was immediately plunged into anarchy once the imperial government vanished, and the success of the ruthless tactics of the Bolsheviks in gaining control. Second, and as Pipes emphasizes, the traditional order could be drawn upon to provide the tools of government and administration, making it possible to employ some of the bureaucratic and military personnel of the czarist establishment. In qualifying Pipes' argument, I would stress that resort to traditional practices was but a superficial aspect of Lenin's new regime. After all, Hitler, too, relied on the militaristic and bureaucratic methods of old Prussia, but his racial project was strictly his own. As a matter of fact, while all the time straining to identify threads of continuity between czarist and Bolshevik regimes, Pipes stresses the innovativeness and the unpredicted, totally new character of Lenin's regime. (The distance that separates Pipes from Solzhenitsyn—his old antagonist in the interpretation of Leninist Bolshevism—is not that great after all; it is particularly evident in their assessment of Stolypin and of their account of the circumstances of his assassination.)

BUT THAT having been said, it is still true that all countries draw on ideas elaborated over centuries, even while applying them to new purposes and problems ("Innovation is a selective tradition," a German historian once put it). Professor J. LeDonne has demonstrated that, since Muscovite times, Russia was a "command society" whose autocratic ruler kept law and order at home and channeled the nation's productive resources for defense and imperial expansion with the help of a closely knit group of elite retinue or nobility. The main beneficiary of this political system was a "ruling class" obligated to perform state service and rewarded for it handsomely. *Mutatis mutandis*, LeDonne argues, this was also the relationship between Lenin/Stalin, the CPSU, and the Soviet Union. In my opinion, this model accounts quite well for the continuities in Russian and Soviet political cultures.

Lenin wrested control from a faltering Provisional Government not only to satisfy his titanic craving for power and his ruthless passion to eradicate the old order, but also—in the title of a book by M. Heller and A. Nekrich—to put "Utopia in Power." This is his major innovation and, alas, his evil legacy to the twentieth century. The deliberate use of indiscriminate mass terror as an instrument of government, the paramountcy of charismatic leadership, the elimination of potential centers of autonomous life—all these prefigure Stalinism. Pipes brings out the organic link from Lenin to Stalin which is in many ways stronger than the continuities between czarist and Bolshevik Russia. It is that link, much more than those continuities, that doomed the country to its modern tragedies.

We should beware of any simplistic (not to say simple-minded) assertion of perennial continuities (or repetitions) and inevitable trends. Several Soviet acquaintances have

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stressed in conversation that the Soviet regime effectively destroyed solid knowledge and genuine understanding of the country's past, even on the part of most intellectuals. The wasteland of Soviet historiography is fertile soil for the sprouting of false interpretations and new historical myths—whether they argue for continuity or radical break in 1917—that may be used to lend the "authority of history" to political decisions now. In my opinion, it is unfortunate that in his article "Czars and Commiczars" (*New Republic*, January 21, 1991), Professor Robert C. Tucker endows with an aura of intellectual respectability the facile and false historical analogies circulating in Soviet Russia. Although he is not a historian, he should be mindful of the admonition of Fustel de Coulanges that "history does not resolve problems; it [merely] teaches one to examine them." This is precisely what Pipes' book, whatever one's reservations in particulars, does so well.

Pipes' eloquent and captivating chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution reveals the most essential imperative of Leninism: keep control at all costs—sacrifice space, people, and resources for that single supreme goal; show no scruples in exploiting the stupidity, gullibility, naivete, and honesty of any opponent. This history may be read as a cautionary tale for the present. Only time will tell whether events of recent years and months point to disconcerting similarities.□

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In Our Image

Jonathan Karl

Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington: AEI Press, 1991). 259 pp., $24.25.

THE GULF WAR seems to have swept away the much heralded right-wing return to isolationism. Despite scattered cries by the likes of Patrick Buchanan and Robert Novak to "bring America home again," not a single conservative vote was cast in Congress against the use of force in the Persian Gulf. And even pundits like Buchanan cheered American dominance once the bombs began falling on Baghdad. But the liberation of Kuwait was largely a diversion. The central issue remains: crafting a post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.

Enter Joshua Muravchik. *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* is billed as an internationalist manifesto calling for "the promotion of democracy as the centerpiece of American foreign policy." Scorning realism, neo-realism, isolationism, and pacifist idealism, Muravchik comes down firmly on the side of democratic internationalism—and in the process becomes a bit bogged down with labels. He argues the superiority and universal appeal of the democratic ideal, examines the feasibility of exporting this ideal around the world, and concludes with an optimistic look toward "a new order of the ages." Despite the distractions of persistent "New World Order" rhetorical flourishes, *Exporting Democracy* is a concise—though underdeveloped—articulation of an increasingly important position in the debate over the guiding principles of American foreign policy.

Muravchik is most successful in arguing the near-universal appeal of liberal democracy. From the signing of the Declaration of Independence to the Velvet Revolution, Muravchik surveys the leading role America has played—through the use of force and the force of example—in the dramatic spread of democracy over the past two

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centuries. The founding of America put democratic ideas of representative government and constitutionally protected liberties into practice for the first time. By example, America's great experiment strengthened the resolve of intellectuals and other aspiring democrats in France, England, and throughout Europe. In addition, the United States has contributed to the spread of democracy through military occupation (Japan, Germany), covert action (Nicaragua), overt encouragement (Eastern Europe), and foreign aid (Eastern Europe, Chile).

In the wake of the democratic revolutions that have swept through Eastern Europe, Chile, Nicaragua, and parts of Africa, arguments about the superiority of the American democratic ideal have particular force. The last two years have been a powerful testament that the appeal of Western-style liberal democracy transcends national borders and cultural differences. Muravchik easily debunks the cultural relativist argument that liberal democracy ought not to be imposed on non-Western cultures: "Belief in democracy as a universal value boils down to the conviction that adult human beings ought not be governed without their own consent." He also makes it clear that he is arguing for assisting *indigenous* democratic movements, not the imposition of our particular form of government on unwilling peoples.

Yet, Muravchik fails to address adequately the formidable obstacles to democratization in nations that have no democratic culture. What about countries beset by tribalism, or religious fanaticism, or extreme poverty, or all three? Though he points to India and Japan as countries that have successfully overcome these obstacles, he fails to explore the unique challenges that face aspiring democrats in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

MURAVCHIK offers "three good reasons" for the United States to continue spreading democracy around the world: a more democratic world will be more humane, friendlier to American interests, and more peaceful. Although these reasons are presented a bit like articles of faith, he makes a compelling case for the virtues of a more democratic world. His argument, however, is damaged by an overblown rhetoric that is at times positively utopian:

> A democratic Soviet Union or a constellation of democratic successor states would be no enemy of ours, or probably anybody else's. We would be free from the nightmare of nuclear holocaust. And this would be only the beginning of the benefits. The Soviet Union would add almost unresistable weight to the democratic camp. As partners rather than adversaries, America and the Soviet Union, backed by a democratic Europe and Japan, could foster a new global order in which peace is less broken, human rights less violated, and the environment less spoiled.

Such rhetoric may be appropriate for a State of the Union address, but hardly passes for sound analysis. Over two hundred years ago, Alexander Hamilton, no stranger to democracy's virtues, warned against such utopian sophistry in *The Federalist* no. 6:

> Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Hamilton was responding to his contemporaries, who, like Muravchik, argued that "commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord." Hamilton responded with a series of rhetorical questions that reflect the realist view of human nature that is so central to his genius:

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> Are not the former [republics] administered by *men* as well as the latter [monarchies]? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships and desires of unjust acquisition that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulse of rage, resentment, jealousy?

Hamilton cites several war-prone republics of the past—including Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage, and the provinces of Holland—to demonstrate that there have been "almost as many popular as royal wars." Of course, when Hamilton wrote, liberal democratic republics did not exist. As Muravchik points out, "war between democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world." It is more difficult for democratically elected leaders to make war; they cannot sustain an extended military engagement without convincing their constituents that the cause is worth the cost. On the other hand, an absolute despot like Saddam Hussein does not need popular support for such ventures. But this does not mean that a democratic world would magically become a peaceful world or that serious, and sometimes violent, conflicts of interest between nations would disappear. Muravchik's case would be strengthened with a dose of Hamilton's realism.

BUT MURAVCHIK sees realism as "the most potent source of opposition" to the foreign policy he espouses. As he endeavors to demonstrate "the follies of realism," he muddles his argument by worrying more about labels than ideas. He defines realism as the "insistence on putting self interest first"; but the only legitimate function of U.S. foreign policy is to be the custodian of the national interest. Muravchik understands that the State Department should not make sacrifices altruistically, but he is too busy defeating "realism" to say so.

Once the labels are removed, however, Muravchik's argument speaks for itself. The "realists" do not realistically calculate the national interest:

> The self-proclaimed realists are slaves to a model that bears little resemblance to the real world. . . . Advancing the democratic cause can be America's most effective foreign policy in terms not merely of good deeds but self interest as well.

In essence, here he argues for *true* realism—one that does not ignore the powerful role ideas can play in international relations. A "realism" that fails to account for the power of principles and morality results in a variety of failed policies. It leads to blind faith in Mikhail Gorbachev and the snubbing of Boris Yeltsin; it leads to supporting a Ba'athist Iraq until it finally invades Kuwait; it leads to coldly ignoring those who hold the true hope for China's future even as they are massacred in Tiananmen Square. Supporting democrats around the world also adds a moral dimension to American policy which can serve the national interest: being on the side of freedom over repression, good over evil, can make it easier to rally support for the American agenda.

Indeed, despite Muravchik's lofty and idealistic rhetoric, his analysis is surprisingly level-headed. He applauds the spirit of Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights, but criticizes the implementation of his policy for undermining undemocratic regimes—as in Iran and Nicaragua—without regard to what kind of regime might follow. Carter's moralism undermined American interests in these two strategically important regions and resulted in no advance for human rights. But Carter's failure, Muravchik correctly contends, does not prove that idealism has no place in foreign policy:

> It shows only that at times one must choose lesser evils, that idealism must express itself with due respect for reality, and that policies must be judged by their consequences, not the nobility of their intentions.

This amounts to the statement of a realist who recognizes that ideals play an important role in the reality of power politics. Teddy Roosevelt responded to the idealism of Woodrow Wilson's clarion call to "make the world

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safe for democracy" by saying, "First and foremost, we are to make the world safe for ourselves." Muravchik identifies this as the classic statement of the realism he attempts to debunk, but there is nothing inconsistent with Roosevelt's statement and the policy Muravchik advocates. Muravchik simply argues that ideals are as much a part of reality as power and a world safer for democracy is indeed a world safer for America.

Muravchik offers a variety of proposals to expand American efforts to "export democracy." After showing how democracy has been exported successfully through military and covert action, he postulates that both methods will became increasingly unnecessary in the post-Cold War era. Instead, he advocates the use of the presidency as a pro-democracy bully pulpit and a variety of foreign aid schemes designed to encourage democracy. He makes a convincing case that programs like the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) have played, and should continue to play, a significant role in spreading democracy at relatively little cost. Muravchik quotes Vaclav Havel, for example, who said of the VOA:

> You have informed us truthfully of events around the world and our country as well and, in this way, you helped to bring about the peaceful revolution which has at long last taken place.

While many argue that these programs have fulfilled their purpose and should now be curtailed, Muravchik maintains they should be expanded both to assist new democracies in the transition from authoritarianism and to continue democracy's expansion. He also suggests that foreign aid should target political development "by directly underwriting elections, courts and other institutions of democracy."

Unfortunately, Muravchik underestimates the crucial role of the private sector in spreading American ideals. His proposals amount to a kind of dignified welfare/workfare program that—though aimed at empowerment rather than paternalism—is nevertheless funded by already over-burdened American taxpayers. In Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the private sector already plays a prominent role in expanding democracy: non-profit organizations administer ambitious programs to assist democrats in other countries and American businesses are bringing the free market language of democracy to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. To his credit, Muravchik does suggest that the president should use the bully pulpit to encourage further private sector involvement in the democratic crusade.

IT IS HARD to argue with Muravchik's modest suggestions regarding the promotion of democracy through peaceful, overt, and relatively inexpensive means. Because of his rhetorical zeal, however, he fails to recognize that democratization, though valuable in itself, must be an instrumental goal if it is to command the concerted use of U.S. resources. It is impossible to justify future military entanglements merely in terms of promoting democracy. Individual Americans may be outraged at the Chinese occupation of Tibet, for example, and may make personal sacrifices to aid the cause of Tibetan independence, but it would be absurd to suggest (and Muravchik doesn't) that the United States should go to war to oust the occupying Chinese.

Muravchik seems to understand that national interest, rather than moralism, should guide U.S. foreign policy—which is why he goes to such length to demonstrate that exporting democracy can often serve the national interest—but for polemical reasons he stops short of saying so (at the onset, he announces that his book is an effort "to advance the cause of democratic idealism"). Charles Krauthammer, in the Winter 1989/90 issue of this magazine, does a better job of articulating a general principle to determine the worthiness of committing U.S. resources to promote democracy in a given instance: To what extent does the undemocratic country in question pose a threat to American security narrowly de-

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fined, or to the cause of freedom broadly defined? Krauthammer continued:

> . . . if the Cold War is won—then the islands of tyranny in the world, isolated and unsupported by a massive imperial center, become not only less threatening, but more likely to wither, in isolation, from their own contradictions. We should do what we can to encourage that withering. But unlike containment, that process of encouragement does not rise to the rank of defining purpose of American foreign policy.

Despite his protestations to the contrary, Muravchik seems to be in fundamental agreement with Krauthammer's assertion. His concrete proposals—more money for programs like the NED and USIA, the use of the presidency as a pro-democracy bully pulpit, and building democracy in a country if "the U.S. finds itself drawn into military occupation for reasons of self-defense or collective security"—hardly amount to "the promotion of democracy as the centerpiece of American foreign policy."

Exporting Democracy is a compelling polemic in favor of increasing American efforts to promote democracy around the world. As a result, however, it falls short of a serious discussion of democracy's weaknesses and the formidable obstacles to its universal implementation.□

Jonathan Karl is an editor at Freedom House.

Assault on Washington

Kenneth L. Adelman

James Webb, *Something to Die For* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1991). 333 pp., $19.95.

"WITH UNCANNY foresight," begins the publisher's publicity blurb, "acclaimed novelist and former Secretary of the Navy James Webb has made a fictional Middle East desert war the centerpiece of his latest novel, *Something to Die For*." Well, yes. But unfortunately, Mr. Webb's "uncanny foresight" is as wayward here as it was in February 1988 when he suddenly quit as Navy secretary over a slight cut in shipbuilding and, more recently, when he predicted bloody disaster stemming from U.S. military involvement in the Gulf.

Before he came to Washington, Mr. Webb had a distinguished and much decorated military career as a Marine in Vietnam, and his first novel, *Fields of Fire*, which deals with that war, was widely acclaimed. It may be that he has a better feel for field combat than for Washington infighting, though, to my ear, even Webb's dialogue for his soldiers in *Something to Die For* seems strained.

Rather than provide a quick plot summary, which often confuses, let me just list the novel's main characters: *President Everett Lodge*, a feckless leader who avoids making key decisions; *Defense Secretary Ronald Holcomb*, a clever man who avoided military service, turned into a hawk, and has become adept at scheming; *Janet Holcomb*, his wife, an ambitious, attractive, and unfaithful lady; *Doc Rowland*, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a bold (though justified) Japan-basher who sleeps with Janet, wife of his arch-enemy; and *General "Mad Dog" Mulcahy*, the local U.S. commander who wishes to end his career with a battle, which he provokes, thereby ending his career swiftly and ingloriously. There is a rich supporting cast—including a gallant American officer, who is killed in the inane battle contrived by Secretary Holcomb and the General, which takes place in Ethiopia and against the Soviets and Cubans (but in collaboration with the French), and during which the United States covertly sinks four Japanese tankers. The

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officer's young son cannot understand these machinations. None of us can blame him.

Webb begins his book by telling us that "Washington is a town whose only industry is the making, shaping, processing, and marketing of words. . . . Words without poetry or music, whose mastery brings money and authority." Washington, however, is about more than words. It is about purpose and service as well. Government gives those fortunate enough a chance to work on big issues—a genuine satisfaction in itself—and to do so in an intricate, many-layered system that provides rich scope for ambiguity, nuance, and maneuver, as well as for the exercise of straightforward virtues like dedication and moral courage. Who makes a decision? That is harder to determine in real life than in Mr. Webb's novel. What makes policymakers decide? Again, tougher to tell in reality than in these pages. Whatever factors are involved, however, they are seldom, if ever, merely the unanchored personal ambitions and craftiness that Webb posits.

INDEED, this novel is most objectionable not for its plot, which, however implausible, moves along with some vivid scenes, but for its portrayal of top officials as either substantively vapid (in the president's case) or morally corrupt (in nearly everyone else's case). When the battle begins in the Horn of Africa, the secretary of defense issues statements that are "a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called 'necessary, unconfirmable distortions.' Nonetheless, they would become the government's official pronouncement on the day's action." Since those statements do not convince for long, the secretary must go the next step: "to lie rather blatantly this time, to cover Mad Dog Mulcahy's tracks and his own involvement in the Eritrean debacle."

That type and degree of cynicism is unfair because it is thoroughly untypical. Those high in government, especially those having power over the lives of Americans in uniform, almost always try their hardest. The scheming Holcomb-esque characters are rare, and the sex-politics-power mix of Doc Rowland and Janet Holcomb, no matter how titillating when it happens, is a rarity. Feckless officials (here represented by Everett Lodge) are so soon cut out of policy-making that they matter little to government, which has a way of compensating for weakness in one office with strength in another. Ambition does counter ambition, much as Madison claimed in *The Federalist*, but within the executive branch as well as between the three branches.

Rather than lack of scruple, the problem with American government officials all too often is a lack of experience. But it is important to keep a sense of proportion and to remember that deficiency of experience is not peculiar to the United States. While, for example, the professionalism of the British is often contrasted with American amateurism, the difference does not seem nearly so stark to those who know the British system well. Lord Carrington, then British foreign minister, once said of his predecessors: "Quite a few of them do not seem to have been much interested in foreign affairs until they were made Foreign Secretary. After all, it is pot luck whether you become Foreign Secretary or not."

When pot luck selects, whether in Britain or here in United States, the system suffers. Many cabinet officers so selected become, out of necessity, chameleons—adopting the premises and prevailing culture of the agency they are supposed to lead. Government is thus divided between those who are able to direct their staffs (which takes prior knowledge and views in that area) and those who are led by their staffs. Too many appointees fall into the latter category.

Many of these are inexperienced officials who do not realize their inexperience and therefore lack the appropriate humility. After the tumultuous Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, who played a rather larger role than he should have at the summit, told the *New York Times:* "I don't take kindly to

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this criticism by people who have not examined my record. How much more experience do you have to have in foreign policy than I do to believe you are qualified?" He had virtually none. Those in high office who are both ignorant and confidently opinionated are the most prone to disaster.

Worst of all are those who check their convictions at the door when they enter government. Time and again in the 1980s, solid conservatives who wrote and lectured splendidly on the outside came to spiel "group-think" once inside the Reagan administration. Once burdened by responsibility, they seemed to rationalize that transformation as merely a sensible and responsible "conforming to reality." Yet reality should, to a significant extent, be shaped by those in authority. That is, after all, what they are there for.

WEBB DOES hit the mark in highlighting government's constant, sometimes frenetic, and often pointless motion. At one point in Webb's novel, the devious Defense Secretary Holcomb is advised by his yet more devious assistant secretary, " 'Don't bullshit a bullshitter, Mr. Secretary. All Rowland cares about is getting laid.' " Secretary Holcomb explains why, nonetheless, the president listens to committee chairman Rowland:

> "It's because Rowland has answers, and he knows how to get things done. Even when, sometimes, the wrong things get done, or the right things get done for the wrong reasons. Government requires motion, perhaps even more than wisdom. And there is a constant temptation to depend on those who know how to keep it moving, rather than demanding that it stay on a particular course."

That is perceptive, both in its emphasis on motion and its recognition that motion in politics—as in much else—may become an end in itself. General Joseph Stilwell's description of Washington in 1941 is still valid in its essentials today:

> My impression of Washington is a rush of clerks, in and out of doors, swing doors always swinging, people with papers rushing after other people with papers, groups in corners whispering in huddles, everyone jumping up just as you start to talk, buzzers ringing, telephones ringing, rooms crowded with clerks all banging away at typewriters.
>
> Someone with a loud voice and a mean look and a big stick ought to appear and yell, "Halt, you crazy bastards. Silence, you imitation ants. Now half of you get the hell out of town and the other half of you sit down and don't move for one hour." Then they could burn up all the papers and start afresh.

Commotion brings frustration and exhaustion, feelings best captured by another British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, who, one Friday evening, was confronted with a pile of papers requiring decisions, topped by a note from his private secretary: "The Secretary may wish to look at these over the weekend." Bevin wearily scrawled beneath: "A kindly thought, but erroneous."

Indeed, the strongest tie that binds top officials in any administration is neither ideology nor loyalty to their president. It is utter and permanent exhaustion. Hence, government demands stamina, persistence, and a firm sense of direction. As a New Mexico rancher once said about his work, "Ya just can't do it if ya have any quit in ya at all." Regrettably, too many who join government do have quit in them. The average time in office of a presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate has dropped in recent administrations. No corporation could be successful if its top decision-makers lasted only two years, but that has now become the average in the upper ranks of government—down from 2.8 years in Lyndon Johnson's time.

Usually that velocity is attributed to low pay. Indeed, many in the higher echelons of Republican administrations (which is what we have these days) regularly complain about the low salaries and high personal sacrifice. Such grumbling is unwar-

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ranted. A number of persons, including myself and others from the academic world, actually *increase* their incomes in government. Others, generally from the business world, made hefty amounts before joining; they presumably have savings to get them through the "lean years" of earning only $90,000 or $100,000 annually (a sum that 99-plus percent of Americans would be pleased to live on).

Besides, most people able to fill top government posts do not live merely, or even primarily, to maximize income. They seek other benefits including challenge, power, fame—and, let it be whispered, even in some instances a sense of contributing to their country. Many such benefits *can* be maximized in government, which is why scores of applicants seek any government opening.

Government could, of course, be a whole lot better. But instead of worrying about cleaning up the sex-politics-power corruption that preoccupies Mr. Webb, I would emphasize the need for such changes as emboldening appointees to push their substantive ideas, appointing those with such ideas and convictions in the first place, and then holding them responsible for what they do.

I remain unabashed in seeing a nobility in government work, despite the easy cynicism of books like *Something to Die For*. Perhaps Walter Lippmann said it best:

> Those in high places are more than the administrators of government bureaus. They are more than the writers of laws. They are the custodians of a nation's ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its permanent hopes, of the faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of individuals.□

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A Close-Run Thing

William E. Odom

WHAT THE world saw in the Gulf War was an overwhelming and impressive show of U.S. military force, a swift victory executed brilliantly. What the world did not see was the frightening potential for a tremendous military debacle. This possibility of failure was the result of neglect of key elements in our military force structure throughout the 1980s, and especially as Gorbachev began to wind down the East-West military competition. Understanding how this neglect nearly caused a disaster in the Gulf is essential in the debate over what kind of military the United States requires after the war with Iraq.

President Bush responded positively to the Saudi request for military forces to deter Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait by first dispatching the 82nd Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia. Tactical air wings quickly followed, but they were woefully short of munitions for attacking Iraqi armored formations. For two full months, U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia were without the means to stop an Iraqi tank offensive southward from Kuwait. Had that attack come, U.S. forces, compelled to debark under fire in whatever sea lift was available, would have faced a veritable Dunkirk.

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How was this critical period of vulnerability possible? The answer is found in the priorities and omissions in the congressional defense debate and in the programs the Defense Department presented to Congress over the past several years. The omissions, in particular, are key. Air and sea lift have drawn virtually no attention. True enough, Senator Nunn has periodically pressed the Department of Defense to address the strategic-lift programs, but with little effect.

Throughout August, Army heavy units with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles able to defeat Iraqi armor sat on the docks in the United States waiting for air lift. For every 300 tons of material ready for transport by air each day, only 100 tons could be lifted. Had the law authorizing the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) been fully used, this bottleneck could have been broken. The CRAF, however, cannot compensate for two other flaws in our military air-lift fleet. The C–141 fleet, the workhorse of transoceanic air movement, is approaching its physical life limit. Without major repair or replacement, C–141s will soon be unsafe to fly. The second problem is that the C–130 fleet is slowly declining in size through accidents and war.

The sea-lift bottleneck is another matter. Over its objections, in 1980 the Navy was forced to purchase eight SL–7 roll-on/roll-off fast ships as part of the support for the newly formed rapid deployment force (soon to become CENTCOM). They were supposedly ca-

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pable of moving one heavy Army division to the Persian Gulf in a little over two weeks. However, the SL–7s failed in this mission because some of them were in poor repair when the Gulf Crisis occurred. The "ready reserve fleet" was also slow in coming into service. Eventually, foreign carriers were used, though too late to prevent acute shortages in August. Even six months later, at the end of January 1991, U.S. ground forces and logistical support were still not ready in Saudi Arabia. Although other factors contributed to this delay, the pitifully inadequate sea- and air-lift capabilities carry the major blame. Because the Iraqis kindly remained in Kuwait, the United States was spared the humiliation of a major military disaster.

IN ADDITION to the lift problem, U.S. forces were plagued by a shortage of Army heavy divisions with M1A1 tanks, the only tank in our arsenal that clearly over-matches the Iraqi T–72. Both the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry Division, the first heavy forces to deploy, were short their third brigades. In each case, the third brigade was in reserve, unable to deploy without six to nine months' training. Eventually, when it was decided to build up an offensive capability, a full heavy corps had to be taken from Europe. In addition, M1A1 tanks had to be moved from Germany to Saudi Arabia to replace the M1s in the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The M1s have only 105-mm guns, in contrast to the 120-mm guns on the M1A1, and the M1s in those units were in poor repair, seriously worn from heavy training schedules.

Why were the Army heavy forces so small in number? Because they had been the "bill payers" for strategic and naval programs—key elements in last year's defense plan—and were in the process of being reduced even further. The 2nd Armored Division was partially demobilized, yielding one of its two active brigades to fill out the 1st Cavalry Division. The other, the Tiger Brigade, was used to reinforce the Marine divisions with some M1A1 tank capability.

Congress is partly to blame, given its penchant for putting Army heavy units into the National Guard. As a result, the ten National Guard divisions now include four heavy, five infantry (organized on a World War II pattern that became obsolete in the 1960s), and one light division (a smaller 10,000-man organization with no armor and very little tactical mobility). The savings from this transfer are nil for the first five years of the shift. Thereafter, reserve heavy divisions still cost about two-thirds of what active duty heavy divisions cost. In other words, the savings are small, and the National Guard divisions are not usable. Such realities, however, do little to deter the powerful National Guard and Army Reserve lobbies.

The Army itself is also to blame, for it took the mistaken view that Third World military contingencies could be met with "light" forces, and organized several new light divisions in place of the planned heavy modernization. Though the Army changed its mind in the late 1980s, it had already lost the budget battle for saving most of its heavy forces. As a result, the Army was able to deploy only about six heavy division equivalents to Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, they proved highly adequate because of a brilliantly conceived and executed operations plan that compensated for the poor ground force ratio between the coalition and the Iraqi army.

The Air Force, forced to choose between the B–2 and close air support, opted for the B–2 and other strategic systems. As a result, the Air Force found itself in less than full readiness for the Gulf Crisis. For example, its stocks of munitions—"smart" air-to-ground weapons—were in short supply. Every other theater in the world had to be robbed of its stocks for shipment to the Gulf. The A–10 squadrons, designed specifically for close air support and anti-tank missions, were late in deploying. Though the A–10 is an old aircraft, scheduled for retirement with no follow-on model replacement, it performed extremely well, especially in combination with attack helicopters, against Iraqi armored

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units. Will the A–10 now be sacrificed to strategic force modernization?

The Navy's penchant for a large carrier force did little to improve the military balance on the Arabian peninsula. Until carriers were moved into the Persian Gulf (in violation of long-standing Navy doctrine), they could bring little or no significant air power to bear on Iraqi forces. Even then, each carrier provides only forty ground attack aircraft. At the cost of at least $10 to 15 billion each, these aircraft carriers are a poor return on the money invested. If not a single carrier had been in the region, the course of the campaign would have been little affected. Naval air, according to Air Force Chief General Merrill McPeak, accounted for only 16 percent of the coalition air forces and less than 10 percent of the bombs dropped.

Fighting the Next War

DURING THE Cold War, the East-West competition imposed constraints on many dynamic forces. The absence of such constraints in the post-Cold War world portends *more* Iraq-like crises, not fewer. The next aggressor may not give the United States several months to mobilize and deploy its forces. Speed will acquire greater significance. The proliferation of modern weaponry in the Third World and elsewhere means that U.S. conventional forces will require constant modernization to sustain the edge enjoyed in the war with Iraq. At the same time, the probability of a major East-West war, one involving nuclear weapons, has declined significantly.

These changes in the international security environment demand a re-orientation in U.S. force structure to accompany a shift in emphasis to the most probable contingencies. In the fall and winter of 1989–90, U.S. defense policy focused primarily on strategic and naval programs (SDI, the MX, the Midget Man, the B–2); what forces, primarily Army, to put into reserve; and what programs to cut to pay for the maintenance of strategic programs. Largely ignored were such crucial areas as adequate air and sea lift and Army heavy forces. The Bush administration is now returning to these pre-Gulf War conceptions of force structure, when what is needed is an entirely new structure, a different emphasis, a new force-building goal.

A proper post-Cold War force-building goal would be a capability to move a heavy Army corps anywhere in the world in twenty days and to reinforce it with a second heavy corps in an additional thirty days. Given this force-building goal, the Defense Department would be compelled to shift its focus to key issues—strategic lift, heavy forces, and close air support.

Strategic Lift: A fleet of twenty-five to thirty roll-on/roll-off fast ships, like the SL–7s, could reach the Persian Gulf in about fifteen days' sailing time, allowing a few days for loading at each end. Troops would have to be air lifted. Of course, this force should have adequate tactical air support. Rapid deployment to the Persian Gulf is the most demanding contingency; the same capability would easily enable U.S. forces to reach any other region within the twenty-day limit.

Heavy Forces: The success of "smart weapons," such as cruise missiles, can be expected to prompt continued attention to them. Defense industries will lobby for them strongly. The United States will need them in much larger numbers than were available in the Gulf. When the search for "bill payers" begins, Army divisions and Army manpower may be the primary candidates. To cut the Army first, however, would be a mistake.

A major lesson from the war with Iraq ought to be that active component combat units are too few. By cutting three National Guard heavy divisions, the U.S. could add two active duty heavy divisions within the same budget outlays. Admittedly, a transition cost would have to be paid. Given the ten National Guard divisions, it is certainly possible to increase the active duty number by two or three. Only the four heavy National Guard divisions have adequate equipment for wartime mobilization. Although they made sense for a NATO contingency with long

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warning time, for post-Cold War crises they are of virtually no use in the reserves. As active divisions, they could prove critically useful.

More disturbing still is the plan to reduce the Army manpower level to 535,000 by 1995. Only 764,000 when the Gulf Crisis began, the manpower level subsequently rose to nearly 900,000 for that contingency. Now it is scheduled to fall to 660,000 by late 1992, and to 535,000 by 1995. And combat forces will drop to only twelve active divisions. The Army could not meet another such crisis at these much lower levels.

ALTHOUGH the Air Force and the Navy will experience cuts, neither will face anything like the planned Army reductions. In each service, a return to the old focus on strategic programs would save their force structures, which are made up largely of units of little use for Gulf-like wars.

The Marines are slated for only marginal reductions, less than 10 percent. A much larger cut, say, two of the four authorized Marine divisions, would make sense. Marine forces are neither heavy enough for such contingencies nor adequately equipped for inland and sustained operations. For the invasion of Kuwait they depended heavily on Army support units and were reinforced by the Army Tiger Brigade with its M1A1 tanks to provide adequate modern armored forces. Furthermore, their amphibious capability is becoming obsolete; there are better and easier ways to get ashore than to assault across beaches. The Marine Corps' mission deserves a fundamental review.

Social equity should not be a major determinant of force structure. Still, it is worth remembering that the scheduled manpower cuts will force thousands of regular and non-commissioned officers to leave active duty involuntarily, including many of those who performed so well in Desert Storm—an ironic reward for a job well done.

Close Air-Support: Desert Storm demonstrated three things that should drive more resources and doctrinal attention to the close air-support mission. First, it was a large factor in the success of the ground campaign, much larger than its traditional standing in Air Force priorities suggested it should have been. Second, the boundary between air and ground in air-land battle was blurred. Tank fire, artillery fire, attack helicopter fire, and close air support tended to be mixed, woven together to bring high concentrations of combat power on one point, then another, with great speed. Third, neither of these two developments would have been as effective if Iraqi tactical air defenses had not been suppressed. All three factors suggest much new work needs to be accomplished both in doctrine and in close air-support aircraft development.

Unfortunately, the Air Force has tended to slight close air-support in favor of other capabilities. Moreover, within the tactical Air Force, air-to-air fighters and interdiction bombing aircraft have consistently taken priority over close-support aircraft. The A–10 "Warthog," for all its excellent performance in Desert Storm, was scheduled to be pushed out of the active force. Rather than a modern replacement, the Air Force has tried to make the highspeed F–16 double as a ground-support aircraft. The result is a much reduced close air-support capability.

To its credit, Congress has tried to get the Air Force to give close air-support more resources and attention, even offering to pass a law that would shift the close air-support mission from the Air Force to the Army. Curiously, the Army demurred. Perhaps Congress should revisit this option and leave the Army no choice.

In addition, the SDI lobby will strive to exploit the success of the Patriot missile system for its budget. Yet the Patriot's success should prompt a major redesign of SDI, postponing attention to space-based systems in favor of an anti-tactical missile system and a point ground-defense system able to defeat ICBM RVs (re-entry vehicles) with non-nuclear kill warheads. One hundred launchers of such a system could be deployed within the limits of the present ABM Treaty. In other words, SDI should work on the end of the

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ICBM trajectory, moving upward toward mid-course intercept, and only much later trying to attack the boost phase.

One positive note concerning SDI is the so-called GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) idea, now gaining currency in the Defense Department under SDI Director Henry Cooper's leadership. It puts the emphasis on beginning with point defense and having the space component serve primarily a surveillance role. There is much to be said for this new SDI design, and it deserves strong support.

Can these goals be achieved within the present defense budget levels? Yes, if the reserve components are cut deeply, strategic forces made to pay, and the Navy carrier force cut by a third or more. If the lobbies for these "bill payers" cannot be resisted, then the defense budget will have to increase. Instead of resisting, the Navy and Air Force should use the end of U.S.-Soviet military competition, or at least the lengthy pause in it, to reshape their structures in light of new technologies. By the late 1990s, both services, especially the Navy, may require large resources for changing structure. The Navy's own cruise missiles raise serious questions about the viability of big carriers. So do accurate ballistic missiles. Land-based air forces with missiles have already become a threat to carriers. New diversity in submarines and surface combatants may be an answer to these problems.

Now is not the time to put large monies in some parts of Navy and Air Force procurement and force structures. Rather it is the time to pause and anticipate the twenty-first century's procurement needs. Chief among those needs is a shift in focus to a heavy air/land contingency force and sufficient lift to move it anywhere. Such capabilities were inadequate in the last war, but the United States triumphed nevertheless. While this reflected a brilliant performance on the part of the U.S. forces, it also involved a considerable element of plain luck. In the next war, the United States may not be so lucky.□

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Head-Hunting

Assassination As a Policy

Mark Falcoff

ONE OF THE sharper grace notes to the Gulf Crisis was the call by some members of Congress and a handful of editorialists to revive certain covert practices by the CIA, particularly political assassination. If Saddam Hussein were successfully eliminated before the January 15 deadline, so the argument ran, we might not need to fight at all. Even if this were not the case, with Saddam gone, the new Iraqi leadership (already purged repeatedly of any independent thinkers or military commanders of genuine capacity) would be utterly divided and confused, unable to mount a credible defense of their position in Kuwait. At their most extreme, advocates of assassination seemed to be suggesting that the United States (and its allies) could, with one well-placed bullet or bomb, win an entire war on the cheap.

This revived, briefly, an old argument about means and ends in American foreign policy (particularly as it affects intelligence operations), a debate one presumed had been put to rest more than a decade ago. Since the spectacular revelations of the Church Committee in 1975—published as *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*[1]—the use of assassination as an intelligence tool has been specifically prohibited by executive orders signed by Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. As far as we know, this prohibition has never been violated. Though the Reagan administration was frequently accused by congressional critics (sometimes quite intemperately) of violating legislative limits on the CIA's covert authority in Nicaragua, for example, it was never suggested that assassination had been revived or was being contemplated.

This should surprise no one: it is extraordinarily difficult to physically eliminate foreign leaders, so much so, in fact, that discussions over propriety are almost gratuitous. This might be regarded as the crucial finding of the Church Committee, which looked into CIA operations in the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Vietnam. While the report established that assassination was regarded as a legitimate tool of national policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, all the secrecy and derringdo amounted to a colossal waste of time and resources. None of the plots carefully constructed by the CIA went forward as planned, and the assassinations which did take place during that period were carried out either in spite of or beyond the control of its operatives, sometimes with decidedly negative results for U.S. policy and interests.

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[1]Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.

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To be sure, between the green covers of *Alleged Assassination Plots* there is enough material for several spy novels. Perhaps the most sensational details concern Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, whom the CIA repeatedly plotted to eliminate, not only providing potential assassins (including Mafia operatives) with high-powered rifles, but "poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination." One particularly droll note: CIA scientists even experimented with a drug that, they hoped, would make Castro's beard fall out. In the case of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, a special poison was developed that, introduced into toothpaste, was intended for placement in his private quarters. In neither case did the CIA succeed: Castro evaded eight different attempts and while Lumumba was killed by political rivals in early 1961, the Church Committee found "no evidence of CIA involvement in . . . bringing about [his] death."

In what today seems like an intolerably cynical effort to achieve ideological balance, the plot against Castro was matched by one against the right-wing dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. According to *Alleged Assassination Plots*, in March 1961 several key opposition leaders were to be provided by the CIA with three 30-caliber M2 carbines. In addition, they were promised several machine guns, which were duly sent to the country by means of the U.S. diplomatic pouch, along with other "small arms and sabotage equipment," early the following month. However, after the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba (which occurred shortly after the arrival of the lethal shipment), "there developed a general realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the vacuum which would be created." Consequently an order was sent out on April 17 that the conspirators stand down, and the CIA station chief in Santo Domingo was ordered to withhold the machine guns until further notice.

To the station chief's consternation, "the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States government." Trujillo was in fact ambushed and assassinated while being driven to his home town of San Cristóbal on the night of May 30, in an action that "closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to the American representatives in the Dominican Republic" and subsequently passed on to Washington. Nonetheless, the Church Committee found that while one or more of the carbines did find their way to the group that killed Trujillo, "the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns."

AN EVEN more bizarre set of circumstances surrounded the October 19, 1970 murder of General René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean army. On September 4, Dr. Salvador Allende, a Marxist physician, was elected president of Chile in a three-way contest in which he received a little more than a third of the votes. However, Chilean custom dictated that their congress (which was to meet on October 24) ratify whomever received a plurality. On September 15, President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to organize a military coup to prevent Allende from taking office. The idea was to overthrow the existing Christian Democratic government of President Eduardo Frei, which was concluding its six-year term, and after a very brief period of *junta* rule, to convoke new elections in which Allende would be forced to run again, this time against the still enormously popular Frei. (The existence of an interim "government," even one that lasted only twenty-four hours, would circumvent a constitutional prohibition against consecutive presidential terms.)

Unfortunately for the CIA and for Washington, President Frei was reluctant to be a party to the plot, and worse still, General Schneider refused to play the role assigned to him. The CIA therefore connived with some of his subordinates (as well as two different para-military groups) to have him forcibly

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kidnapped and sent off to exile in neighboring Argentina. With new army leadership, and President Frei compelled to bow to changing circumstances, the plan could go forward. As in the Dominican Republic, weapons were pouched to the station chief and distributed to one of two insurgent groups. However, the other insurgent group—with which the station had finally decided not to operate—nonetheless went ahead on its own. General Schneider resisted the attempt at abduction, and was mortally wounded in a struggle with his captors.

The impact of Schneider's murder, far from preventing Allende's accession to power some days later, helped to assure it. The entire country was shocked by the act of violence; the "constitutionalist" line in the army (of which Schneider himself was the strongest advocate) was reaffirmed; and the new commander, General Carlos Prats, proved with time to be Allende's most loyal (some would even say obsequious) supporter in the entire military establishment.

By the time the Church Committee had looked into the circumstances surrounding the murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on November 2, 1963, the Pentagon Papers had long been in the public domain. There was little, therefore, to add to the factual base: the United States had covertly encouraged (one might even say connived at) a military coup to remove the brothers Ngo, who were regarded as increasingly unpopular and therefore undermining the U.S. effort to help South Vietnam win the war against the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese insurgency.

Assassination, however, was neither contemplated nor desired by American authorities. The Church Committee found, in fact, that while Washington encouraged the coup itself, Diem's murder "appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup." Almost immediately the U.S. government recognized that things had gotten dangerously out of control. The CIA director cabled Saigon on November 5: "We cannot be in a position of actively condoning such a course of action." The issue was not merely one of appearances; with Diem's murder, South Vietnam lost the most able political leader it ever possessed. Today there is almost unanimous agreement among Vietnam scholars that not merely Diem's murder, but the decision to connive at his removal, was the single biggest mistake in U.S. policy throughout the entire period of our unfortunate association with that country.

As no two intelligence operations are exactly alike, one cannot be absolutely certain that an attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein would have failed. But what the record does show is that these plans are notoriously difficult to implement, often don't work, sometimes get out of control, or have unexpected (and undesired) consequences. To repeal the executive orders prohibiting assassination would not restore to our intelligence service a capacity it needs or probably could even successfully use: it would, however, enrich the arsenal of ideological weapons used by our enemies against the United States and its covert services. As the Gulf War demonstrated, there is no substitute for overt military power, applied directly and without ambiguity, if the national interest so requires. Certainly there is no reason to expend valuable political capital on behalf of policies that—if the past is any guide—don't work anyway.□

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No Screw-Up

Patrick Clawson

I WISH TO take issue with Paul Gigot's thesis that American policy toward Iraq in the 1980s constituted a terrible blunder.[1] I maintain that, even knowing what we know today, the U.S. policy of supporting Iraq against Iran from 1982 to 1988 was wise, on the grounds of both principle and *realpolitik*. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait gives no reason to regret this policy.

By supporting Saddam, the United States was upholding the principle of opposing aggression. That statement sounds outrageous to those who have only a sound-bite knowledge of the Iran-Iraq War, which, according to Gigot, holds that Iraq invaded Iran while the United States "publicly . . . remained neutral in the war but behind the scenes tilted sharply toward Iraq." In fact, the war went through two distinct phases, and U.S. policy during each phase was to oppose the invading nation.

In the first phase, from 1980 to early 1982, Iraq was clearly the aggressor; it indeed invaded Iran. Much as America disliked the Khomeini regime, much as relations were poisoned by the hostage affair, the United States took a clear stance against Iraq's aggression. When the war started in September 1980, the United States announced it "certainly would be strongly opposed to any dismemberment of Iran."[2] Steps were taken to hinder Iraq, including blocking the delivery of ship engines from the United States and pressuring Oman to keep out Iraqi planes that intended to attack Iran from Oman. During an October 1980 debate with Ronald Reagan, President Carter announced that the United States would sell arms to Iran as soon as the hostage crisis was resolved. On assuming the presidency, Reagan reversed this policy, but upheld the basic principle of no aid to Iraq. During the entire period that Iraqi troops were deep in Iranian territory, the United States provided no aid of any sort to Iraq.

The war entered an entirely new phase in 1982 and U.S. policy changed accordingly. In March of that year, the Iranians pushed the Iraqis back thirty miles, took 15,000 prisoners, and almost captured Saddam. Iraq responded by withdrawing voluntarily from Iranian territory (barring a few disputed areas). Saddam offered to make peace with Iran on exactly the terms that finally ended the conflict six years later;

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[1] "A Great American Screw-Up: The U.S. and Iraq, 1980–1990," *The National Interest* (Winter 1990/91).

[2] Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, quoted by Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Warns Iraq on Seizing Oil Regions," *New York Times*, September 29, 1980.

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that is, a return more or less to the status quo ante. Simultaneously, he abandoned much of his radical stance on foreign and domestic issues. In June 1982, a high-level Ba'ath Party meeting established a new policy—one that downplayed socialism, did not mention the liberation of Palestine, and emphasized Iraqi nationalism—that prevailed until the end of the war. In January 1983, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz visited Cairo, the first visit of a ranking Iraqi official since the condemnation of Sadat at the 1978 Baghdad summit. In short, Iraq seemed prepared to abandon aggression against Iran (though, as we now know, Iraq still harbored designs on its neighbors).

AFTER CHASING Iraqi troops off its soil, Iran debated during May and June 1982 whether to end the war. Some in the Iranian military argued for hot pursuit of the retreating Iraqi soldiers until Saddam was overthrown. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini refused this limited aim and rejected all peace proposals. He insisted instead on "War, War, War Until Victory," in the words of the slogans chanted at demonstrations over the next six years. On July 14, 1982, Iranian troops crossed into Iraq. The debate in Iran shifted to what the goals of its aggression should be: to annex Iraq, to form a union of the two countries, or to install by bayonet an Islamic regime in Iraq. The Iranians, like the Iraqis, had not learned that in the post–1945 world, open conquest is in bad form; a cloak of deniability is important. In order to minimize condemnation by other states, the preferred method of forcible expansion has been to create puppets through foreign-supported subversion.

U.S. aid to Iraq began after the Iranian invasion and accelerated as Iran penetrated deeper into Iraq. The first step was taken in March 1982, when Iraq was removed from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism. That December, as the burden of opposing Iranian aggression mounted, the United States extended to Iraq $300 million in agricultural credits to buy American rice and wheat. As Iranian battlefield victories continued, the United States stepped up its aid. In a symbolic gesture, full diplomatic relations with Iraq were restored in November 1984. More important, the United States permitted the sale of such previously embargoed dual-use equipment as planes with both military and civilian capabilities. When Iranian forces threatened to overrun Basra in 1986, the United States gave Iraq information from spy satellites. In brief, the more serious the threat from Iranian aggression, the more aid the United States supplied.

In addition to the principle of opposing aggression, U.S. policy toward Iran and Iraq was guided by geopolitical interests. The United States was determined to achieve two goals that did not always harmonize easily: first, to stop the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and second, to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the Gulf region. Prior to 1982, the predominant factor was concern about Soviet influence in Iraq, which relied on Moscow for nearly all its arms since sales of French and other European arms were small at that time. After 1982, when Saddam distanced himself from the Soviets, the United States shifted its attention more to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.

But the United States was prepared to shift sides again if Iran turned into a strategic asset instead of strategic dilemma. This was an important element in the Iran-*contra* affair. As that episode slips into the memory hole, those who should know better accept the superficial view that the affair was only about hostages and *contras*. For instance, the congressional committees investigating the Iran-*contra* affair largely ignored the major thrust of the documents prepared in early 1985 that called for an opening to Iran. Those documents, such as the June 1985 draft National Security Decision Directive that Secretaries Weinberger and Schultz criticized, argued that Iran was on the brink of turmoil from which the Soviets were placed to benefit and that the United States

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should therefore sound out Iran's leaders about forming a tacit anti-Soviet bloc.[3]

This quid-pro-quo was simple and cold-blooded: if Iran would downplay the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and emphasize opposition to communism, then the United States would aid Iran instead of Iraq. I see nothing wrong with that in theory, though the execution was naive and policy became dominated by bargaining over the release of the hostages.

The serious problems in U.S.-Iraqi relations do not date from the Iran-Iraq War, but appeared in 1989–90, when the Bush administration persisted with an outdated policy. During that period, there were certainly many illusions in Washington about Saddam, and these are well documented by Paul Gigot. He charitably attributes the persistence in a mistaken policy to lack of attention by key policy-makers who were unwilling to delegate authority.

To be fair, we Middle East specialists were convinced that the United States had time to work out how best to deal with Saddam. We reasoned that he would not take adventurous steps for at least a few years because Iraqis were war-weary and, more important, because Iraq was putting so much effort and money into weapons programs that would not reach fruition until the mid–1990s. Saddam, we thought, would wait until he had acquired the weapons of mass destruction on which he was spending billions: domestically produced missiles, chemical warheads, at least a crude nuclear bomb, and possibly biological weapons.

Harsh criticism of the State Department and the National Security Council for the policy during this period is more than appropriate. It is worth noting, however, that the Defense Department took seriously Saddam's threats against the United States, threats which became more explicit and more extreme month by month. In February 1990, it was reported that the Defense Department ordered the Central Command to make its primary focus a plan to repel an Iraqi invasion of the Gulf states, rather than a Soviet invasion of Iran.

The lesson to be learned from U.S. relations with Iraq is not that the United States backed a thug. There are many reasons to work with thugs, such as stopping worse thugs. The true lesson is that the world is more complex now than during the Cold War and policy can no longer be guided solely by the one basic question of what can be done to stop Soviet expansion. Though the problem of how to work with friendly tyrants certainly existed during the Cold War,[4] the new element now is that the United States can no longer judge friendships primarily in terms of containing that expansion. Samuel Huntington has formulated this change well:

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[3]On May 17, 1985, Casey received a memorandum from National Intelligence Officer Graham Fuller entitled "Toward a Policy on Iran." It said: "The Khomeini regime is faltering and may be moving towards a moment of truth; we will soon see a struggle for succession. The U.S. has almost no cards to play; the USSR has many. . . . It is imperative, however, that we perhaps think in terms of a bolder—and perhaps riskier policy which will at least ensure greater U.S. voice in the unfolding situation" (The Tower Commission, *Report of the Special Review Board* [New York: Bantam Books, 1987], p. 113). The June 1985 draft did not mention hostages. The sentence that justified arms sales reads: "[The U.S.] should encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran meet its important requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance and trade offers." CIA Director William Casey's comment on the draft was, "I strongly endorse the thrust of the draft NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward Iran, particularly its emphasis on the need to take concrete and timely steps to ensure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary of any change and turmoil in this critical country" (*Report of the Special Review Board*, p. 116).

[4]On this point, see Richard N. Haass, "Dealing With Friendly Tyrants," *The National Interest* (Spring 1989).

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> The international politics of the Persian Gulf could be an extreme foretaste—almost a caricature—of what global politics could be like in the future. . . . First, the relations between countries may be more volatile and possibly more duplicitous than they were in the Cold War years. . . . Second, relations among countries are more likely to be ambivalent; the world of "good guys and bad guys" will give way to a world of "grey guys."[5]

Unfortunately, I suspect that this history with Saddam will be a paradigm for future U.S. policy. That is, the United States will cling to alliances with what Huntington called "grey men" long after those ties become inimical to U.S. interests. Americans are not good at changing gears or directions. We do not like to admit that today's allies are in essence evil thugs with whom we cooperate only because the neighborhood is tough. I doubt that we will learn soon to be more nimble and devious.

I hesitate to prophesy about the Middle East, given the region's high standards for prophets, but I would suggest that the United States is headed toward problems by continuing to support several regimes that no longer fit our interests.

The first example is Pakistan. The United States had no choice but to work with the Pakistanis during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan because Pakistan provided the only route through which to transport aid to the Afghan rebels. But there is precious little reason to continue to support Pakistan now. India is the region's strategic prize, and India today is barely more anti-American than Pakistan. In addition, the United States has created the impression in world opinion that it stands behind Pakistan; this is dangerous, given that the United States lacks both the will and the military might to stop the Indian army if it decides to dismember Pakistan. The time to distance ourselves is now, before there is an Indo-Pakistani crisis. To wait for a crisis before making a clean break would leave the impression that the United States is abandoning an ally under siege.

The second case is Syria. To be sure, during the first month of the Gulf Crisis, Syrian troops were useful in solidifying the anti-Saddam coalition among Arabs. But the interests of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad are opposed to those of the United States on many issues. For instance, the aid that the United States pressured Saudi Arabia into offering Assad has been used to reactivate military divisions that were moved to reserve status during Syria's economic crisis in the mid–1980s. Assad is strengthening his military in order to dominate Lebanon more completely and also pose as the savior of Jordan, were that country to be overtaken by troubles, foreign or domestic. If the United States keeps quiet now or sends Assad the mixed signals given to Saddam pre-crisis, Assad could mistake U.S. distraction for tacit approval of his plans to intervene more actively in his neighbors' affairs.

The danger in the mistaken view that support for Saddam was "an American screw-up" from start to finish is that it reinforces the notion that if only presidents were smart enough, they could identify the white hats and the black hats. The problem is not that the United States supports some black hats in the misguided belief that they are white hats. Rather, it is that most foreign leaders wear grey hats. The United States must learn to work with some grey hats in order to oppose others—any alliances in these circumstances should be understood to be temporary. It is not a policy mistake to abandon one grey hat and to support his opponent; it is the inevitable result of living on the same planet as such tough guys.□

[5]Samuel Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* (January/February 1991).

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National Disinterest

Michael Lind

IN THE aftermath of the Gulf War, many who had opposed the military liberation of Kuwait could be heard criticizing the president for not committing American troops to combat in Iraq on behalf of the rebellious Kurds. If one Vietnam syndrome has been cured, another lingers: after the fall of Saigon, George McGovern, a harsh critic of American involvement in Vietnam, wanted the United States and other nations to invade Cambodia to liberate the Cambodian people from Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

Perhaps this simply represents a "genocide" exception to the non-interventionist norm of contemporary American liberalism. I suspect there is more to it than that. Underlying such paradoxical inversions of ordinary strategic thinking is an entire morality, a morality that equates the good with altruism, and evil with self-interest. The less a policy benefits the nation undertaking it, the nobler the policy and the nation. This might be called the politics of national disinterest.

The cult of national disinterest is not uniquely American. Modern Europeans have now surpassed Americans as purveyors of saintly sentiments in world affairs. The vital Wilsonian tradition of the United States notwithstanding, it is difficult to read the effusions of Genscher or Delors without reflecting that these days *realpolitik* finds more of a home on this side of the Atlantic. Power has matured America, while impotence has rejuvenated Europe. The chancelleries of Western Europe, of course, are full of statesmen solemnly announcing the determination of their states to surrender their statehood to this or that Whitmanian *En Masse*. More troubling is an inclination one finds at times in the writings of Central European intellectuals like Milan Kundera and Adam Michnik and observers of the region like Timothy Garton Ash. This is a tendency to draw a contrast between a global, or at least "European," loyalty, and a nationalism that is presumed to be a threat. To be sure, ethnic hatreds and statist economics in the former Soviet bloc should be discouraged. Still, it seems rather ironic that the nations of the East, having just regained their autonomy from a transnational empire spouting universalist rhetoric, should immediately be counselled to renounce or attenuate their particular identities in favor of a new universalism.

The equation of justice with altruism is so pervasive in public discourse that even self-described realists can find themselves maneuvered into taking one side of a supposed debate between "morality" and "the national interest." Needless to say, once realists allow the debate to be defined in such terms, they can hardly avoid sounding like the Grand Inquisitor. All too often, for example, realists claim that their views are based on a perception of "original sin." To

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suggest that man's evil nature forces us to settle for a second-best world of multiple independent communities is implicitly to concede, however, that a truly good world would resemble the utopias of Dante or Wendell Wilkie.

Such a concession is foolish. Pluralism, the political division and diversity of the world, is not an unfortunate necessity, but a positive good. The division of the world among independent power centers can only be justified, however, by a morality that does not find the model of moral behavior in prodigies of self-sacrifice. Elements of such a defense of moral self-interest can be found in the Western ethical tradition, for example, in the Catholic idea of "ordinate charity": your duties are first to yourself and your family, then to your friends and associates, then to your city and nation, and only then to mankind at large. Although duty, like gravity, may extend in theory across the universe, it becomes so quickly attenuated with distance that the duty of Americans to Tibetans—and of Tibetans to Americans—is as limited as the power of the moon to raise tides on Pluto.

This is surely for the best, because knowledge, like duty, diminishes with distance. As Joseph Schumpeter points out, "when we move still farther away from the private concerns of the family and the business office into those regions of national and international affairs that lack a direct and unmistakable link with those private concerns . . . the sense of reality is . . . completely lost." That is why, he maintains, most people attend to great world events with considerably less intellectual rigor than they bring to their jobs and hobbies. It follows that in some cases the duty of the prudent *and* moral statesman is to *reject* some humanitarian adventure favored by the public, on the grounds that it has neither a significant stake in the outcome nor a genuine understanding of the circumstances. At the risk of proposing heresy in an era in which *vox populi* is *vox dei,* one might suggest that in foreign affairs at least the government sometimes has a firmer sense of reality than the poll-answering public.

If the president had proposed imposing a surtax on income to pay for relief of the Kurds, and conscription to garrison Kurdistan, popular enthusiasm for the Kurdish cause would probably have dried up rather quickly. "In the United States, preserving one American life seems more important than saving hundreds, perhaps even thousands of Kurds," Steven V. Roberts complained in the *New Leader* in March. This is a fact; is it a reproach? Are the American people immoral because, like most peoples, they place the highest value on their own?

IT CAN be argued, of course, that responsibility increases with wealth and power. Both assets are produced, however, by careful husbandry, and by careful husbandry they must be preserved. As Edmund Burke observed, "In every arduous enterprise, we consider what we are to lose as well as what we are to gain; and the more and better stake of liberty every people possess, the less they will hazard in a vain attempt to make it more." The more one has, the more one has to lose: Burke's argument against risky attempts to increase freedom marginally in a good society applies with even more force to riskier attempts to install freedom in bad societies.

Does this make a secure, wealthy country nothing more than a version of Wagner's Fafnir, a great reptile grumbling "Leave me be!" as it coils atop its glittering hoard? If the wealth of the nation were the wealth of the government, perhaps the accusation of selfishness could be made. But surely one of the basic premises of our republic is that the treasure and blood of the nation are the trust of the government and not its property. The government stands in a fiduciary relationship to the people. What would one think of a banker who considers it ignoble to make a profit for his clients through prudent investments, and prefers to lavish their funds on the needy?

The statesman as banker is admittedly less inspiring than the statesman as knight or saint, notwithstanding the military successes

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of mercantile republics from Athens and Rhodes to Venice and the Netherlands. In the *Götterdämmerung* of the Third Reich, though, one can perceive the consequences of an attempt to revolutionize a modern society around warrior values. The rule of the socialist saints in the Soviet Union and other communist countries proceeded from terror to moral as well as material bankruptcy. The solvent, it appears, shall inherit the earth; in this light, the multiple meanings of "interest" might be reflected upon, profitably.

THE CORPORATION—the body politic—that makes a profit (often at the expense of others) and shares it on the basis of membership, not need, is one of the oldest models of political society. An even older model is the family. From the universalist point of view, nations look very much like families, entirely too much, in fact, so that nationalism is suspect as a form of nepotism. Seen from the vantage-point of the family, the state looks much more abstract, more universal. Indeed, the partial transfer of loyalty from Montagues and Capulets to something as abstract as Italy is no small achievement of the moral imagination. In their hurry to get on with a merger of the entire human race, advocates of national disinterest all too often demean the effort involved in persuading, say, a Portuguese-American in Massachusetts that he has something morally significant in common with a Chinese-American in Seattle—that is to say, nationality. It cost the United States a bloody Civil War and generations of racial and regional strife to achieve even the "narrow" nationalism that put a Colin Powell and a Norman Schwarzkopf together in uniform at the head of a victory parade.

Even the small-scale cosmopolitanism of the nation-state is difficult to sustain. Consider two contemporary democracies, India and Germany. India's peace and unity are threatened by new generations of Indians for whom ethnic and religious identities are more important than any abstract sense of "Indianness." In Germany a different phenomenon has produced somewhat similar results. An American observer of German politics can find it difficult to sympathize with the grudging attitude of many prosperous West Germans toward reunification. Reunite the Fatherland? Sure, as long as my middle-class subsidies are not threatened. Consumerism and welfarism can be solvents of national identity as effective as tribalism.

The proponents of a politics of national disinterest may have it wrong, then. They see a world in which the progressive plans of altruistic universalists are held back by retrograde nationalists, whether in Washington or Sofia. It may be, however, that this is an issue only for a very small intelligentsia. The most important moral and political struggle in the world today may be between relatively selfless nationalism and relatively selfish parochialisms, of religion, race, class, region.

Those who identify state morality with state altruism are not dangerous because they are likely to bring about a world unity which is undesirable as such, whatever its character. There is not the slightest chance of that happening in the conceivable future. Rather, the politics of national disinterest is threatening because its proponents, while failing to create genuine transnational loyalties, may well succeed in attenuating, even destroying, the attachment of people to the largest practically effective moral community, the nation-state. The danger, in other words, is that the de-nationalization of, say, Canada, will not produce good North Americans or Westerners or world citizens, but only parochial provincials. If the nation-state is morally discredited, the beneficiary may be not mankind but class and tribe. It would not be the first time that a sentimental conception of human life inadvertently encouraged the very passions it sought to suppress.□

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
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